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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Good afternoon.

Welcome to the

4

second hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on California Public

5

Utilities Commission Reforms.

6

The Subcommittee was formed in December, both in

7

response to concerns over improprieties in the Commission's

8

so-called "IRD" telephone decision, and because of my

9

long-standing interest in ensuring a fair process at the PUC.

10

I have often said that a fair process at the PUC is

II

the basis for making good decisions.

12

credibility and integrity of the institution are always subject

13

to question.

14

that I have disagreed with, but I am usually satisfied that the

15

decisions were reached in a fair manner.

16

concerned that, at least in some cases, neither the process nor

17

the outcomes of cases could be considered fair.

18

Without a fair process,

Over the years, there have been many decisions

Lately, I have been

At our first Subcommittee hearing in January, we

19

discussed the formation of the Advisory Group to the

20

Subcommittee, Chaired by former PUC President Don Vial.

21

Advisory Group is made up of ten distinguished members who bring

22

with them a wealth of knowledge and experience and a broad

23

breadth of perspectives.

24

The

Today we will hear the Advisory Group's

25

recommendations for PUC reforms.

26

reaction to these recommendations and other proposals for PUC

27

reform.

28

We will also hear the PUC's

It is my intention to take the best of these

2
proposals and fold them into legislation that I have already
2

introduced.

3

consider which proposals they support, and we can move forward

4

with legislation before the full Committee.

5

I hope the other Subcommittee Members will also

I have introduced two PUC reform bills.

SB 1956

6

would clarify the applicability of the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting

7

Act for the PUC.

8

meetings should be public, and put into statute the opinion of

9

the Attorney General that serial, rotating, or seriatim

10
II

It would require a presumption that all PUC

meeting~

are not allowed.
My SB 1957 has three provisions:

it bans ex parte

12

contacts after the ALJ proposed decision is released; it

13

requires that substantive alternatives to ALJ decisions be

14

public for 30 days before a vote; and it strengthens the

15

independence of the Division of Ratepayer Advocates.

16

In addition, all 11 Members of the full Committee

17

have co-authored a spot Committee Bill, SB 1938, to allow

18

noncontroversial consensus items to move forward expeditiously.

19

I hope we can quickly identify these consensus issues.

20

As the background paper discusses, several other

21

Legislators have introduced PUC reform legislation this year.

22

This shows me that this issue has received wide attention, and

23

that the Legislature is serious about passing responsible

24

reforms this year.

25

A disturbing issue has recently come to my attention

26

that is related to the Subcommittee's topic.

27

that the PUC Commissioners held two secret meetings in February,

28

with no public notice or access.

I have discovered

This appears to violate the

3

Bagley-Keene Act.

According to the Attorney General's Office,

2

these meetings, quote, "should be conducted in open public

J

session," end of quote.

4

This development strengthens my resolve to tighten

5

the Bagley-Keene Act to require all Commission meetings to be

6

public.

7

The Attorney General's letter is available in the

8

hearing room today, and I intend to question Commissioner

9

Fessler on this topic.

10

Today's hearing is an important step in our process

II

of considering PUC reforms.

12

former PUC President Don Vial, who is chairing the Advisory

13

Group.

14

We will start by hearing from

Before we start, I'd like to announce that we will be

15

allowing public comment at the end of the agenda today.

16

wishing to publicly

17

during the hearing with the Sergeant.

addr~ss

Anyone

the Subcommittee should sign up

18

Don, thank you for appearing here today.

19

understand that the Advisory Group has held four meetings, the

20

last one just yesterday.

21

time to prepare a formal paper on your recommendations.

22

I

I understand that you may not have had

I hope you can provide us today with at least your

23

understanding of the issues that were discussed, and after your

24

presentation, we'll allow any other Advisory Group members here

25

today to make comments.

26

repeat what we've already heard, but simply provide further

27

information about areas where there may not be consensus.

28

However, such comments should not

Please start by telling us about your process, and

4

then tell us your recommendations.

And my question is whether

2

or not this paper that you're going to present to us takes care

3

of all of the consensus recommendations, as well as others?

4

MR. VIAL:

Well, I'm pleased to report that we have a

5

document that has been prepared, and it's in your hands.

6

25 pages, and it is more than just my version of what happened.

7

I

believe it truly represents a consensus of what we have done.

B
9

It's

However, it is a preliminary report.

It is subject

to further review and augmentation, as well as editorial

10

changes, but we did pull together a specific document for you.

II

We're not

12

I'm not winging it today.
And as you indicated, the report is organized around

13

an agenda, or a framework, that we adopted at a meeting on

14

January 17, 1994, and which we reported to you at your meeting

15

on January 25th.

16

full days of meetings on February 7th and 14th, and then again

17

yesterday.

18

January 25th, when we gave you our framework, we have produced

19

this document that is before you.

20

Subsequent to that, the working group held two

So, within the six weeks since that meeting on

And as I indicate, it's subject to further review and

21

augmentation, as well as editorial change; however, it

22

represents the consensus views of our Advisory Group.

23

And I would -- the report is organized around those

24

--that six-question framework, and I'd like to take you through

25

the bulk of this report.

26

present in executive summary, because it's mostly summary in the

27

way it's written.

28

you understand what we are recommending here.

This is not a report that is easy to

So, I'm going to take the time to make sure

5

So, under the first category, the first question,
2

"How can Commissioners effectively utilize their resources,

3

exercise responsible policy discretion, and make informed

4

decisions," we have come to these general conclusions .

.5

We agreed, whatever the cause, that there has been a

6

breakdown in the case and issues management systems which in the

7

past have worked reasonably well for Commissioners to function

8

as decision makers in a strong working relationship

9

staff.

10

We have no desire to assess a blame.

CPUC

w~th

With the

II

benefit of hindsight, it is not surprising that some mishaps

12

should occur, given the pressing need of the Commission to

13

confront the necessity of structural and procedural reforms to

14

keep pace with the competitive restructuring of regulated

15

utilities.

16

What is important to learn, and I want to emphasize

17

this, what is important to learn from the mishaps in addressing

18

-- is to address real problems rather than chasing symptoms.

19

And I urge you, in preparing the legislation, that you not chase

20

symptoms, and that you look at this report in terms of an effort

21

to identify re·al problems that require attention.

22

So, what is most basic to our report is a framework

23

for the _Commission itself to be on top of the decisions that are

24

involved in managing its caseload and managing issues.

25

there is a consensus that high priority must be given to

26

establishing a case and issues management system that clearly

27

involves the President's office and other Commissioners, with

28

So,

top staff people, in addressing the key management decisions

6
required to carry out the Commission's work plan.

This would

2

include, among other responsibilities, preliminary scoping of

3

issues and cases, selecting forums for record development and

4

decision making, determining when full panel hearings will

5

facilitate development of the reqord and expedite decisions,

6

establishing time frames for decisions, and otherwise serving as

7

the top management policy unit to handle problems when case

8

management systems break down.

9

There is agreement that the unit would be called the

10

Case and Issues Management Forum, and I have attached to the

II

report -- we have attached to the report a diagram of how the

12

Forum relates to the Commission and other staff units.

13

Now, I want to go over some important characteristics

14

of the Forum, what it would include.

15

look at the very end, at that diagram that's attached to the

16

report.

17

You might want to take a

It must include participation of the President and

18

other Commissioners' offices to the extent permitted by

19

Bagley-Keene, or as Bagley-Keene might be amended.

20

to discuss this further later on.

We're going

21

The Strategic Planning Unit is to be the catalyst for

22

breathing life into the Commission's required work plan, drawing

23

on internal CPUC resources as well as external resources to help

24

frame broadly based alternative strategies for focusing the

25

Forum in confronting its issues and case management

26

responsibilities.

27

28

In addition to Commissioners' offices, staff
participation would include the Commission's two exempt

7

employees -- the Executive Director and the General Counsel -2

and the chiefs of the various divisions.

)

point out, and this will be discussed later, there is no

4

consensus regarding inclusion in the Forum of ORA as a ratepayer

5

advocate unit within the Commission.

6

along what the issues are in that matter.

However, I want to

I will explain as we go

7

Also to be included are how management systems would

8

be linked to the Forum for carrying out the policies adopted by

9

the Forum, including management systems which provide access to

10

resources needed by Commissioners to exercise responsible policy

II

discretion, carry out their responsibilities, and to make

12

informed decisions.

13

The Forum would have available to it a wide variety

14

of record development options for discussions -- for decisions

15

to be made by Commissioners.

16
17

I have to put on my shades, I have to apologize, in
order to see better.

18

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

19

MR. VIAL:

Just be comfortable.

These options for record development as

20

the essential base for exercising public trust in the decision

21

making process would continue to be managed and implemented

22

through an expanded array of administrative law forums housed in

23

the ALJ Division, which should be renamed the Division of

24

Administrative Proceedings, called DAP, D-A-P.

25

would include all forms of adjudicatory-type proceedings with

26

ADR alternatives, a full range of rule making proceedings for

27

policy decisions, along with decision preparation assistance,

28

which would include document writing and the development of

The options

8

alternative decisions as desired by Commissioners based on the
2

developed record for the type of proceeding used.

3

Now, let me also talk about the shift that is going

4

on from quasi -- toward quasi-legislative decision making on

5

rules for policy development.

6

There's a strong consensus that the mix of

7

quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial proceedings is shifting

8

toward more quasi-legislative decision making.

9

to add that it must be recognized that the shifting could have a

However, we want

10

transitional impact.

11

market-oriented form of regulation, there will continue to be

12

quasi-judicial cases as the Commission is presented with claims

13

of anti-competitive conduct and violations of newly established

14

rules.

15

Once a shift has been made to a more

There's strong consensus that rule making proceedings

16

should be utilized by the Commission for resolving issues of

17

policy,

18

rule making is clearly not feasible.

19

rathe~

than relying on adjudicatory proceedings, unless

There is also support, but not consensus, that the

20

use of rule making for policy decisions be required by a

21

statutory presumption that could be overridden by the Commission

22

only for sufficient reason.

23

calling your attention to a possible statutory presumption.

So, that is one area where we are

24

There is agreement that the utilization of a broad

25

array of administrative law forums for record development and

26

sound decision making requires the following:

27

given to identifying and distinguishing between issues of policy

28

and fact; recognition that many issues can be resolved without

more attention be

9

major policy decisions; and recognition that the record is too
2

often incomplete when issues come to a head, requiring more

3

timely status conferences in shaping the record for decisions

4

and for the considerations of alternatives in the decision
making process.

6

I want to go into this a little more deeply later.

7

There is general agreement that possible modification of

8

Bagley-Keene to accommodate Commissioner discussion on matters

9

that involve pre-action management of issues and cases through

10

the recommended Forum.

II

of the Forum be public in the traditional sense, there is

12

general agreement that the subject areas under consideration and

13

actions of the Forum be made public as I will discuss later

14

under Section 5 in the question framework.

While there's no consensus that meetings

15

The second question that we have addressed ourselves

16

to is, "What is within the individual Commissioner's ability to

17

shape the decision making process?"

18

assigned Commissioner system.

19

And first we address the

While it is recognized that the current assigned

20

Commissioner system is embedded in the CPUC's tradition of

21

regulating monopoly utilities primarily through the adjudicatory

22

proceedings that are both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial,

23

there is consensus that the system is still viable in the

24

current regulatory restructuring environment, but that it needs

25

to be strengthened to involve assigned Commissioners more

26

effectively in the development of cases, whether they are rule

27

-- be rule making or adjudicatory/ADR proceedings, and in

28

bringing them forward with a complete record for decisions.

10

Assigned Commissioners should have early and
2

continuous oversight involvement with ALJs or other advisory

3

staff persons designed [sic] to work with them.

4

agreement:

5

under overall Forum management is critical; that greater use of

6

full panel hearings at the outset of proceedings, or when

7

appropriate, would strengthen the assigned Commissioner system,

8

that assigned Commissioners be required

9

case status sessions with ALJs or other advisory staff assigned

There is

that early scoping of issues for record development

be encouraged to hold

10

to the proceeding; that rule making be assigned -- by assigned

II

Commissioners affecting the development of the record or other

12

important case handling decisions be known in advance to other

13

Commissioners; that alternatives to proposed decisions developed

14

by assigned Commissioners be record-based, with access to all

15

staff recourses as required by Commissioners to exercise

16

judgment .i n interpreting the record and preparing the

17

alternatives; and specifically, that assigned Commissioners and

18

other Commissioners who prepare principal alternates all have

19

access to document writing assistance in the ALJ Division, or

20

what we call the DAP, as well as with other appropriate staff in

21

the CACD.

22

That's made clear in the outline of the Forum, where

23

we have at the bottom to show within DAP, there is the

24

Alternative Document Writing Unit.

25

Also with reference to access to staff resources, we

26

have the following observation.

27

Commissioners can have access to the advisory resources they

28

need to effectively manage the cases, develop fully adequate

There is consensus that

11

records for decision making, and the exercise of policy
2

discretion, including the development of alternative proposed

3

decisions, without directly bringing ALJs and other resources

4

into the offices of the individual Commissioners or assigning

5

such staff to individual Commissioners.

6

Section 6, there is agreement that such concentration of

7

resources would make it more difficult for the Commissioners to

8

function together as a Commission and would be

9

counter-productive in terms of efficient organization and the

As discussed further in

10

use of staff resources.

11

reassign staff to Commissioners' offices, but to make staff more

12

useful to individual Commissioners.

13

substantially more detail later on.

14

The organizational challenge is not to

And I will go into that in

Next, we also discussed ORA's role is going to be, we

15

think, subject to change.

16

pursue the long-term interest of all ratepayers evolved out of

17

an adjudicatory model.

18

proceedings shifts from quasi-judicial to quasi-legislative,

19

with greater or nearly exclusive reliance on rule making

20

proceedings for policy decisions, the role of ORA is likely to

21

go through some modifications.

There is agreement that ORA's role to

It is further agreed that as the mix of

22

With greater reliance on rule making, the structure

23

of ORA needs to be re-examined, since its dominant adversarial

24

role may undergo some changes.

25

First, there is general agreement that ORA staff

26

should not -- should not -- be given greater advocacy

27

independence within the CPUC, such as independent authority to

28

appeal Commission decisions or the appointment of ORA's chief by

12

an outside appointing power.
2
3

Such changes require moving ORA

out of the CPUC, which we oppose.
While maintaining its independence for representing

4

the long-term interests of all ratepayers, the desired

5

alternative would be to facilitate ORA becoming an effective

6

representative of ratepayer interests in rule making proceedings

7

which are predominantly quasi-legislative rather than

8

adjudicatory.

9

One view is that ORA's role in helping the CPUC carry

10

out its public responsibilities in rule making proceedings may

II

require some ORA staff persons to function as ratepayer

12

advocates in both adjudicatory and quasi-legislative rule making

13

decisions, while other ORA personnel are made available as

14

advisors to Commission officers.

15

Another more opposing view, primarily of intervenors

16

and utilities, is that ORA should not be made available as

17

advisors to Commissioners' offices on terms different than those

18

on which representatives of other interested parties are allowed

19

to advise Commissioners.

20

a strong ORA distinct from a CACO.

21

The viewpoint of intervenors supports

The ex parte implications of Commissioner-ORA

22

contacts are to be discussed further in Section 6 that I will

23

get to, for this is not the end of our discussion of ORA.

24

Now, also, it's important to emphasize protecting

25

public interests under a broader array of proceedings that we

26

are advocating be available to the Commission.

27

consensus that as the role of adjudication diminishes both in

28

fact, in relation to greater use of rule makings for policy, and

There is

13

by ADR applications within adjudicatory proceedings, there is a
2

heightened need to make sure that the public interest is being

J

protected in all proceedings.

4

become the basis for greater use of ADR or other alternatives,

5

such as developing new options for rule making regarding policy

6

determinations as market forces are unleashed.

7

Shortages of staff must not

The assigned Commissioner system must give high

8

priority at all times to assuring public confidence in all types

9

of CPUC proceedings, particularly in developing and utilizing a

10
II

solid record for decision making.
The DRA, representing the interests of all

12

ratepayers, along with the Commission itself, needs to give

13

special attention to the public interest being fully protected

14

in ADR, alternative dispute resolution, in all party

15

settlements, in assisting a large spectrum of public interest

16

and in assisting a large spectrum of the public interest to

17

participate in proceedings such as rule making, that can be more

18

friendly to participation than CPUC adjudicatory proceedings.

19

What we're trying to point out here is that people

20

that practice before the PUC are well-schooled in its legalistic

21

judiciary system.

22

that are really blocked out of participating.

23

more rule making for policy decisions, you really are basically

24

opening the door to participation of the public, and we want to

25

make sure that that's encouraged.

A lot of people who are uncomfortable with
As you move into

26

Turning now to question number three, "How can

27

Commissioners follow procedures which give them necessary

28

decision making authority without undermining the checks and

14

balances of the decision making process, and what should those
2
3

procedures be?"
First let me pick up again on record-based decisions

4

and procedural safeguards.

5

consensus that Commissioners must feel comfortable in working

6

with a broad array of proceedings, not just adjudicatory

7

proceedings.

8

type of proceeding used, is that decisions must be made on the

9

basis of the record that has been developed with broad and

10
11

As I have indicated, there is strong

The corollary to that consensus, regardless of the

effective participation of the public.
Within the above broad consensus, there is

12

substantial agreement on procedural protections and safeguards.

13

While moving toward reliance on rule making for policy has

14

become a necessity, development of the rule making record must

15

include procedural safeguards that are at least as strong, if

16

not stronger, than those relied upon in adjudicatory

17

proceedings.

18

Beyond traditional notice requirements, there is

19

consensus that a decision in a rule making must address every

20

issue raised, as well as inputs received in writing, indicating

21

acceptance or rejection of whatever's being proposed.

22

There is agreement also that since distinctions

23

between adjudicatory and rule making proceedings are being drawn

24

largely on the basis of the use of the latter for policy

25

determinations, it is essential that workable criteria be

26

developed to determine how policy considerations should be

27

identified for rule making.

28

assumed by the Forum, perhaps with the assistance of changes in

This is another function to be

15

the Rules of Practice and Procedure.
2

There is agreement also that present OII and OIR

3

proceedings are not adequate for rule making that open the door

4

to broader public interest participation.

5

that new forms of policy proceedings need to be developed, both

6

formal and informal, including the allowance of petitions for

7

rule making, the use of notices of proposed rule making, and

8

other adaptations which focus on an initial statement of policy

9

direction as the basis for rule making and the adoption of

10
II

There is consensus

policies.
I'm going to turn now to the necessity of taking a

12

fresh look at ex parte concerns.

13

now; I'm going to pick it up later in more detail.

' 14

I'm going to touch on this

Refining the use of rule making for policy and

15

narrowing the area of adjudicatory proceedings requires a fresh

16

look at how ex parte concerns are handled.

17

in Section 6, quasi-legislative rule making proceedings for

18

policy development should be less stringent on ex parte contacts

19

than proceedings that are more clearly quasi-judicial.

20

former case, ex parte rules either could be relaxed or retained

21

only on a disclosure basis.

22

quasi-judicial, the ex parte rules should be stricter.

23

will pick this up in more detail under Section 6.

24

As discussed further

In the

As proceedings become more clearly
And I

Now, the fourth question was, "What decision making

25

tools should the Commission have at its disposal besides the

26

traditional formal hearing process and alternative procedures

27

for decision making and dispute resolution that have been

28

developed and utilized over the past several years?"

16

So first, let me turn to the adjudicatory model and
2

ADR options within the adjudicatory model.

3

Where the adjudicatory model is used for decision

4

making, a number of ADR options for record development are

5

already either being developed, or are in use by the CPUC.

6

I would urge you in this connection to look at the proceedings

7

on CPUC full panel hearing on ADR on October the 12th, 1993, and

8

the background papers that were prepared by the staff.

9

are excellent documents to tell you what is now going on in

10

alternative dispute regulation in adjudicatory proceedings.

II

And

Those

But as indicated previously, a concomitant to the

12

expanded use of market forces in the regulatory process has been

13

a discernible shift toward quasi-legislative administrative

14

decision making.

15

systems, however, there is still extensive use being made of the

16

adjudicatory model in rate making proceedings which involve

17

substantial quasi-legislative fact finding as a basis for

18

decisions, as well as considerable dependence on the

19

adjudicatory proceedings for policy making.

In the transition to market driven regulatory

20

There is consensus that not all policies can or

21

should be developed in an over-arching policy statement or

22

follow-up rule making.

23

doesn't mean that only rule making should be utilized for policy

24

making.

25

The shift is in that direction, but that

In separating policy development from implementing

26

proceedings, it must be recognized that there are policies that

27

have to be developed to guide an implementing proceeding.

28

cases by their very nature include many issues which have policy

Rate

17

content.

For example, when an area rate analysis is undertaken

2

in an electric utility proceeding.

1

issues should be taken up and resolved on a policy basis during

4

a policy phase of a proceeding.

5

such a case would be expected to work with the ALJ to provide

6

for briefs on the scope and nature of the policy issues, working

7

together to define the policy direction of the case so that all

8

five Commissioners could vote in the policy phase of the case

9

prior to making implementation decisions.

10

11
12

The assigned Commissioner in

Now, I'm talking about a traditional kind of rate
making cases to the extent that that still goes forward.
Now I turn to the conference hearing model as an

13

option for resolving factual issues.

14

within the adjudicatory model.

15

As a general rule, such

Again now, I'm talking

There is also agreement that the conference hearing

16

model can be an effective alternative to the more traditional

17

courtroom model of prepared testimony and cross-examination in

18

an adjudicatory proceeding.

19

guidelines, priority should be given in such adjudicatory

20

proceedings to avoid as much as possible the more traditional

21

courtroom method of resolving factual issues and to utilize the

22

conference hearing alternative wherever feasible.

23

In accordance with Forum

The Commission, as you know, normally conducts

24

adjudication in a traditionally adverse, courtroom style

25

style mode, specifically in highly complex economic

26

determinations such as rate making.

27

that it is legally obligated to use this approach, although it

28

is unclear from existing statutes and procedural regulations.

The Commission believes

18
In any event, it is part of the Commission's culture to use the
2
3

adjudicatory process.
Under the traditional approach, expert witnesses give

4

direct testimony in writing -- in written form prior to the

5

hearing and are then cross-examined by various parties.

6

approach may well be useful in enforcement cases where the

7

issues boil down to who is telling the truth and evaluating

8

states of mind.

9

certainly not the most efficient way of determining economic

10
11

This

However, it is not always the best and

facts or setting policy.
It would be desirable to have an alternative

12

adjudicatory process that would be less formal, less

13

judicialized, quicker, cheaper, more accessible to non-lawyers.

14

And that's important if you want greater participation in PUC

15

proceedings.

16

An important recent innovation in administrative law

17

is the conference hearing.

18

State Administrative Procedure Act of 1981, and different

19

versions of it exist in a number of states.

20

It is provided for in the Model

Under the conference hearing model, witnesses do not

21

testify and are not cross-examined.

22

written statements.

23

own statements, agreeing or disagreeing with experts.

24

parties, or nonparties if the Commission so desires, can make

25

informal oral statements.

26

represents a hybrid between adjudication and rule making.

27

28

Instead, they submit

Other parties are welcome to submit their
All

Thus, the conference hearing

It is like rule making in that it dispenses with
trial-type procedure, but it is like adjudication because

19

adjudicatory protections continue to apply.

An ALJ presides and

2

must write a proposed decision based on an exclusive record; ex

3

parte contracts are restricted or prohibited; separation of

4

functions applies.

5

The PUC should have the ability to use conference

6

hearings in appropriate cases, particularly where the facts at

7

issue are primarily matters of policy or expert opinion.

8

California statutes -- this goes to your ball park -- the

9

California statutes should be amended to make clear that the

10

conference hearing procedure is available to the CPUC.

11

The Commission would not be required to use

The

12

conference procedure.

13

cross-examination in appropriate cases, or in exploring

14

particular issues of fact or policy.

15

proposal, conference proceedings would become part of the

16

arsenal of techniques the Commission could employ to do its

17

work.

18

It could opt for the use of

However, under our

I want to turn now to the use of workshops.

The

19

growing use of workshops in recent years has cut across a wide

20

range of decision making proceedings.

21

workshops have become a useful and established part of the ADR

22

process.

23

groundwork for advancing settlements, to implement orders of

24

the Commission, or to refine or shape issues prior to

25

evidentiary hearing.

26

There is agreement that

They have been used, for example, to lay the

What is clear is that the workshops are useful as a

27

precursor to decision making.

28

making, but rather decision facilitating forums.

As such, they are not decision

20

There is a clear need for the purpose of workshops to
2

be carefully identified at the time of their establishment

3

pursuant to directives included in Commission decisions and/or

4

developed by the Forum to guide usage as part of specific case

5

and issues management strategies.

6

Further, the parties involved in

workshop~

often

7

desire the outcome -- that an outcome which leads to settlement

8

-- should lead to settlement, which we would encourage.

9

However, there is agreement that settlement negotiations should

10

be distinguished from workshops, that Commission rules governing

II

the submission of settlements are essential, and that workshop

12

records should not be viewed as settlement documents.

13

Workshops should be viewed as purely informal

14

proceedings which, among other uses, should serve to effectively

15

broaden the options available to the Forum in carrying out its

16

case and issues management responsibilities.

17

We suggest the adoption of workshop guidelines, and

18

we lay out very specifically how to look at those guidelines.

19

The Forum may decide that certain issues should be

20

referred to workshops for a variety of purposes and at different

21

points in time.

22

might be used outside a docket proceeding in pre-Aecision; we

23

give examples there.

24

post-decision, and also while on ongoing docket proceeding

25

[sic].

26

be applied, how workshops might

27
28

And we give examples.

We lay out how they

Another, an outside of docket proceedings,

So, we give details on how to-- how this criteria might
b~

developed.

I've given you the broad outline of the use of
. workshops, and to shorten time, I won't read that, but I urge

21

you to read what those guidelines would be.
2

Next, I want to turn to discovery and due process in

3

alternative dispute resolution.

4

settlements have raised many questions about due process as a

5

critical aspect of protecting the public interest.

6

ADR procedures which promote

In our group, there's general agreement that ADR

7

approaches to decision making, whether linked to rule making or

8

adjudicatory proceedings, should have as a primary objective the

9

enhancement of due process, not the avoidance of due process

10

issues in the interest of expediting decisions.

11

level playing field ideal, particularly in the employment of

12

market forces in the regulatory process, due process is

13

absolutely essential to alternative dispute resolution.

14

Because of the

Now, there are viewpoints on due process, as you

15

might expect.

16

utilization of ADR requires recognition of how the parties to

17

CPUC proceedings approach the requirement of fact finding in

18

advancing decisions.

19

Providing for due process in the development and

Those intervenor groups most comfortable with the

20

courtroom model of adjudication tend to be focused on the

21

potential for less formal proceedings to undermine opportunities

22

for the resolution of factual issues and for discovery.

23

Specifically, they maintain that rule making proceedings used

24

for policy development without opportunities for cross-

25

examination, for example, can simply leave unresolved major

26

differences over the factual basis for decision.

27
28

Given a choice, when issues of fact emerge in a rule
making proceeding, those issues would be thrown into evidentiary

22

hearings by this group.
2

The opposing view is that there are always underlying

3

factual issues in rule making.

4

if a proceeding had to be stopped every time a party was

5

motivated to demand an evidentiary hearing.

6

making, being essentially legislative in character, is viewed as

7

being substantially more structured for developing a factual

8

base for decisions than decision making by the Legislature

9

itself.

It would hamstring rule making

Administrative rule

A strong view among utility applicants is that

10

II

discovery rules currently in use by the Commission are already

12

hamstringing adjudicatory proceedings.

13

discovery rules are already too loose.

Their view is that

Now let me turn specifically to discovery

14

i~

rule

15

making.

16

making proceedings, discovery is enhanced by the requirements

17

that all files be open to public for discovery.

18

preclude the Commission -- I want to emphasize this -- this does

19

not preclude the Commission or the presiding officer from

20

providing for additional discovery proceedings where

21

appropriate.

22

The consensus in our group appears to be that in rule

This does not

What is important is that discovery rules not become

23

so formalized that they prevent the exercise of flexibility by

24

the Forum in adapting the implementation of discovery objectives

25

to the type of administrative proceeding being utilized.

26

Next, I want to turn to cross-examination as a fact

27

finding procedure.

28

examination as a fact finding procedure at the CPUC

Because of the dominant role of cross-

23

historically, it is important that the Working Group's views on
2

the continued validity of this courtroom process be clearly

3

understood.

4

Group's key recommendations are intended to simplify the

5

Commission's procedures for developing the factual records

6

adequate to support the Commission's decisions and to make

7

alternative procedures available that are better suited to the

8

Commission's needs and resources.

9

As indicated elsewhere in our recommendations, the

The Working Group has recommended that the rule

10

making proceedings be the procedural mechanism of first choice,

II

and that a conference hearing procedure be employed in

12

appropriate adjudicative cases with the traditional hearing

13

process involving detailed cross-examination of sworn witnesses

14

to be made more sparingly.

15

It is not -- and I want to emphasize -- the Working

16

Group's intent to have the Commission abandon the use of cross-

17

examination process for the development of detailed evidentiary

18

records to reach soundly based decisions.

19

The Working Group seeks to have the Commission,

20

through the proposed Case and Issues Management Forum, and with

21

the participation of interested parties in scoping conferences

22

where appropriate, make deliberate, case-specific choices of the

23

procedures to be followed in particular proceedings.

24

The Working Group recommends that the Commission opt

25

for the simpler, less costly procedure for rule making or

26

conference hearing, except where contested issues are identified

27

that can more effectively and reliably be addressed through the

28

submission of testimony and cross-examination.

24

While due process is a legal concept -- as a legal
2

concept is essential to the provision of a level playing field

3

in market driven systems of regulation, it is equally important

4

to recognize that a level playing field for information about

5

regulatory options and for access to the analysis of regulatory

6

issues is also essential for effective participation in CPUC

7

proceedings.

8

responsibilities, we believe the Forum should give high priority

9

to evolving management systems which enhance information sharing

10

to encourage broader participation.

II

12

In the exercise of its case and issues management

The role of negotiated rule making is the next topic
I'd like to take up.

13

Negotiated rule making is viewed by the Working Group

14

is a precursor to the launching of a formal rule making

15

proceeding.

16

look at, even though it may not always be appropriate.

17

is agreement that

18

effective use of other rule making proceedings so long as there

19

are safeguards to prevent the sanctioning of deal making that

20

effectively overrides due process, or that undermines broad

21

public participation in administrative decision making.

22

In this respect, federal agencies are required to \

negotia~ed

There

rule making can facilitate the

Given these concerns, it can work when all parties at

23

interest are brought into the negotiations: when the agency

24

involved enters the negotiations; when a facilitator is

25

utilized; when everyone agrees and understands what is being

26

negotiated, when the agreement reached serves only as a basis

27

for a proposed rule making; and when all the standard procedures

28

are followed in the rule making proceeding that embraces and

~5

advances the negotiated agreement.
2

The consensus view is that negotiated rule making, if

3

it is to be utilized more extensively by the Commission, should

4

be carefully structured by the Forum to mesh with other

5

approaches to rule making which reinforce due process

6

requirements, encourage broad public participation, and ensure

7

the development of a fully adequate record for decision making,

8

while reasonably providing opportunities for discovery and the

9

resolution of factual issues.

10

The OIR process currently used by the Commission

II

should be examined as a possible vehicle for structuring

12

negotiated rule making approaches.

13

adaptation by the Forum to accommodate a new rule making

14

proceeding that advances a preliminary statement of policy

15

direction, and that's what I want to turn to now.

16

It should also be used for

Among the procedural choices available to the Forum

17

is the need for a procedure that allows the Commission to

18

clearly signal how it intends to approach rule making that

19

addresses major regulatory policies, as in the restructuring of

20

utility industries.

21

As in federal practice, in utilizing a statement of

22

policy direction, a clear distinction between rules and

23

statement of policy direction needs to be drawn.

24

the name indicates, should be focused on the way the Commission

25

intends to exercise its policy discretion, short of actually

26

adopting rules affecting Commission policies that are to guide

27

implementation decisions.

28

The latter, as

And here in the report we point out that essentially

26
the Strategic Planing Division has been moving in this direction
2

with the reports it has issued, and the next logical step after

3

holding these panel hearings, full panel hearings, is in fact to

4

come up with a statement of policy direction.

5

We anticipate that as there is greater use of the

6

statement of policy direction, which we explain more fully in

7

the report, we anticipate that increasing use will lead to more

8

structured ways of obtaining input from a broad spectrum of the

9

public, including interested parties who regularly participate

10

in the CPUC proceedings.

II

position to consult openly with all groups, inside and outside

12

the PUC, to pick the brains of everybody -- academicians and

13

others -- in laying out a basic framework for dealing with

14

issues.

15

As it is now, Strategic Planning is a

It has done so in reports it has issued.
The statement of policy .direction is a way of

16

carrying that further to get the Commission involved, indicating

17

the direction in which they are going, indicating what's really

18

needed by rule making, and what type of rule making, in whatever

19

procedures are to be followed.

20

So, we believe the Working Group urges appropriate

21

use of statements of policy direction to

22

for example, major structural changes in utilities and their

23

regulation are to be addressed.

24

the appropriate case and issues management unit to take

25

responsibility for integrating the use of the statement of

26

policy direction as a procedural vehicle within the Commission.

27
28

cl~arly

indicate how,

Again, the Forum is viewed as

Turning now to how the Commission -- in the fifth
category, of how the Commissioners communicate among themselves,

27

and what are the necessary public policy constraints on such
2

communications in the decision making process.

3

will address Bagley-Keene application to the procedural

4

decisions for case management.

5

And here, we

There is a strong consensus that communications among

6

Commissioners that constitute the essence of decision making

7

must be open and public in accordance with Bagley-Keene.

8

key issue in communications among Commissioners, as currently

9

viewed by our Working Group, is the extent to which more than

The

10

two Commissioners may meet in private to make procedural

II

decisions for case and issues management that can be separated

12

effectively and legitimately from actions that are the exercise

13

of the Commission's public policy authority for action oriented.

14

This key issue is confronted in the Working Group's

15

recommendation to provide for the exercise of Commission

16

leadership and guidance through a Case and Issues Management

17

Forum, which is the key to our recommendations.

18

The Case and Issues Management Forum is viewed as

19

essential to the implementation of the structural and procedural

20

recommendations of the Working Group.

21

permissible, it is therefore necessary for Commissioners and/or

22

their personal staff to be either directly involved or fully

23

informed of procedural decision making through the Forum in

24

carrying out its case and issues management responsibilities at

25

the highest level of procedural decision making.

26

27

28

To the maximum extent

I want to add here, if I may, that it's really
impossible for a Commission to function intelligently, to be on
top of the management of its caseload, if it is not able, as a

28

Commission, to participate realistically in procedural decisions
2

that evolve only procedural decisions on how to manage that

3

caseload.

4

And it's very important that this be clarified.
The Working Group would

sup~ort

the clarification of

5

Bagley-Keene to permit legitimate procedural discussions among

6

Commissioners that do not compromise in any way the open meeting

7

requirements of . the law.

8

Group would recommend against any would-be tightening,

9

tightening up of the open meeting .law that would have the effect

This may be difficult, but the Working

10

of limiting present authority under Bagley-Keene to engage in

II

legitimate communications between Commissioners that are

12

procedural and necessary for the Commission as a whole to be on

13

top of the important cases and issues management decisions.

14

I ask the Legislature, firstly, to be realistic.

15

That you can't run an organization if you're going to be in

16

public, discussing every procedural step that you're going to

17

take in running an organization.

18

shouldn't be attempted.

19

symptoms in this respect.

20

It's just impossible, and it

And I hope that you don't chase

Now I want to turn to Commission involvement, or

21

procedural issues, through the Forum.

22

procedural issues through the Forum, is what I'm trying to say.

23

Commission involvement in

To facilitate such involvement by Commissioners and

24

their offices in procedural issues through the Forum, attention

25

should be focused on the following.

26

there should be clarification, of Bagley-Keene to permit, to the

27

maximum extent possible, participation in procedural decisions

28

that are absolutely essential for the Commission to be on top of

First, I have asked, and

29

managing its cases and issues load.
2

Now, these are focused on the following.

3

be focused on assuring participation in the Forum at all times

4

of at least two Commissioners; we hope more, if possible.

5

They should

Providing all Commissioners with regular and timely

6

briefings, summaries, of case management issues under

7

consideration and of

8

of Commissioners and/or other offices.

9

act~ons

taken, in addition to participation

Routinely providing for notice of meetings of the

10

Forum to the public for the purpose of keeping interested

II

parties informed of procedural matters under consideration.

12

example, if the Forum has under consideration how they're going

13

to proceed with the Infrastructure Report on Telecommunications,

14

that should be known to all the parties that that's going on.

15

For

And then, there should be timely reports by

16

designated staff on case and issues management decisions made by

17

the Forum at regular, full panel meetings of the Commission.

18

other words, what the Commission -- what the Forum has been

19

doing should be an agenda item at regular meetings of the

20

Commission.

21

made available to the public.

22

informed, the objective of Forum action reports being an agenda

23

item would be to encourage public discussion between key staff

24

and Commissioners of case and issues management strategies being

25

pursued through the Forum, and to do so in the public.

26

In

Written summaries of such actions should also be
While keeping the public

Finally, what should the relationship be between

27

Commission and staff, particularly the ORA, and how can

28

management systems facilitate these decision making staff

30

relationships?
2

First, I want to turn to the organization of advisory

3

staff resources.

4

relationships with Commissioners to facilitate the responsible

5

exercise of discretion and sound, record-based decision making

6

has raised questions about how Commissioners gain access to

7

staff resources that they need.

8

and controversy have been focused on suggestions for bringing

9

substantial staff resources under direct management of

The organization of staff working

More specifically, discussion

10

individual Commissioner's offices, augmenting present personal

11

staffs.

12

Outside of the Congressional model, there is no

13

administrative precedent for individual Commissioner's offices

14

to have large staffs.

15

seriously undermine c9operative working relationships among

16

Commissioner offices,· encourage the creation of islands of

17

over-specialization, and otherwise run the risk that outweigh

18

the potential benefits.

19

There is consensus to do so would

The organization of staff resources to fully serve

20

Commissioners is a manageable work organization problem, and as

21

such, is a major responsibility of the

22

General Counsel, and other key

23

shifting management responsibilities from them to Commissioners'

24

offices, the Working Group urges that the work organization

25

practices of the Commission's staff

26

involving employees themselves in the organization of work for

27

high performance, both in serving the public and to make sure

28

that all Commissioners have easy access to needed resources

Exe~.

~anagement

Director, and

personnel.

u~dergo

Instead of

frequent evaluation,

31

short of encouraging ex parte contacts.
2

A few guidelines on organization to serve

3

Commissioners' needs are advanced, and here are the guidelines.

4

I have larger type to be able to read it.

5

identify it right now in your copy.

6

It's in -- I can't

But advisory staff resources, to the extent feasible,

7

should be organized in work teams, cutting across divisional

8

lines, in a manner compatible with carrying out the Commission's

9

work plan.

10

Advisory staff teams should be available to serve and

11

work with all Commissioner offices, and should not be looked

12

upon as the designated staff to work only with assigned

13

Commissioners on the basis of issues and cases they are

14

handling.

15

offices so that the assigned Commissioner system is not

16

permitted to degenerate into an issues specialization system

17

along the lines of Commissioner offices.

18

The objective is to share information with all

Particularly in the formulation of policies to guide

19

implementation proceedings, special care should be taken to make

20

sure that staff teams working with assigned Commissioners also

21

assume some responsibility for keeping all offices abreast of

22

developments, of evolving issues, and decision options.

23

this is important also.

And

24

Information systems should be organized and

25

integrated so that they can be effectively accessed by

26

Commissioners' offices as needed, the objective being not only

27

to better serve Commissioners, but also to prevent segmentation

28

of information services to serve only the specialized interests

32
of particular offices.
2

Now let me turn to ex parte contacts with

3

Commissioners.

4

within the Commission, but also we are laying out in this

5

section what we believe are needed changes in the ex parte

6

rules.

7

Now, this is looking basically at ex parte

So, within the Commission, concerns about ex parte

8

contacts between the Commission and staff have focused both on

9

DRA, as the internal advocate of the long-term interests of all

10

the ratepayers, and on other staff functioning in a

ll

prosecutorial role in enforcement cases.

12

However, as the DRA has been more clearly identified

13

over time as an advocacy division in its transformation from a

14

less clearly defined public staff division, the concerns of the

15

utilities and intervenor groups about DRA ex parte contacts have

16

expanded far beyond concerns about Commissioner office contacts

17

with DRA staff actually involved in proceedings as ratepayer

18

advocates.

19

inside track, and influencing a broad range of policy matters

20

that may significantly influence the outcome of proceedings.

21

Their concerns have been extended to DRA having an

Thus, the concern about DRA participation in the

22

recommended Case and Issues Management Forum.

23

the proliferation of proceedings available to the Commission for

24

decision making is raising new questions, as indicated earlier,

25

about the appropriateness of restrictions on Commissioner

26

contacts with staff having largely adversarial functions in the

27

public interest.

28

At the same time,

A fresh look at the separation of functions within

33

the CPUC is needed to clarify the areas in which ex parte
2

contacts may be permitted, necessarily restricted, or prohibited

1

altogether.

4
5

6

Now, ORA-- I'm turning specifically to ORA
participation in the Forum.
Regarding participation of ORA in the activities of

7

the Case and Issues Management Forum, which is opposed by

8

intervenor groups, the hardening of viewpoints and concerns

9

preclude a solid consensus on this matter.

10

However, to the extent that parties interested in the

II

work of the Forum are effectively noticed, and that actions of

12

the Forum are openly discussed by staff and Commissioners at

13

regular, full panel meetings of the Commission, concerns about

14

ORA participation in the Forum are potentially moderated, and in

15

my view, should be moderated.

16

ORA's role as an internal advocate of ratepayers

17

cannot be lightly dismissed as having no greater relevance to

18

the Commission's mission than outside interest groups which are

19

largely private.

20

The most pressing area of action on ex parte contacts

21

within the Commission is in the area of enforcement actions.

22

Enforcement actions, particularly in the largely deregulated

23

transportation industry, require a strong ex parte prohibition

24

on procedural staff contacts.

25

clarify rules applicable to complaint cases where they are --

26

which are distinguishable -- where they are distinguishable from

27

enforcement proceedings and actions.

28

Care, however, must be taken to

In nonenforcement proceedings, an objective should be

34
to maximize advisory resources for the Commission.
2

DRA contacts with decision makers in various types of

3

rule making proceedings are increasingly being viewed as the

4

areas in which ex parte constraints should be the least

5

stringent, disclosure being . the most appropriate form of

6

restriction.

7

in rule makings, as a practical matter, might require some

8

symmetry in the treatment of applicants and intervenors.

9

is agreement that this could be accomplished in rule making

It is understandable that to permit DRA contacts

There

I

10

proceedings by not requiring disclosure of contacts by any party

II

until after formal agreements -- arguments are filed.

12

Now, then we recommend in there changes in Commission

13

ex parte rules.

14

embrace what I have been outlining.

15
16

They are laid out very specifically, but they

I could read them to you, but I think -- how are we
doing in time?

17

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

18

MR. VIAL:

We're short of time.

So, I will just skip over that, but I call

19

your attention to the three areas in which we are asking for

20

refinements in the rules.

21

And I want to point out, at the end of where we list

22

those refinements, that the above proposal presumes that reply

23

comments will be filed in nonenforcement complaint cases.

24

Commission has discretion under Section 3ll(e) to relieve the

25

ALJ of the obligation to file and serve a proposed decision in a

26

customer-related complaint proceeding.

27

28

The

The Working Group, however, strongly encourages the
Commission to require the circulation of a proposed decision,

35

and to provide for comments thereupon in any nonenforcement2

related complaint proceeding, except those subject to the

3

expedited complaint procedure.

4
5

6

Finally, there's a section here on preparation of
alternative decisions and their circulation.
Controversy has flared around the preparation and

7

circulation of proposed alternatives by the Commissioners.

8

large part, it's a reflection of how parties view the special

9

status given to the proposed decisions of ALJs under Section 311

In

JO

of the Public Utilities Code, even though ALJs are not clearly

JI

decision makers.

12

The statutory requirement imposed on the ALJ to file

13

and serve a proposed decision does not mean -- and I want to

14

emphasize it -- it does not mean that the record in a proceeding

15

cannot support more than one decisibn.

16

privilege or the right of having comments focused on the ALJ's

17

proposed decision, or the obligation for that to be done,

18

particularly where there is disagreement with the assigned

19

Commissioner or other Commissioners' offices over interpretation

20

of the record, must not prejudice the development of alternative

21

decisions, so long as the alternatives are grounded in a solid

22

record for decision making.

23

More specifically, the

There is also strong consensus that Commissioners

24

must have timely access during proceedings to effectively shape

25

the development of the record to accommodate the diversity of

26

viewpoints in decision making.

27

encouraged, through the Commission's case and issues management

28

system, to take an active role in discussing the record and its

Further, they should be

36

interpretation with ALJs, reserving the right to advance
2

alternatives where disagreements arise.

3

Important issues regarding the issuance of

4

alternatives that need to be addressed involve:

5

staff resources to do so effectively; secondly, timing of their

6

development and release to interested parties and the public at

7

large; and third, the appropriateness of a comment period for

8

alternates.

9

one, access to

Access to staff -- first on access to staff resources

10

to develop alternatives, including a record that can support

II

alternatives, is an absolute necessity.

12

ALJs who may have disagreements with an Assigned Commissioner or

13

other Commissioners, while having no obligation to submerge

14

their views of what the record can support, nevertheless have an

15

obligation on the record -- on the basis of the record of the

16

proceeding to work wLth Commissioners' offices to develop

17

alternatives.

18

As in past practice,

Where interpersonal or other problems may preclude

19

this cooperation, the Division of Administrative Procedure, DAP,

20

as proposed, would have an obligation to provide the resources,

21

supplemented by traditional alternative writing responsibilities

22

of Commissioners' personal staffs, to develop the alternative

23

desired, drawing on other advisory resources as necessary.

24

is one of the main reasons for creating the alternatives

25

document writing unit in DAP.

26

is served.

27

resources to augment their personal staffs, and the public

28

This

Through this unit, a dual purpose

Commissioners are assured access to competent

interest is protected by a measure of assurance that

37

alternatives will have a supporting record.
2

The timing of the development and release of

3

Commissioners' alternatives is a more difficult issue.

4

privilege of Commissioners to present record-based alternatives

5

or modifications to proposed orders, right up to the point of a

6

full panel meeting of the Commission and decision, should be

7

respected, provided the alternative or modification is clearly

8

before the Commission in writing, and that no new subject area

9

is being introduced.

10

The

In the same vein, many applicants, intervenors, and

II

staff members welcome early release of alternatives because they

12

give an early indication of how Commissioners may view proposed

13

ALJ decisions going to comment.

14

that are released to the public as ALJ-proposed decis.ions go out

15

for comment, or that are released during the comment period,

16

should be reasonably complete proposals, or proposals which give

17

a clear indication of what is to be included in the development

18

of an alternative.

As a general rule, alternatives

19

As a matter of protected speech, however, individual

20

Commissioners are not precluded from doing something less if it

21

is simply to indicate that they have disagreements with a

22

proposed decision that is out for comment, and that they are

23

working on an alternative that can be supported on the record.

24

The fundamental question is whether or under what

25

conditions an alternative should also be subject to a set

26

comment period.

27

experimentation with a comment period on alternates under

28

There may not be an answer outside of some

guidelines developed by the Issues and Management Forum.

38

The Working Group believes that the time has come -2

that time should be allowed for comments on alternates that are

3

reasonably complete proposals, or that raise issues not fully

4

addressed in the proposed decision.

5

augmentation of the record is needed for the suggested

6

alternative to be properly considered.

7

The latter may suggest that

As a general rule to be followed by the Forum in its

8

guidelines, the Working Group believes that the development of

9

alternatives based on a solid record is an important part of the

10

decision making process.

11

to curb them, the thrust of Forum guidelines should be to give

12

parties an opportunity to comment on them to the maximum extent

13

possible.

14

Rather than developing rules that tend

And the end of our report, we point out that we were

15

not able to reach any consensus on the question of judicial

16

review, which is now before your Committee, and which we -- if

17

members of the committee may want to submit statements, they

18

will probably be doing so on their own.

19

I'm sorry I've taken so long, but we worked hard on

20

this report, and we tried to cover this in a comprehensive way

21

that makes sense.

22

as you consider legislation which you have already introduced.

23

We hope that you'll ·give it serious attention

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I want to commend you and the

24

Advisory Group for taking on this huge task and .developing these

25

recommendations in such a short timeframe.

26

Several of your recommendations anticipate internal

27

PUC actions.

28

will take the actions you recommend?

In your opinion, how likely is it that the PUC

39

MR. VIAL:

We recommend a lot of internal action.

2

Well, basically, this is a document that is addressed to the

J

leadership of the PUC.

4

accomplished internally by the PUC itself.

5

We believe that most of this can be

However, there are a few areas where we have

6

indicated that legislation may be appropriate.

7

presumption, for example, on evidentiary -- on use of rule

8

making for development of policy, and also to clarify the law

9

that the conferencing methods available as an alternative to the

As a statutory

10

traditional cross-examination courtroom method in resolving

11

facts.

12

Those are the two basic areas, and there's another

13

provision

14

mentioned.

15

another place in regard to 311 that we have

Basically, we are suggesting here that the -- that

16

whatever you do with this report, that the PUC -- that it be

17

called to the PUC's attention, that they give it careful

18

consideration, because the mission of this group has been

19

primarily to maintain the integrity and the viability of the

20

system that is now being challenged.

21

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Your recommendation regarding

22

the Case and Issues Management Forum sounds somewhat similar to

23

the system used in previous years when you were President.

24

How well did this work in your experience?

25

MR. VIAL:

Well, I think your reference is to the

26

way, in my day, when I was President, we kind of used the Friday

27

committee meetings as an informal way of achieving basically

28

what we've outlined in the Forum.

40

That's always an option available, but for whatever
2

reason, as I said at the outset, the system that we had working

3

for us then is not working now.

4

rationally construct a case and issues management system where

5

the Commissioners could feel on top of it, and where they would

6

have available to them a broad array of proceedings, and they

7

would have management systems to ca-r ry it out.

8
9

10

And all we tried to do is

So, we're just simply laying out a more structured
way for a Commission to operate.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Are your recommendations

11

intended to solve the specific problems we heard about in last

12

October's hearing regarding IRD?

13
14
15

MR. VIAL:

I think they address most of them.

And I

think that we do it in a way that doesn't chase symptoms.
For example, I know there's a lot of controversy

16

going on now about meetings, as you indicated in your opening

17

statement, about the ability of the Commission to get together

18

on internal matters.

19

I hope you're not distracted by side shows on issues

20

of this nature.

21

matter that it's absolutely necessary for a Commission and

22

Commissioners to be able to relate to each other on procedural

23

matters that involve the basic direction of a system, a case and

24

issues management system.

25

I hope that you go right to the hub of the

That's not a violation, in my view, and no one wants

26

to violate, the Bagley-Keene Act.

27

in order to strengthen the application of the Bagley-Keene Act,

28

you have to have a system that works for the public to get

We want to strengthen it, but

41

decisions to it properly.
2
3

And that's what the case and issues

management system is all about.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Before we go further, I want to

4

welcome to the Committee a Member who's a Member of the Senate,

5

who's not a Member of the Committee, but who's interested in

~

many of the aspects that we are talking about.

7

We'll allow other Members now of the Advisory Group.

8

Thank you very much, Don.

9

MR. VIAL:

You're welcome.

10

SENATOR KOPP:

1I

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

12

May I ask him a question?
Can any other members of the

Advisory Group clarify any issues?

13

SENATOR KOPP:

14

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

15

SENATOR KOPP:

16

This is an awesome report.

17

MR. VIAL:

18

SENATOR KOPP:

Can I ask a question?
Yes, Senator Kopp.

Thank you.

Thank you.
I am but a neophyte in this

19

Commission's work.

20

it, but it surely is comprehensive on procedure.

21

I defer to the Chairman on the substance of

I'm not clear as to whether also you were charged, or

22

you sought the issue of substantive jurisdiction, for example,

23

over transportation institutions, or industries:

24

moving van, and that kind of an issue.

25

MR. VIAL:

No.

storage, the

was there any --

That's a very good question, because

26

right at the outset, we felt that our mandate was to look at

27

structural and procedural changes, and that generally we

28

understood that national policy, on a nonpartisan basis, was

42

moving toward more deregulation and the use of market forces,
2

and certainly that's the case in transportation.

3

It's a bottomless pit to say how far is deregulation

4

or the use of market forces going to go.

5

involved in that.

6

should be more or less deregulation, picking up jurisdiction

7

that they might have and exercising, or whether leaving it to

8

the market.

9

We did not get

We did not get involved in whether there

We felt that that was beyond our authority as --

10

SENATOR KOPP:

So, you took the law as it is and

II

assumed that that law would be in effect, and then used that as

12

the basis

13

ot

how to improve the procedures?

MR. VIAL:

Well, let me put it, we did that, but we

14

did it with knowledge that there is public policy, and the

15

discretion of the Commission is being exercised in a way that

16

moves toward a utilization of more market forces, rather than

17

the regulation of monopoly utilities, or to have the kind of

18

transportation regulation that we had in the past.

19

been an awful lot of deregulation.

20

And there's

Know that those are policies going on, we know that

21

those structural changes that have been taking place in the

22

utility industries have been quite painful and traumatic, in

23

many respects.

'24

been a lot of traumatic change in the structuring of the

25

regulatory process that goes with the restructuring of

26

utilities.

27
28

But we know also that the corollary to that has

So, we were focused primarily on what is the
restructuring that is necessary and compatible with the way

43

regulation is going.

And we wanted to make sure that we had all

2

the options covered in giving the Commission the procedural

3

tools to make those very tough decisions on how or when they

4

should employ market forces, or employ them more or less,

5

whether they should abandon a given jurisdiction, or take on a

6

new jurisdiction.

7
8

Those are things that I felt that if we got into
them, we would need more than six weeks.

9

10

SENATOR KOPP:

Last question, Mr. Chairman.

I thank

you for your patience.

1I

Did you consider the dichotomy between utilities and

12

common carriers, and whether common carriers should be divested

13

from Commission jurisdiction?

14

MR. VIAL:

Well, common carriage runs through a lot

15

of the structural reform that we're talking about in energy

16

utilities and telecommunications, in gas, electric.

17

and as well as transportation.

18

So, that

We did not deal with common carriage as an issue as

19

such.

20

regulatory process, and that various types of proceedings are

21

dealing with policy, policy rate making, and other proceedings

22

in these areas.

We just don't know that that's an important part of the

23

SENATOR KOPP:

24

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

25

Any other members of the Advisory Group?

26

I'll tell you what, we're going to take a five-minute

27
28

Thank you.
Thank you very much, Donald.

break for our _reporler.
[Thereupon a brief recess was taken.]
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Ladies and gentlemen, we are

2

prepared to continue.

3

members of the Advisory Group, starting off with Mr. Wilk,

4

former President of the PUC.

We'll continue now with the other

5

Please identify yourself for the record.

6

MR. WILK:

7

My name is Mitch Wilk, W-i-1-k.

8

President of the California Public Utilities Commission, and now

9

what you could call, if I were a lawyer, in private practice.

Yes, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm a former member and

10

I just have some very brief comments to make to the

11

Committee. First, I will be submitting a letter, Mr. Chairman,

12

to the Committee, outlining some of my personal thoughts as we

13

explore the issue.

14

And I want to commend Don Vial, and indeed, all of

15

the members of the Advisory Group.

We did -- we sat around a

16

table and hashed out these issues.

As you well know, these are

17

complicated, convoluted issues.

18

with our own personal perspectives, our own professional

19

perspectives, just as you had intended us to do.

20

there are obviously no easy answers.

21

We all came to these issues

Therefore,

My only, I suppose you could say, admonition at this

22

juncture is that consensus does not mean, necessarily,

23

unanimity.

24

these same issues.

25

All of us have certain different ways of looking at

And today, as you examine the PUC, I would -- and Mr.

26

Chairman, you and I often have talked about this in the past.

27

think we need to put the PUC in the proper context today.

28

a very rapidly evolving context of competition in what used to

It's

I

45

be a monopoly modeled regulation.
2

place to be.

3

4

That's a very convoluted

And what we should strive for, I think, in terms of
the public interest is really a sense of predictability and
consistency, and responsiveness to that public interest.

6

And that would suggest to me openness, not closed

7

doors, and not Draconian measures as Don Vial suggested.

8

think there's very broad consensus on the Advisory Group from a

9

variety of different perspectives that perhaps the last thing in

I

10

the world we should be doing is closing doors, and shutting

11

windows, and forcing a basically increasing quasi-legislative

12

body to have to deliberate these things in complete isolation,

13

much less only by themselves.

14

That's a job that cannot be done.

And I would ask only that, as Members of the

15

Legislature, and I realize that the example has several very

16

notable exceptions, but nonetheless, this is becoming a

17

deliberative, quasi-judicial -- excuse me, quasi-legislative

18

body.

19

to have operated under those same rules as you deliberate policy

20

as well.

21

Think of it when you apply rules, and how you might have

Now, I think the other thing is that what we didn't

22

say is perhaps as important as what we did.

23

legislation is not needed in most instances.

24

think that the PUC is fully able and capable of examining its

25

own processes and procedures.

26

precisely that.

27

not only the staff, obviously, but also at the Commissioner

28

level as well.

In my view,
In fact, we do

Indeed, President Fessler's doing

We have very talented folks there, as well as

And I think much of -- many of our
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recommendations will be useful to the Commission as it itself
2

deliberates its options.

3

4
5

Another point I would also emphasize, Mr. Chairman,
is that we are indeed dealing with symptoms here.

We know what

I also respect your long-standing interest in many of these

6

very same issues.

7

many times in the past, and it's been a very useful -- been very

8

useful guidance for all of us that have been involved in this

9

system.

And I know that you have sounded this bell

10

But we are dealing today in some cases with symptoms

II

as a result, as you explained, the IRD matter and other things.

12

And as Don indicated, I think we think, on the Advisory

13

Committee, that it would be a mistake to over react to that

14

particular incident; that in fact that was probably an

15

inevitaple consequence, again, in large measure because the

16

models upon which all of these things have been built are, in

17

fact, crumbling before us.

18

I think any Draconian efforts to isolate the PUC any

19

further would be, I think, not only inappropriate, but I think,

20

indeed, harmful to the public interest.

21

So with that, I would just simply again thank you,

22

Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to serve.

23

back involved again, and also to express my thanks to not only

24

Chairman Vial, but all the members of the Advisory Group for all

25

the efforts.

26

Thank you.

27

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

28

Yes, Martin Mattes.

Thank you.

It was fun to be
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MR. MATTES:

Yes, I'm Martin Mattes with Graham and

2

James.

]

Utility Counsel, and am, in effect, the delegate of that

4

organization which consists of the attorneys who practice before

5

the Commission.

I'm an attorney and a member of the Conference of Public

6

So, I've come to the Advisory Group's work with the

7

perspective of an attorney who practices before the Commission,

8

and, I have to say, with respect for the traditional practices

9

before the Commission, particularly the evidentiary hearing

10
II

processes.
So, I find myself, unusually for me, in probably

12

being the most conservative member of the Advisory Group on the

13

transformation toward depending more on simplified rule making

14

proceedings, and less on traditional evidentiary hearings for

15

the Commission's work.

16

And I support that position of the Advisory Group,

17

that that kind of a transformation is necessary in the very

18

dynamic circumstances the Commission finds itself in.

19

the same time, I think it's my role to emphasize the need for

20

safeguards as the Commission makes that move.

But, at

21

Don mentioned a number of those safeguards in the

22

report, and the ones that I'd particularly emphasize are the

23

need to have the Commission's decisions in rule making

24

proceedings address all substantive, relevant positions that

25

have been stated by parties, to make sure that important points

26

of view are not overlooked.

27

be referred out of the rule making proceeding into an

28

evidentiary type proceeding with cross-examination of witnesses,

And also that factual controversies

48

where those factual issues are key to deciding the types of
2
3

policy issues that need to be determined in a rule making.
That may delay the rule making process in some cases,

4

but it's an essential delay to make sure that the Commission is

5

deciding wisely.

6

And a further safeguard is the need to apply the

7

Commission's ex parte rule to rule making proceedings.

8

is an area where the existing ex parte communication rule does

9

not apply at all to rule making proceedings.

And this

The Advisory

10

Group, in the spirit of compromise, decided that that rule

II

should apply in rule making proceedings because of the greater

12

use that will be made of them, but that it should only apply

13

late in the proceeding, after the formal submissions of comments

14

have been made, and then, only as a disclosure rule.

15

Now, I'd like to note that the decision-- the

16

recommendations of the Advisory Group are consistent with some

17

elements of your SB 1957, Mr. Chairman.

18

there's very -- there's lack of consensus in the group as to

19

whether legislation is needed for these purposes, but there is

20

support for cutting off ex parte contact completely at a late

21

stage in the proceeding.

22

release of the ALJ's proposed decision, we would recommend that

23

because there needs to be a clarification of parties' positions

24

through the comment and reply comment period, that it would be

25

best to allow for ex parte communications through the submission

26

of the last round of comments on the proposed decision.

27
28

Although, I think

Although we'd recommend later than the

We'd also -- the Group supported the idea of making
ALJ -- alternates to the ALJ decisions public, as Don went into
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some detail about.

But again, there's a problem of

d~fining

2

what is the substantive type of alternate that requires being

~

made public.

4

Those kinds of determinations could be left to the

5

Commission.

6

Group was that those issues should be left to the Commission in

7

the first instance, to see if the Commission can effectively

8

address them, and only if the Commission doesn't step up to bat

9

on those issues should the Legislature need to step in.

10

Finally, I'd like to note one point of minor

I guess my view of the perspective of the Advisory

II

disagreement with our Chairman, Mr. Vial, that in the area of

12

the Case and Issues Management Forum, I don't think there was

13

really a consensus that those meetings might -- required a

14

relaxation of the Bagley-Keene Act.

15

misunderstood what -- the way Don presented it, but that Forum

16

process could work quite effectively within the bounds of the

17

present Bagley-Keene Act, with maximum use of memoranda to

18

explain to other Cqmmissioners who don't happen to attend what's

19

gone on at the meeting, and also to explain to the public what

20

issues have been considered.

21

And I may have

We think that that Management Forum ought to be open

22

to the public.

23

even if those meetings are held in private, there ought to be

24

information to the public about what went on in them.

25

26

As Mitch says, the doors ought to be open.

And

I thank you for the opportunity to address the
Committee.

27

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

28

Let me ask, Don has already expressed an opinion, do

Thank you very much.
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you have any comments regarding judicial review?
2

MR. MATTES:

Well, I would say that that's another

3

very important safeguard for the Commission, for the fairness of

4

the Commission's processes and the due process that's allowed to

5

interested parties in Commission processes.

6

With the movement toward greater use of rule making

7

proceedings, I think it's worthy of a hard look to see whether

8

the time has come to have more effective judicial review of the

9

Commission's decisions.

10

I personally believe that the process of judicial

II

review of Commission decisions is not very effective, and that

12

the major problem is that the review can be had only at the

13

California Supreme Court.

14

I don't believe that it's necessary to have a right

15

of review of Commission decisions necessarily, so long as

16

there's a judicial forum that is receptive to appropriate

17

appeals.

18

court of appeal designated to hear CPUC appeals that would

19

become somewhat expert in the subject matter of CPUC cases, and

20

therefore, would be more receptive to an appeal in an

21

appropriate case.

22

And so, I support the general idea of there being a

I don't think that requires a right of appeal.

23

think a petition for review procedure still might be quite

24

adequate.

I

25

MR. VIAL:

May I comment on that?

26

MR. WILK:

Mr. Chairman, I would just observe that my

27

concern over the judicial review issue has been like some of

28

your concerns, fairly long-standing.

It has to do with this
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changing environment that we're confronting in terms of utility
2

regulation.

3

And my concern has to do specifically with

4

timeliness.

5

very eloquently to things of due process, and petitions, and the

6

difference all that might make.

7

I'm not a lawyer.

I'm sure the lawyers can speak

The bottom line to me is, will this increase the

R

amount of time it takes to be responsive to the public's need

9

for timely decisions?

10

Again, you have, obviously, the balance of that

II

against the due process rights of the parties.

12

increasingly, the contentiousness at the Commission is

13

competitively inspired.

14

involves issues far more directed at competitive interests.

15

always, and again, that's not necessarily wrong.

16

But

That's not to say it's wrong, but it
Not

But my concern is, taking a rate case, for example,

17

that might result in, as most of them do, in rate reductions, in

18

some cases, of substantial magnitude, having those kinds of

19

things delayed for a long time without the certainty of some

20

kind of conclusion.

21

And I think we all have faith in our judicial

22

process, but in my personal opinion, the more bites at the apple

23

you have, the less amount of timeliness you have in the process.

24

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

You see, I've never thought that

25

there ought to be an appeal on a decision because you didn't get

26

your way.

27

took place.

28

On the process, primarily, on the procedures that

MR. WILK:

Legal error, I think, as we've referred to
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it as being legal error, although a lot of things are couched in
2

terms of legal error.

3

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

4

Trying to figure out when and how would be the

5

I understand.

concern.

6

You know, I hear often about, for example, comparing

7

the PUC to the Legislature.

8

talk to my friend over here about a particular issue.

9

I hear, for example, that I can

However, all decisions are made in public, from the

IO

management decisions, to the policy committee of those

II

committees, all bills, and all amendments are available for

I2

public scrutiny before you to a vote.

I3

And since you're moving more into this legislative

14

concept more, it seems to me, and even in the Legislature we

I5

have even more problems.

16

have two different houses, and no bill becomes a law without the

17

Governor, and then there's always an appeal process of some

18

kind.

We have the two political parties, we

19

So, when you're thinking about how different you are

20

from the Legislature, keep in mind that everything we do, while

2I

I might have a conversation with Legislators about it, the vote

22

is public.

23

MR. VIAL:

We're talking mainly about -- I want to

24

make sure you understand that when we're talking about

25

clarifying, relaxing, whatever the proper word is, of

26

Bagley-Keene, we're talking not about action as you're

27

suggesting on bills or anything.

28

matters that have to do with solely with how the Commission is

We're talking about procedural

53

managing, handling its caseload or the issues.

We're not

2

talking about action-oriented decisions that must be made

3

public.

4

here, and we know that it's difficult.

5

6
7
g

9

We're saying that there's a clarification to be made

And, you know, Marty was saying that he kind of had a
disagreement with the way I was presenting it.
What we're trying to say is that there's room -there's need for clarification.
But I'm also saying this, it's different, maybe, and

10

that is you cannot expect a responsible Commission to exercise

II

its public trust responsibilities without giving it a leg up in

12

being able to talk to each other about procedural matters that

13

are basic to the management of the caseload.

14

be a way of allowing it, and you shouldn't be chasing symptoms

15

of that problem.

And there has to

16

You should be dealing with the fact that you have to

17

have a solid case management way of dealing with issues so that

18

what you're talking about being open meetings are real and

19

significant open meetings, where you're discussing issues.

20

shouldn't be focusing on the wrong thing.

21

trying to identify.

22

MR. WILK:

We

That's all I was

And, Mr. Chairman, if I might just add,

23

even in the quasi-judicial model, and again, I'm a little on

24

thin ice because I'm not an attorney, but even if you take a

25

look at appellate courts.

26

There are no requirements that they can't talk to each other.

27

Even in the most judicial model you can think of, I can't find

28

an agency where the members, public or private, where the

Those judges can talk to each other.
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members can't talk to each other.
2

I mean, I frankly can't see how the public interest

3

would be served under any circumstances by simply saying,

4

"You've got to sit in that office with your door shut, and all

5

you can do is read this."

6

make policy, whether it's quasi-judicially inspired, or

7

quasi-legislatively inspired.

8
9
10
11

I mean, to me, that's not the way to

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

There isn't a judicial decision

that can't be appealed.
MR. WILK:

But the PUC's decisions, technically, can

be appealed, too.

12

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

13

MR. WILK:

Only to the Supreme Court.

That's true.

Well, the appellate court

14

judges, you know, they have -- I guess they get up to the

15

Supreme Court, too.

16

But in any event, my point is that I'm sure that

17

there are some legitimate reasons why parties are concerned

18

about having another bite at the apple.

19

The bottom line is, do you want inspired responsive

20

decision making in the public interest?

21

course, yes, we do.

22

be made publicly; there's no question about that.

23

24

25
26
27

28

And the answer is, of

And that means that those decisions should

But on the other hand, you do need to be able to talk
to your colleagues.
MR. VIAL:

You can't be in complete isolation.
Mr. Chairman, I want to clarify the way

the committee was dealing with the judicial review question.
What I tried to convey to you is, that since
according to the Rules Committee it's not within the
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jurisdiction of your Subcommittee, and since our mandate relates
2

to your Subcommittee, we knew that we were not obligated to

J

recommend on this, but we were also told by -- through your

4

staff that we were not precluded from commenting.
And what I wanted to convey to you is, there is no

6

consensus of this.

7

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

8

MR. VIAL:

9
10

I understand.

And that therefore, any views that you get

will be from individuals or members joining each other, but they
are not coming from the 'c ommittee as such.

11

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

12

MR. VIAL:

I understand.

And from my personal view, since

13

everybody's asserting their personal view, I think it's a

14

question of timing.

15

judicial review, and I think President Fessler indicated that at

16

the earlier meeting.

17

I think that there has to be a new look at

He suggested a way of looking at it.

But it's a question of when you do it.

Right now,

18

the problem is when you have a lot of distrust over how an

19

organization is functioning, in my view, if you move into a

20

system that allows expanded judicial review, you may be

21

distorting the uses.

22

order and then confront the issue with the house in order.

23

That's my priority.

24

MR. MATTES:

It's better to try to get the house in

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I'd just like to

25

comment on the point about allowing the Commissioners to meet to

26

handle procedural matters.

27
28

That's the tough part of the question, is whether to
allow the Commissioners to have private meetings on tough issues
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of how they get their own house into order.
2

I just wanted to point out that there's an easy part

3

to the question.

4

Group that the Commission should do more in public.

5

hold more full panel hearings in proceedings:

6

proceeding, late in the proceeding, early on to scope out the

7

proceeding, late to kind of get the last oral arguments from the

8

parties as to their final positions.

9

those open sessions, with everybody who.'s interested able to

10

participate, would do a lot to improve the atmosphere at the

11

Commission.

I wish there was a strong consensus in the

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

13

President Fessler.

14

And I want to thank the Members.

15

SENATOR PEACE:

Okay, thank you very much.

Yes, Senator Peace.

While President Fessler's coming

forward.

17
18

early in the

And that to have more of

12

16

They should

You made reference to the analogy between legislative
conduct and the Commission.

19

I think there's a couple things that we ought to keep

20

in mind.

When we gather as a caucus, we gather in the case of

21

the Democrats in the particular time and frame, we're gathering

22

as a 'm ajority of our particular house, and we have private

23

meetings.

24

membership of a committee to either casually or otherwise have

25

communications.

It is not at all unusual for a majority of a given

26

The real issue here is how do you --

27

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

28

SENATOR PEACE:

How does a public

-- how do you improve accountability
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of the decision makers, I think, is what is at issue.
2

One of the concerns that I have, and I think that the

3

task force seems to address in, I think, a very responsible

4

manner, is there appears to be currently a dichotomy between the

5

work product at the staff level, and almost a sense of

b

uncertainty on the part of Commissioners whether or not they're

7

in control.

8

9

These are the closest we have.

One might argue that

one of the structural changes that ought to be there with

10

respect to accountability is some kind of a mechanism with

11

respect to the selection of Commissioners in the first place.

12

All we have is an appointment process, and a confirmation

13

process.

14

thing the public has to accountable persons.

15
16

They're not elected members, but they're the closest

The staff people are not accountable.

They're

accountable only to the Commissioners.

17

And if we preclude those Commissioners from any level

18

of communication amongst themselves with respect to

19

administration, we empower the most unaccountable folks in the

20

process.

21

Now, that has nothing to do with whether they're good

22

people, bad people.

23

any way, shape, or form.

24

weakness that is fundamentally undemocratic, and leads to the

25

kinds of bureaucracy-driven decision making that we've seen

26

crumble on the other side of the world.

27
28

It's not a judgment about their conduct in
It's a structural, inherent structural

My concern, and I can only say it in absolute
fundamental terms, the more we keep walking down the path with
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all good intent of disempowering people who are accountable to
2

the electorate, either directly by election or indirectly by

3

virtue of appointment by elected officials, inherently the more

4

we empower professional, permanent bureaucrats -- and I use the

5

term in the nonpejorative sense -- who have no accountability.

6

And that's the fundamental difference between

7

democracy and oligarchy.

8

more at stake in these discussions, and I would hope that we

9

take Mr. Vial's admonitions to look far more soberly at what

And I think there's a heck of a lot

10

might appear to be, in the current milieu, to be extraordinarily

II

popular notions that are, in fact, directed more at symptoms

12

than at problems.

13

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

14

SENATOR RUSSELL:

15

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

16

SENATOR ' RUSSELL:

17

20

May I ask a question?
Yes, Senator Russell.

The ALJs who hear cases and make

recommendations, what kind of restraints are on them?

18
19

Thank you.

MR. FESSLER:

In what sense, Senator?

I mean, they

are
SENATOR RUSSELL:

In terms of conferring with other

21

people who may be associated with the case, bouncing ideas off

22

other staff members or other ALJs?

23

MR. FESSLER:

To my knowledge, and the Chief

24

Administrative Law Judge is here, and perhaps it would be better

25

and more authoritative to have a response from her, if that

26

would be satisfactory.

27

28

I do not believe there are any restrictions on
administrative law judges talking with one another.
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MS. CAREW:

No, there are not.

2

I'm Lynn Carew, the Chief ALJ.

3

The ALJs have access to the same advisory staff that

4

the Commissioners in terms of implementing their decisions.

5

When they're, for example, in the stage of preparing a proposed

6

decision, they may wish to find out what the impact of ruling

7

for one party versus another is, and they will ask the staff to

K

run numbers.

9

that the Commissioners have.

10

11

They have access to advisory staff, the same staff

SENATOR RUSSELL:
with the staff?

12

MS. CAREW:

13

SENATOR RUSSELL:

14

Commissioners can do the same thing

Exactly.
Can the Commissioners interface

with the ALJ prior to his decision?

15

MS. CAREW:

That happens very, very frequently, and

16

we encourage it, both at the beginning of the proceeding and all

17

the way through, and especially the ALJ who's assigned to the

18

case and the assigned Commissioner.

19

SENATOR RUSSELL:

And staff has free access to all

20

other staff members and can discuss anything and everything to

21

the extent that they feel it's necessary without restrictions;

22

is that correct?

23

MS. CAREW:

24

staff.

25

the case, for example.

26

the advisory staff.

27

28

Well, there are various divisions of the

We don't have discussions with staff who are parties to
We confine our discussions, as ALJs, to

SENATOR RUSSELL:
talking about ALJs now.

How about other staff?

I'm not

I'm just talking about the general
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staff that are required to write reports, synthesize issues,
2

formulate procedures, or proposals that are given to the

3

Commission.

4

I'm not talking about ALJs.

5

6

Do they have any restrictions on them, do you know?

MS. CAREW:

It's difficult to answer that in a

vacuum, but no, I don't believe they are.

7

SENATOR RUSSELL:

So, the only people that cannot

8

talk to anybody else, I mean, to another Commissioner, are the

9

people who make the decisions, who have to gather all this

10

information simply by reading it.

II

And it would just seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that --

12

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

13

Nobody's preventing that.

14

15

SENATOR RUSSELL:

They can talk to each other.

They ought to be in public.
Well, why should you and I have to

talk in public if we're discussing your legislation and we're

16

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

When it comes time for me to

17

make a decision, or for you to make a decision, your vote or my

18

vote is public.

19

20

SENATOR RUSSELL:

Of course.

So is theirs.

So is

theirs.

21

SENATOR PEACE:

If that's true, Mr. Chairman, why

22

shouldn't the staff have to have all their conversations in

23

public?

24

You know, control of information is power.

And as

25

long as staff can preclude the publicly accountable decision

26

makers from being able to share information, they control the

27

power.

28

Let's get this down to its baselines.

You can talk
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about all this kind of staff and that kind of staff -- bunch of
2

baloney.

~

wonderful people, bright people, well educated people, probably

4

well meaning people.

5

You've got a culture in there, and they can --

But they are totally insulated from the real world.

6

The only potential -- and it's not the only institution that

7 -

suffers from this problem.

8

day with respect to Caltrans, and a report that Mr. Kopp, and

9

Mr. Katz, and Ms. Bergeson produced.

10

We had an eloquent hearing the other

The only way in which you are going to have the

II

public, the people of this state, have a say, ultimately, is to

12

break down the institutional barriers created and perpetuated by

13

staff in order to hold power.

14

This is a power struggle.

15

of the professional bureaucracy

16

That's all it is.

17

And it's a power struggle

ag~inst

the people of the state.

Make no mistake about it.

SENATOR RUSSELL:

It seems to me that we here, in the

18

Legislature, try to create this perfect world where nobody gets

19

hurt, nothing wrong occurs, and we pass a snow storm of bills,

20

and legislation, that we desire to create that perfect world.

21
22

And yet, it's not a perfect world and never will be a
perfect world.

23

It seems to me by tying the hands of the

24

Commissioners behind their backs, not allowing them to discuss

25

cases among themselves, the discussion which will result may

26

result and help them come to a more clear understanding of the

27

issue, and their vote then will be in public, just as our vote

28

is in public.
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But we don't have any restrictions upon having a
2

caucus, or two or three Members of a committee discussing a

3

particular piece of legislation.

4

vote is.

5

6

That's not in public, but our

So what's the difference?

It's a rhetorical

question.

7

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

When the Commissioners have an

8

alternative plan which is devised 24 hours before a decision,

9

and they've spoken to one another, then what?

10
11

SENATOR PEACE:
the point.

12

13

It's simple.

You see, that's exactly

You make the point.
You now have somebody who has responsibility focus

and a procedure to deal with.

14

And your argument probably ought to be, maybe

15

appointing Commissioners doesn't make them accountable enough.

16

If the same thing had happened, and does happen, as we all know,

17

with respect to communication and last minute work product of

18

staff, we never find those people.

19

names, for the most part.

We don't even know their

20

Here you have a situation where, if it happened at a

21

Commissioner level, at least we know who to get in the room and

22

focus on.

23

So, I would argue that I'd far rather have to deal

24

with the people I can find than the faceless folks who now wield

25

the power behind the scene, for the most part; who I can't even

26

find, let alone deal with.

27

28

You make an eloquent argument, though, for perhaps a
weakness in the current process by which we select
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Commissioners.

And you know, I'd encourage this body to visit

2

other potential mechanisms by which we can select and, in turn,

3

hold Commissioners accountable, all the way from the current

4

methodology to, perhaps, direct election.

5

of potential options in between, no doubt.

6
7
8

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

II

12

Okay, thank you for coming

today.
MR. FESSLER:

9
10

And there's a bunch

I was beginning to feel superfluous.
[Laughter.]

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I continue to hope that we can

work together to implement some necessary reforms.
The Advisory Group recommendations seem to fall into -

13

three categories:

14

reforms that seem fairly straight-forward; a management Forum to

15

facilitate case assignment, keep the Commissioners informed

16

about the progress.

some recommendations involving PUC management

17

Do you have any feelings about that?

18

MR. FESSLER:

19

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

20
21

Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say -And I understand that you may

not have had a chance to go through this whole thing.
MR. FESSLER:

Well, Barbara Hale kindly drove the

22

car, and I was the passenger, and therefore I had an opportunity

23

to sit for an hour and a half and read.

24

I have looked at the report.

25
26

27
28

I . have not studied it.

I will do so.
My tentative and initial reaction, and again,
speaking only for myself, is that I find the report to be a very
impressive piece of work.

I expected as much, given the
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composition of the task force.
2

I am particularly intrigued by this idea of a

3

Management Issues Forum.

4

hearings, which is the conference hearing, is a very useful one.

5
6

I think that their call for paper

And I can assure you that I will give the most
serious attention to the content of this report.

7

I was particularly heartened to hear the recognition,

8

which has just been amplified in your·colloquy with your

9

colleagues in the Senate, that I think that we all recognize

10

that the Commission today, as opposed to the Commission of 20 or

11

30 years ago, is operating in a far more dynamic market.

12

As I told this body in previous appearances, I think

13

that 20 years ago, my predecessors had a pretty good idea of

14

what it was that they were to do, and how it was that they were

15

to do it.

16

environment, dealing with regulated; vertically integrated

17

monopolies.

They were operating in a relatively static

18

Twenty years hence, there will be a period of time in

19

which competition will have been deployed, and it will be easier

20

for the Senate, for the Assembly, for the people of the State of

21

California, and for the people who are California citizens that

22

you asked to be Commissioners, to understand how to interface

23

with that.

24

It is my dubious distinction to be serving now, in

25

the meantime, where the old order has not passed away, nor has

26

the new order become clear.

27

28

And therefore, what do you pay me for?

I assume that

it is to make decisions, and to be responsible for those
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decisions.
2

One of the decisions that I recently made you and I

3

discussed because you called the other day, and I know you want

4

to get into it, but I am disturbed by this characterization

5

which I find being passed out, because I do not consider it to

6

be fair.

7

indulgence, to address that issue.

And I want to have an opportunity, with your

8
9

But when the Legislature passes laws, it is my
obligation, because it is my sworn oath, to uphold them.

10

have sworn to uphold the Constitution of the State of

II

California.

12

I also

And it is something that I -- Senator Kopp, I spoke

13

to him as he was leaving.

14

Legislature should think of taking away from the Commission its

15

authority over common carriage and transportation.

16

require an amendment to the Constitution of the state.

17

be done by the people of the State of California, but they have

18

a right to be directly implicated in that process.

19

He was inquiring about whether the

That would
That can

I also think that this Legislature is to be taken at

20

its deadly earnest when it told the people of the State of

21

California in 1974, in Article 12, Section the 9th of this

22

Constitution, that it had merely recapitulated the Constitution

23

of 1911 with utterly no substantive change.

24

If that is true, then Section 23 of the Constitution

25

of 1911 is the law of the State of California.

26

very, very important matter, as is Article 22 of that

27

Constitution, which clearly says, and nothing in the

28

And that is a

recapitulation would contradict it, that the decision making
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powers of the Public Utilities Commission are vested by the
2

people of the State of Calitornia in five Commissioners.

3

are not vested in administrative law judges.

4

five Commissioners.

5

They

They are vested in

Article 12, Section the 2nd, says that the Commission

6

shall have the right to devise its own procedures, subject to

7

statute and to due process.

8

9

I have prepared, because this Committee is very
interested in such things, and I would ask that it be submitted

10

as part of the record, here are all of the major decisions of

II

the Supreme Court of California in the 20th Century that have

12

dealt with the issues of judicial review, and the contents of

13

the California Constitution insofar as they touch the Public

14

Utilities Commission.

15

They begin with the Eshleman case in 1913, which was

16

the great reaction to the reform Legislature of 1912, and the

17

election of Hiram Johnson as the Governor of this state.
~

18

They

go right through the Camp Meeker decision of the early 1990s.

19

I would ask that the Members of this Committee study

20

these cases in order to inform themselves as to what the people

21

of the State of California have done and thought, over a lengthy

22

period of time, with regard to this issue of judicial review.

23

This is not a new issue.

24

And the California Supreme Court has spoken to this

25

issue time and time again.

26

which is anti-factual that the California Supreme Court has

27

recently lost interest in the Public Utilities Commission, and

28

that it doesn't review.

There has been put forward an idea

Doesn't review compared to when?
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The California Supreme Court is of the view that it
2

has done a very nice job, thank you, in discharging the

3

responsibilities given to it by the Legislature in Section 67 of

4

the original Public Utilities Code of 1912.

5

iterate that view right on through the Camp Meeker decision.

6

And it continues to

So, I would ask the Committee to begin by getting its

7

facts very much in order, including examining the work product

8

of the California Supreme Court, before it is taking for granted

9

that we accept as an untested cliche that that Court is not

10

doing its job.

11

I am here to tell you, and to provide you with the

12

evidence

it's the primary evidence; it's the only relevant

13

evidence

that that is not true.

14

That simply is not true.

Now, if I could, because I want to engage myself at

15

the pleasure of the Committee, I would like to speak to this

16

issue of what is characterized here as, quote, "PUC violations

17

of Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act."

18

I do not believe there is any PUC violation of the

19

Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act.

20

responsibility is, is to exercise the authority granted to me

21

under the Constitution, which is to devise the procedures of the

22

Commission with my colleagues, subject to statute and to due

23

process.

24

Act, and I set forth in a letter to you the reasons why I

25

concluded, and it is

26

accountability

27

that in a discussion among the Commissioners of how we would

28

deploy Commission staff, that we were not conducting the public

I believe that what my

Therefore, the first thing I read was the Bagley-Keene

Senator Peace is interested in having

it is I who are accountable for the conclusion
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business as it is defined in the Bagley-Keene Act.
2

Now, at the same time, out of an abundant regard for

3

the Act, and recognizing that at the Commission I have to make

4

decisions, but I am concerned that there was contrary view

5

expressed, we had advice of counsel that there

6

look at this.

7

California to express a view, and noted that in the meantime, we

8

were recording, using a little tape recorder that Commissioner

9

Knight supplied, the two meetings that we had.

10

wer~

two ways to

I asked the Attorney General of the State of

And I received, after work at 5:30 on Friday night, a

11

FAX from the Attorney General's Office, from an Assistant

12

Attorney General, which concluded that in that individual's

13

view, those meetings should not have been held as I hold them.

14

I sent that letter to you immediately.

15

all of the relevant data, and as soon as they have been

16

transcribed, I will cheerfully give you the discussions.

17

I sent to you a copy of

The discussions are as I have told you, not as stated

18

here, ostensibly, as I have told you the discussions were.

Now

19

that the Legislature has brought to a head in a short time frame

20

the question of government reorganization, that I have been to

21

the Legislature and heard from you that you wanted to know

22

whether I was working with my colleagues and the staff to

23

develop views on this matter, even as you were appointing and

24

empowering an advisory committee to advise you, that I went to

25

my colleagues and said, "We had best begin to look at these

26

broad outlines of how the staff could be optimized to make the

27

Commission more useful to the public," recognizing that there is

28

tremendous concern and anxiety at the Public Utilities
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Commission staff level over the impacts on individual careers,
2

3

and individual jobs.
And so, until we had the broad outline of a consensus

4

arrived at as among the Commissioners on our own internal

5

operations, I thought it was best to get that in order so that

6

we could then present it to the staff and get staff comments,

7

staff suggestions, and the potential of staff improvement, but

8

we had to have some document to work with.

9

The Bagley-Keene Act speaks of matters that are going

10

to be put on an agenda for a meeting, a public meeting.

11

asked whether in the past, when the Commission, upon which

12

President Vial served, upon which President Wilk served, made

13

decisions to change Commission organizational structure, it had

14

ever been put on a public meeting, and the answer was no.

15

And it is therefore on those predicates that I

16

17

I had

reached the decision that I did.
And I would ask the Legislature to look at this as

18

very, very useful in the context of Chairman Vial's statement to

19

you today, that if the Commission cannot discuss

20

arguing for Commissioners' ability to manage the caseload of the

21

Commission at the level of deciding, well in advance of any

22

issue-specific or party-specific matter before the Commission,

23

what our priorities were.

24

This is even removed from that.

he was

This looks at the

25

internal way in which we make assignments and divisions of staff

26

assignments of the Commission.

27

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

28

The Attorney General, though,

indicated that the discussions regarding internal reorganization
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of the Commission and its staff is not something that should be
2

held privately.

3

MR. FESSLER:

I acknowledge that that is so.

And as

4

I told you in the letter, we will immediately atone and obey the

5

indications of the Attorney General, hoping that the Legislature

6

will also look at the Act, because you fix all these things.

7

And while you're looking at this matter, and while

8

your precious attention is engaged in examining the Commission,

9

I would ask you simply this:

when you were on the roster of

10

Senators who testified and who made comments at my confirmation

11

hearing, I was most grateful.

12

But no one ever warned me that what I was being

13

appointed to was a committee that could never meet.

14

was being asked to serve on was a body -- I mean, if what is

15

stated in this letter were to be true, I don't know what is

16

meant by the author of the letter, "in seriatim meetings."

17

reference is to a decision of a California District Court of

18

Appeal, interpreting not the Bagley-Keene Act, but the Brown

19

Act.

20

asked to be discussed.

21

That what I

And the facts of that case are radically unlike what I had

That was a matter of a zoning variance; emphatically

22

an issue that was before the body for discharging its public

23

responsibilities.

24

The

What I find difficult about the letter of the

25

Attorney General -- but I asked for it; I received it, and I

26

will now Bagley-Keene and the Brown Act.

27

respectfully state to Attorney General Lungren that the next

28

time he speaks with his Deputies, he might point out to them

And I would simply
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that it would be a very bad idea to mix and match provisions of
2

the California Aeronautics Code with the Motor Vehicle Code.

3

would produce some rather bizarre traffic patterns.

4

what has happened here.

5

And that is

I am, therefore, telling you that I am responsible.

6

I made the decision.

7

the letter.

I asked for the letter.

I have received

8

For the reasons that I have shared with you and now

9

your colleagues, I do not regard the letter as helpful, but we

10

It

will follow it.

II

We'll absolutely follow it.

And I will look to you, to the Senate and to the

12

Assembly, to give us procedures that enable us to work better.

13

Working better means that we should be involved early on, as the

14

five Commissioners empowered by the Constitution, and we are the

15

Commission; there is no other.

16

Constitution, there can be none other.

17

And without amending the

The Senate and Assembly can remove me from office,

18

but as long as I am in office, I am one of the five

19

Commissioners.

20

That's what the people decided back in 1911.

And so, I would ask you to consider very carefully

21

that if you like this idea of the Management Forum, then allow

22

the Commissioners to become directly involved.

23

Do not ask me to send staff people.

Do not ask me to

24

have to be briefed by taking five or ten of our most bright

25

individuals, and have them walk down the hall, repeating

26

themselves five times.

27

is that?

28

How much of a waste of time and effort

Just allow the five of us to sit there and make those
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decisions.
2
3

They have nothing to do with any litigant-specific,

nothing to do with any issue-specific matter.
And then, I would ask you again to seriously look at

4

the Michigan statute in terms of allowing us to discuss in a

5

period-- and I'm perfectly willing to have you cut off

6

communication from all other parties before we make decisions so

7

that we can deliberate.

8

9

There is a very interesting recent development.

The

only significant and extensive decision on the Bagley-Keene Act

10

was decided on July the 1st, 1993.

11

myself as being functionally equated with the Board of

12

Morticians and Embalmers, but they were the defendants in that

13

particular case.

I do not like to think of

14

The Court talks about deliberation.

15

that that Board should have the ability to deliberate in

16

private, and it draws an interesting analogy.

17

It points out

In a trial in which a man's life is at stake, the

18

evidence is heard in public, and the verdict is rendered in

19

public, but emphatically the jury deliberates in private, where

20

individuals are able to discuss in a calm and tentative manner,

21

and are trying to arrive at decisions.

22

23
24

And I think that the decision of those judges is a
most apt analogy, that we should have that authority.
I think you would find, if you would allow Chairman

25

Russell of the Michigan Commission to come here and tell you

26

what it was like --

27

after -- how dramatically they have reduced their caseload; how

28

more expeditiously they now go about their business.

he served on the Commission before and

The very
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groups that had opposed the act -- as you recall, Michigan's
2

Legislature passed it with a five-year sunset, and then they

3

have just recently reauthorized it -- the groups that initially

4

opposed it because they were suspicious of deals that were done

5

in the dark, endorsed it.

6

7

I would challenge the Legislature to trust us to pass
such an act for one year, and let's see what happens.

H
9

10

But I tell you, having been there for three years,
the system you are asking me to function in is dysfunctional.
It is dysfunctional.

II

And when we talk about the IRD case, there is no one

12

in this room more embarrassed about the IRD matter than am I.

13

It happened on my watch, but I didn't know about it.

14

the reasons I didn't know about it was the very mechanisms that

15

we're now discussing strengthening.

16

Because I didn't talk, I wasn't aware.

And one of

I should have

17

been able to be aware.

18

into that matter so that I was aware of what was going on.

19

And had I been, I would flatter myself with the

20

I should have been very much integrated

thought that we would not have that mess.

21

It happened.

I also know that in the three years that I have been

22

there -- and you could ask Don Vial for the six years of his

23

stewardship, or Mr. Wilk for the four and a half years of his

24

there was nothing comparable to that.

25

But that tested a system which was inherently

26

dysfunctional at its weakest moment, and the system failed the

27

people.

28

It didn't work.
So, that's my basic plea to the Legislature.

You
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have never asked that I have not come.

You have never indicated

2

a desire to discuss any subject that you have not been obliged.

3

It is my responsibility, it was the pledge I gave you at my

4

confirmation hearing.

5

accountable, with my colleagues.

6

I am the person you should hold

And then, if we are doing a job that displeases the

7

Legislature, remove us and hold accountable the individuals who

8

appointed us.

9

confirmed me by a vote of 39-0.

10

In my instance, Pete Wilson, and the Senate that
But you didn't know then.

I sincerely say that we have to be able to be

II

possessed of a buy-in on where the Commission is going, and we

12

have to be able to have a knowledge of the material and the

13

attitudes of Commissioners.

14

you are all -- we all make decisions collectively -- is to

15

understand that I don't always get my way, and that I have to

16

compromise with people.

17

colleagues.

18
19

20

Much of what I do on a committee,

And I have to listen to the views of my

Right now, I do it on a one-by-one basis, and I hope
that I get it accurate, but it is a very inefficient way.
And your original legislative proposal would go a

21

long way toward making that more rational, the one that you

22

previewed and were kind enough to send to me before the session

23

resumed, which was that in a period before the decision was

24

actually made, much like the jury, we could deliberate.

25

then, I am perfectly willing to vote.

26

I hear people say, "Deliberate in public."

And

I have

27

been pushing these full panel hearings, trying to get the body

28

out there, and at times, we'll hear from 30 or 40 witnesses in a
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day, and I want to do more of that.
2
3

But on the specific matters that are coming before
us, I would plead with you to consider those as reforms.

4

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

There are some other

5

recommendations on some procedural reforms which could be done

6

internally or by legislation.

7

or making alternates public, could be done either way.

8

9

MR. FESSLER:

For example, the ex parte rule,

I think the first person to articulate

the notion of making alternates available for a period of public

10

comment was myself.

II

that as a bad idea.

So, it would be difficult for me to condemn

12

What has always flawed the idea, as I've discussed it

13

with you, and with Gwen Moore and others in the Legislature, is,

14

we are constantly trying to balance between the public's desire

15

to know and to comment, and the public's desire to have its

16

business transacted.

17

administrative law judges are very amenable to making changes.

18

And if the changes that were made, some

But last night, I read an order which I hope we will

19

issue tomorrow.

20

order.

21

of you, but it would be en camera.

22

changes.

23

participles.

I made 41 changes, proposed changes, in that

It's in my briefcase.

24

I'd be happy to show to any one
They are grammatical

I don't like split infinitives and dangling

Now, those are-- that administrative law judge, I'm

25

sure, will make those changes.

26

there's a speculation about future policy, and I didn't think it

27

was wise to try to commit us in that regard, and I'd like to

28

have that.

There's also one area where
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With grammatical changes of an old school teacher,
2

and a substantive thought that we might not want to be

3

expressing ourselves on how we interface with a certain future

4

development, would that be the type of thing that we should theri

5

send this back out and wait for 30 days before we can move on

6

it?

7

were anticipating the decision last January, and it is now

8

March.

9
10

The parties are already legitimately complaining that they

So, it would be trying to figure out how to decide
when there is a substantive thing.

II

Mr. Mattes had a very interesting idea today.

He

12

said, you know, if it talked to issues that were not covered in

13

the ALJ's proposal, that, I think, would be very useful.

14

You began this with an invitation to work together.

15

I've always come to the party.

16

think that that would be a good idea, because if suddenly the

17

public is taken completely by surprise, that, I don't think, is

18

a very good thought.

19

people make comments.

20

comments, and you don't want people coming to visit . me, saying,

21

"You've done a lot of stinky things in your life, Fessler, but

22

this is the worst I've ever seen."

23

I am desirous of working, but I

But there ought to be some period in which
I take it you envision only written

There is an attraction to me, in that I'm also the

24

bellwether that people can come to, just as you can pick up the

25

phone and reach me, and say, "What did you, and why did you do

26

it?"

27

or individuals at utilities, able to call me up and say, "Why

28

would you be doing this?

I think there's a value in having members of the public,

Do you recognize that this would be
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the consequence?"
2

That's my plea to the Committee.

3

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

4

MR. FESSLER:

5

SENATOR PEACE:

6

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

7

SENATOR PEACE:

Thank you very much.

Certainly.
Mr. Chairman.
Yes.

I have to say that I'm sure when you

8

were confirmed, in addition to not anticipating being appointed

9

to a body that wasn't allowed to meet, that you also didn't

10

anticipate being the object of baseless contempt and attack.

II

All of us in public life have at one time or another had that

12

visited upon us.

13

I had the opportunity to revi.ew this memo prepared by

14

staff upon arrival here.

15

want to apologize to you personally.

16

that it makes an accusation of an actual violation as opposed to

17

a description of an allegation associated with a violation.

18

If nobody else is willing to do it, I
The memo is outrageous, in

Second, it also is prepared in an extraordinarily

19

judgmental manner.

20

words included in the basis.

21

You made reference to one of the little code

I consider this to be an extraordinary breach of

22

etiquette, at minimum.

23 ·

visited upon me as a person in public life at one time or

24

another.

25

happens to someone else.

26

It's the kind of thing that I've had

I resent it when it happens to me; I resent it when it

So, Commissioner, you have more eloquently presented

27

yourself today here than I could ever in the form of an apology,

28

but I think that somebody needs to step up.
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MR. FESSLER:
2

You're very kind.

I'm sure that the memo was not prepared with any --

3

any malice.

4

that I had heard that it was being stated that this was, in the

5

judgment of one of the Committee staff, an effort to provoke a

6

crisis with regard to the Bagley-Keene Act.

7
8

I was troubled, as I told Senator in the letter,

It was not.

Things are susceptible of being given

their most malevolent interpretation.

9

I was attempting to work in a timely manner.

The

10

timeliness and urgency of this matter can be illustrated by the

11

fact that this Committee met yesterday, and you have me here

12

today commenting on this report.

13

SENATOR PEACE:

Your availability to this Legislature

14

is unprecedented.

15

time before we began session to read the attached opinion from

16

the Deputy.

17

And I will say beyond that, I also took the

As is unfortunately so often the case in this place,

18

we have the opinion of one lawyer who, frankly, in my view, at

19

least from this, I hope he's better in the other work product

20

he's done, because even internally, with the document he's

21

presented, you know,

22

secondary information to recognize the poor workmanship.

23

is an extraordinarily poor piece of work.

24

lawyering.

25

usua~ly

you at least have to go to some

I understand your position.

This

It's just bad

I think you probably are

26

taking the correct public course in following the advice, but I

27

think any scholarly reading of the opinion would certainly come

28

to the irreversible conclusion that the opinion itself, as
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issued by the Deputy in the Attorney General's Office, is
2
3

blatantly wrong.
Now, quite frankly, that has not been an unusual

4

circumstance in this Attorney General's Office.

5

the Legislature have often, and I'm sure the Chairman has

6

probably on occasion found himself on the other side of

7

so-called legal opinion coming out of the AG's Office.

8

9

Many of us in

So, I would hope we would all be a little more
circumspect before we let the public conclusions be based upon

10

the overnight work on one lawyer who happens to have the benefit

II

of the attachment of authority.

12
13

14

15
16

MR. FESSLER:

Senator, I'm at your pleasure, if there

are any other questions you have.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I look forward to your detailed

analysis of the Advisory Group's recommendations.
MR. FESSLER:

Yes.

And we will -- I will go back and

17

commend to my colleagues, Senator, that we begin to discuss the

18

Advisory Group's matter.

19

meetings that will be held in public.

20
21

22
23
24

25
26
27

28

We will do so in the context of

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I think that that is

And until such time as there is

a reversal from the AG's Office
MR. FESSLER:

Right, or the Legislature changes the

statute to clarify.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

-- or the Legislature changes,

makes clarification, that is the -MR. FESSLER:

That's our system, Senator.

I

perfectly am willing to abide by the strictures of the system.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you.
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MR. FESSLER:

Thank you very much.

2

Thank you, Senator Peace.

3

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

4

Next, Ed Texeira, ORA, Director

of the Division of Ratepayer Advocates.

5

Thank you for coming today.

6

recommendations of the Advisory Group.

7

PUC reform bills.

8
9
10

You've heard the
You've seen the various

Could you tell the Subcommittee, from the specific
perspective of ORA, what procedural and structural problems you
see at the PUC, and what your recommendations are to fix them?

11

MR. TEXEIRA:

12

I read the document after I arrived here, and I would

Thank you for inviting me.

13

prefer, if you would, submitting written comments when I've had

14

a chance to review them more carefully.

15

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

16

MR. TEXEIRA:

That's fine.

I'd like to focus primarily quickly on

17

the comments that you made, or the report made in connection

18

with ORA, and there' re several observations· that I'd like to

19

make.

20

First of all, I was surprised by the tenor of the

21

report in giving us more power than we have.

22

implication that ORA can do a lot of things in the ex parte area

23

that we find that we cannot do.

24

that ex-Commissioners Vial and Wilk thought that we had that

25

much power when we really don't.

There's an

And so, we're kind of surprised

26

The question of the Forum, and that was interesting,

27

whether -- and there was ambivalence upon part of the committee

28

ori whether ORA should participate in the Forum or not.

And the
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committee used as the genesis of the Forum the old Friday
2

committee.

3

composed of the directors of several divisions, including ORA.

4

In fact, the Director of ORA at that time was the leader of that

5

committee.

6

And the old Friday committee at the Commission was

And so, I can't imagine, you know, why the Forum

7

would not require the participation of ORA, because some of the

8

issues that are being discussed are Commission resources, and

9

how to deploy Commission resources in cases.

And Commission

10

deployment of resources in cases is -- there are more ORA people

II

that participate in these cases than anybody else, and to

12

exclude us from the decision on what cases we're going to

13

participate on boggles the mind on how any decision could be

14

made in that sense.

15
16
. 17

Now, there are times when the Forum seems to be
headed and could discuss more substantive matters, and we could
be excluded when they did that, if that was necessary.

I don't

18

think it's necessary, but, you know, we have ex parte rules

19

right now, and we meet in some committees with decision makers,

20

and we're allowed to communicate with the decision makers in

21

active proceedings, and we've been able to cope with that

22

problem by one of us -- one or the other of us excusing

23

ourselves from whatever meeting when those kind of issues are to

24

be discussed.

25
26
27
28

So, I don't perceive ' it as the same kind of a problem
that the committee did.
Those are kind of my quick observations on -- the
other observation was, it's kind of difficult following

82

President Fessler when he's being so eloquent on a variety of
2

issues, and he had a few more hours to read this stuff than I

3

did.

4

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

5

MR. TEXEIRA:

6

But anyway, I thank you for -- and if you have any

7

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

MR. TEXEIRA:

I mean regarding the independence of

ORA?

12
13

Have you seen the Senate Bill

1957, that suggests a new approach for ORA?

10
11

That's a lot.

questions, I'll be pleased to answer them.

8
9

One and a half.

I'm aware of the bill.

I haven't seen the specific

bill, but I'm aware of the bill.

14

ORA is generally satisfied with the level of

15

independence that we have with the Commission at the present

16

time.

17

There are certain areas where we'd like additional

18

authority, maybe.

19

rehearings, and maybe to petition the Supreme Court in certain

20

decisions.

21

For example, in being able to petition for

We have not been influenced, or unduly influenced, by

22

anyone in the Commission in the way we do our job.

23

completely independent and able to present -- present our point

24

of view in every case and every opportunity.

We feel

25

And I communicate 'with Commissioners quite a bit, and

26

I've never felt that they were trying to influence anything that

27

we were trying to present in a proceeding.

28

So, I don't sense a

great need for distancing ourselves from the Commission because
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of undue influence by the Commissioners.
2

On the other side of the coin, being part of the

3

Commission helps us in discovery.

4

utilization.

It helps us in personnel

It helps us in a lot of ways.

5

There's a thing you should know about ORA.

6

in a lot of ways, the part of the Commission that does a lot of

7

the analysis.

8

variety of areas.

9

Commission in a lot of other ways.

10

ORA is,

And so, we wind up with a lot of the experts in a
And these experts become useful to the

But the way we're structured right now, there's ample

11

opportunity to become experts and to be able to present good

12

information to the Commission.

13
14

SENATOR PEACE:
right.

You do a great deal of the analysis within ORA?

15
16

I want to make sure I heard this

people do a lot of the analysis?

17

MR. TEXEIRA:

18

SENATOR PEACE:

In cases, right.
And as a result, you attract a lot of

19

the best personnel insofar as analysis is required, and as a

20

result, they're in demand with respect to other work in the

21

Commission?

22

You said that a lot of their work product, and a lot

23

of these people's time was used for other purposes at the

24

Commission. . What are those other purposes and what other

25

MR. TEXEIRA:

26

SENATOR PEACE:

27
28

Your

what you said?

Well, what I was driving at then is
Is it possible to go back and read

Maybe it would refresh your memory.

It's very simple.

You really think he needs your
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help?
2
3
4

5
6

7

MR. WILSON:

Lionel Wilson, Assistant General

Counsel.
I think -- I want to make clear what he was talking
about, that that -SENATOR PEACE:

Why do you need to make clear what he

was talking about?

8

MR. WILSON:

9

SENATOR PEACE:

Well, okay.

10

MR. WILSON:

11

SENATOR PEACE:

I'd really rather talk to him.

I understand.
I really resent that when somebody

12

this is exactly the culture I'm talking about:

13

out; staff coming to rescue the staff.

14

15

Why don't we read back what Mr. Texeira had said.
[Thereupon the record was read.]

16

SENATOR PEACE:

17

What other ways?

18

MR. TEXEIRA:

19
20

staff coming

Thank you; .that's it.

We provide some level of advice to new

Commissioners about the industries in general.
SENATOR PEACE:

I'll tell you what.

Why don't you

21

take your hour and a half and write me a letter and outline what

22

these other things are that your folks do.

23

MR. TEXEIRA:

24

SENATOR PEACE:

25

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

26

Our next and final witness is Audrie Krause of TURN.

27

28

I'll be glad to.
Thank you.
Do you have anything further?

Thank you for being here.
Would you please comment on the Advisory Group's
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recommendations, and tell us your views on PUC reforms?
2

MS. KRAUSE:

Thank you, Senator Rosenthal and Senator

3

Peace.

4

for the strong interest that you have personally shown in the

5

need for procedural reform at the Public Utilities Commission.

I appreciate your inviting me, and I want to thank you

6

I had an opportunity to look over the two bills that

7

you are introducing, and generally speaking, we support those

8

measures.

9

certainly be communicating to you.

10

We do have a few very limited concerns that we will
But generally, they are

moving in the right direction.

ll

Of course, we also support the legislation we are

12

sponsoring, and our general feeling is that the three areas that

13

the bills TURN has introduced are addressing are the three key

14

areas where procedural reform is needed.

15

TURN that the reason we need these changes are to improve public

16

accountability and ensure due process.

17

of the changes being recommended by the Advisory Committee, in

18

my opinion, move in the opposite direction, and would do more to

19

diminish public accountability than to improve it.

20

And it's our view at

And that, in fact, some

Specifically, we have concerns about the idea of

21

promoting more extensive use of the rule making procedure as

22

opposed to other processes available to the Commission to

23

conduct its business.

24

accountability to exist, because these are the, essentially, the

25

loosest kind of procedures with the least restrictions on what

26

happens, and the least actual factual evidentiary record out

27

there.

28

This will move away from enabling public

As you may know, in rule makings, I believe that
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there is no ban at all on ex parte contact.

There is also no

2

requirement that a proposed decision be circulated publicly if

3

it is the outcome of a rule making specifically and not another

4

kind of procedure.

5

6

So, we see that as moving away from the public
interest and public accountability.

7

We also feel very strongly that --

8

SENATOR PEACE:

9

If the process required a ban on ex

parte communications, and a publication and review of those

10

processes, but otherwise were subject to the more informal give

11

and take of the rule making procedure, would that change your

12

opinion?

13
14

MS. KRAUSE:

We would have concerns about the absence

of factual records or evidentiary records in any case.

15

Generally speaking, there are a number of procedural

16

avenues the Commission can use.

17

and --

18

SENATOR PEACE:

Rule makings are one of them,

Your real concern is the evidentiary

19

record that's inherently associated with a quasi-adjudicatory

20

process?

21

MS .. KRAUSE:

Well, I don't personally know of too

22

many other ways to develop an evidentiary record, other than

23

holding some sort of a hearing.

24

SENATOR PEACE:

25

MS. KRAUSE:

Yes.

26

SENATOR PEACE:

27

MS. KRAUSE:

28

That's why I asked.

Your concern is that record.

We think the record is very important.

With regard to the need for appellate review, as you
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know, there's not only the bill that we introduced, SB 1325, but
2

one that has been introduced in the Assembly.

3

We think that without the kind of additional

4

opportunity for review that is provided by the appellate

5

reforms that we're looking at, that the problems that we've seen

6

develop at the Commission with procedural irregularities and

7

with legal errors in decisions will only increase over time.

8

believe they have increased over time, because the Supreme Court

9

has not, in fact, reviewed a PUC decision in a number of years.

10

I'm not sure how many years since their last review of a

II

decision.

12

use their discretion not to in most cases.

13

We think the very fact that the Commission can act
with some confidence that

IS

SENATOR PEACE:

16

MS. KRAUSE:

17

SENATOR PEACE:

18

MS. KRAUSE:

19

SENATOR PEACE:

20

MS. KRAUSE:

21

SENATOR PEACE:

22

MS. KRAUSE:

23

SENATOR PEACE:

25
26
27
28

We

But they have discretionary review rights, and they

14

24

revi~w

Is last month close enough for you?

Pardon?
Is last month

On a PUC decision?
Yes.

Can you tell me what -No, but that's what I'm told.

They actually heard the case?
We have a 1990 one here in front of

me.
MS. KRAUSE:

Do you know what issues they were

dealing with?
Perhaps, then, I should limit it to the issues we're
familiar with at TURN, which would be the energy and
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telecommunications issues.
2

The Commission itself does deal with

other issues, and we are not following them.

3

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Why don't we just get that

5

What was the issue?

This was regarding a park

6

district, a recreation and park district?

4

clarified.

7
8

MR. ARTH:
A-r-t-h.

9

I was the one -- my name is Pete Arth,

I'm the Commission's General Counsel.
I think I'm trying to make essentially the same point

lO

that President Fessler was making, and that is that we got a

II

notification from the court two days ago that didn't grant

I2

review.

I3

point is, that in our view, our hearing process is the

14

intermediate review.

15

In fact, they denied a petition for review, but the

There we function as an appellate court.

Then a party goes to the Supreme Court, and we take

16

the review very seriously.

17

please take the case."

18

Commission saying, "No, we think there was. no error of fact in

19

law, and here's why," and the court reacts to that.

20

at the two sides, and they say, "Yes, the Commission does appear

21

to have erred, and we're going to take the case," or "No, they

22

haven't, and we're not taking the case.

23

Petitions are filed, saying, "Court,

We file an answer on behalf of the

They look

And it is true that the last time the court published

24

an opinion was three years ago.

25

cases right around the 1990-91 time frame and published

26

opinions.

27
28

They took a spate of three

But the fact is, our decisions get referred to the
court all the time on petition, and they look at them.
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SENATOR PEACE:

If in fact they were being reviewed,

2

wouldn't you be arguing the fact that the court had to

3

continually step in and take cases, which would be a reason that

4

there's something wrong there?

5

MS. KRAUSE:

The point I'm making is that when there

6

is effectively no avenue to appeal a decision that has legal

7

errors or violated due process, that the Commission itself is

8

going to be, over a period of time, more sloppy in its legal

9

work.

10

II

SENATOR PEACE:

But the record doesn't reflect that.

You just haven't suggested in making the case --

12

MS. KRAUSE:

Well, I think what the record reflects

13

is that the Supreme Court is seriously overburdened with other

14

matters that the .Justices consider --

15

SENATOR PEACE:

Maybe there's a Supreme Court

17

MS. KRAUSE:

more important.

18

SENATOR PEACE:

Which goes back to my point before.

19

This is how society falls apart.

It really is,

We're all on the same side here.

I mean, I don't

16

20

problem.

folks.

21
22

think anybody questions President Fessler's commitment to doing

23

the right thing, or your commitment to doing the right thing.

24

But when we begin to look at the work product of an

25

ordered society, and react based upon the premise, "I'm not

26

getting my

27

of looking at the order of the society, and how is each of these

28

processes held accountable, and dealing with the question of

way~

therefore, I want to change the rules," instead
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accountability, that's when things fall apart.
2
3
4
5

There's a

message there that says none of the rules count.
You think I'm getting far afield, but I believe every
word of what I'm about to say to you.
You want to know why our children grow up

6

increasingly not having a sense of boundaries, having a sense of

7

rule, or order, and a sense of respect, it's because we, as

8

adults, have adopted the philosophy that says, "If I don't get

9

my way, I'm going to change the game, and if I can't change the

10

II

game, I'll take my ball and go home."
And I would beg of you, you have an extraordinary

I2

level of responsibility, authority, and impact in this process.

I3

Please, look at your work product in a more global context.

I4

If this doesn't happen in everything we do in this

I5

Legislature and in other areas, if people don't get out of the

I6

little box that they come from and get out of advocating from

I7

their narrow viewpoints, we're doomed.

I8

MS. KRAUSE:

Well, to respond to your request that I

I9

look at it more globally, let me point out that California is

20

one of very few states in this nation that does not have the

2I

right to appeal a PUC decision directly to a court.

22

allow it, and it does not, in fact, create a more time consuming

23

regulatory process, or lead to delays that are hurting the

24

economies of other states.

25

SENATOR PEACE:

26

you may be right in that.

27

the other in that respect.

28

Most states

I'm not arguing that you're not -I'm not issuing an opinion one way or

I'm just concerned that the evidence you presented as
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the reason to go that way was not convincing to me.

On the

2

contrary, to be honest with you, it almost seemed to argue

3

against your case.

4

5

I'm not commenting on whether we need to have
judicial review, or we don't need to have judicial review.

6

But please, the body of evidence that needs to be

7

presented to suggest these changes needs to be, in my view, far

8

more sophisticated, and far more enlightened than simply getting

9

up and saying, "Well, it's been a long time since the court has

10

reviewed things, and we think they'll get sloppy when they don't

II

get there."

12

Because I can turn around and give you just as

13

superficial an argument for the opposite circumstance to make

14

the same case.

15

not making your case.

That's all I'm saying.

I'm just saying you're

16

MS. KRAUSE:

17

! . want to point out also that in our view, the delays

Thank you for your comment.

18

that do exist in the regulatory process are primarily a result

19

of the fact that the Commissioners have, in large measure,

20

isolated themselves from not only the public, but from their own

21

working staff.

22

And with all due respect, Senator Peace, I think it's

23

unrealistic to assume that the five Commissioners who are

24

appointed to make these decisions are not, in fact,

25

realistically going to have to delegate a large amount of their

26

work to the staff level.

27

And I think a big part of the --

28

SENATOR PEACE:

That's why we have such a large staff.

But the large staff is not
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accountable.
2

If we, as Members of the Legislature, were totally

3

dependent upon staff persons hired by a central authority over

4

which we did not have the hiring and firing authority of those

5

staff people, those staff people aren't going to be responsive

6

to and accountable to me.

7

responsible to the people who elect me.

8

"Well, that's some crazy staff person who went out there, and

9

gosh, you know, it's some bird in the sky that that hires that

10

person, and they're responsible for that sloppy work product."

And in turn, I'm not going to be

II

You're laying out --

I2

MS. KRAUSE:

I3

Presumably, you talk to your staff.

SENATOR PEACE:

I5

MS. KRAUSE:

I6

SENATOR PEACE:

I'm allowed to.

Oh, the Commission is allowed to talk -And I'm allowed to hire and fire my

staff as well.
MS. KRAUSE:

I8

The Commission is allowed to talk to its

I9

staff, too.

20

are about hiring and firing.

I don't know what the civil service requirements

2I

SENATOR PEACE:

22

MS. KRAUSE:

23

I

think --

I4

I7

I can simply say,

Let me share a · little story.

I don't really think that's the issue,

though.

24

SENATOR PEACE:

25

I had a problem with one of my children in school,

26

where the academic standards in the classroom were atrocious.

27

My wife was concerned about this.

28

did, rather than go down and make a big scene, she spoke with

Let me share a story with you.

The first thing my wife
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the teacher.
2
3

That wasn't -- she didn't get a satisfactory

resolution.
Rather than go to the teacher's superior, the

4

principal, first she checked with other parents, "Are you having

5

problems in this classroom?

6

experience?"

7

Are you having the same kind of an

Got some feedback from various parents.

Went and visited the principal.

The principal's

8

first response was, "Well, Mrs. Peace, first of all, I want you

9

to know I don't appreciate you're going around, talking to other

10

parents because that causes problems."

II

Now, that is a classic example of the top-down

12

bureaucrat mentality, protect ourselves from that outside

13

influence, and it's exactly the culture you're describing.

14

If the staff can control access, just as the

15

principal didn't like parents talking to each other because that

16

created problems, that's the indicator of a weak administrator.

17

I had a solution to that.

My kids were out of that

18

school within four weeks and back to their prior public school,

19

and doing fabulous, thank you very much.

20

It's the same mentality.

You're so focused on the

21

procedures, that you're losing track of the fact that no matter

22

what procedures you establish, there're still human beings at ·

23

the end of the procedure process.

24

Commissioners, the staff people, the Legislators, the staff

25

people here, the Governor, no one group of us are any better

26

than the rest of them, you, anybody else.

27

28

MS. KRAUSE:
saying, because --

And guess what?

The

I'm somewhat confused by what you're
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SENATOR PEACE:
2

You're so bought into a bias.

If I took the entire circumstance and reversed the

3

historical roles in terms of work product, and you were fighting

4

the staff all the time, okay?

5

were your only way to save the work product, from your

6

perspective, you'd be here arguing the opposite thing, because

7

you're not arguing from an objective perspective of structure.

And felt that the Commissioners

8

You're arguing from an acute perspective.

9

difference between looking at an income statement and a balance

10

sheet.

11

looks like right now.

12

You're looking at a snapshot:

It's the

this is what the world

We've got to try and devise a structure that works no

13

matter whether the Governor's a Democrat and the Legislature's

14

Republican, or the Legislature's Democrat and the Governor may

15

be a Republican, and the Commission staff, over time, is

16

influenced by the hiring done by Democrat administration or

17

Republican administrations.

18

You have premised your entire proposition that the

19

world's always going to look like what it looks like today in

20

terms of political --

21

MS. KRAUSE:

I'm just astonished that you can come to

22

that conclusion after the very limited amount of my testimony

23

that you've heard, and the fact that you've essentially

24

interrupted each of my statements before I've completed my

25

thought on it.

26
27
28

SENATOR PEACE:

Oh, no, you've completed each

thought, and I've commented on each thought.
MS. KRAUSE:

I have not been able to complete a
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thought since I started, if you'll excuse me for saying so.
2

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

3

SENATOR PEACE:

4

sense, don't blame me.

5

MS. KRAUSE:

6

Senator, let

If you're having trouble making

Go right ahead.
I don't think I'm having trouble making

sense.

7

I do want to point out to you, though, since you may

8

not be aware of it, that TURN has been monitoring and observing

9

the Public Utilities Commission for 21 years now, so we do have

10

a fairly long-term perspective on what's happened there and the

II

changes that have occurred, and how the agency operates over

12

years.

13

Our senior staff attorney has been with TURN for 17

14

years now, so we have on our staff an individual who has that

15

long-term perspective, as well as having it organizationally.

16

In addition to which, as a nonprofit consumer group, we are in

17

fact representing the public's interest, not a narrow subset of

18

somebody's interest, but in the most broad sense possible, the

19

interest of the public, who are, in fact, not well represented

20

in the process now, and not

21

22

SENATOR PEACE:

The

And indeed, you're part of the process, allegedly
representing the public.

25

I would argue-- and I'm not trying to pick a fight

26

with you.

27

from.

28

Isn't that the point?

public's not well represented in the process.

23
24

Bingo!

You're totally misunderstanding where I'm coming

What I'm trying to say to you is that while you work
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to represent the public interest, that process that's
2

established today is inadequate.

3

It doesn't succeed, okay?

And that's not an indictment of your work product, or

4

anybody else's work product in the place.

5

It's not the people.

6

process in all venues, including inside TURN.

It's structural.

There's lots of good people in this

7

But in the aggregate, it doesn't work.

8

MS. KRAUSE:

9

Senator Rosenthal, I'd like to complete

a couple of other thoughts I have.

10

We have specifically proposed amendments to

II

strengthen the Bagley-Keene Act, because we think, in fact, the

I2

current way that the agency operates is not in compliance to the

I3

extent that Commissioners do, in fact, regularly consult with

I4

each other individually in ways that enable them to make up

I5

their mind about votes before they go into public and vote.

I6

And in fact, I think it's important to note that

I7

while the Bagley-Keene Act applies to the PUC and other state

I8

agencies, the Brown Act is similar legislation that applies to

I9

local agencies, I personally am far more familiar with may local

20

agencies.

2I

councils, boards of supervisors, and other local agencies

22

conduct their business in public, and that the problems that the

23

Public Utilities Commission perceives in having to meet in

24

public are problems of their own making, and not problems

25

inherent to requiring agencies to meet in public.

26
27

28

And I can assure you that school districts, city

Certainly, by deliberating in public, they would have
to spend more of their work day in a public setting and less of
it in private meetings with utility lobbyists.

And we believe
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that ultimately, that would be better.
2

We think that spending more of their days in the

)

evidentiary hearing process, working more closely with the

4

administrative law judges, are all ways in which they would

5

become sufficiently familiar with the record to enable them to

6

deliberate in public in advance of a final vote, and give the

7

public some perspective on their views.

8

9

We do appreciate the fact that over the last few
years, the Commission has held more full panel hearings, and a

10

piece of our Bagley-Keene legislation addresses the need for

II

even more of those.

12

The element missing from what they are doing

13

currently is that, while they do invite parties in and spend a

14

great deal of time listening to the views of others, in fact,

15

other than some limiting questioning that's done, they don't

16

really deliberate their views in those settings yet.

17

that over time, they will do so, and we think that legislation

18

to clarify that will help in that regard.

19

We hope

The other point I want to make is that there's been

20

some discussion of potentially a tradeoff in doing away with the

21

right to ex parte visits in exchange for, at least some point in

22

the process, in exchange for the ability of Commissioners to

23

meet in private.

24

We think that what needs to be noted here is that the

25

judicial system is not an appropriate model to look at.

26

it's true that Justices of the Supreme Court meet to discuss

27

their caseload and the disposition of cases, they do not under

28

any circumstances allow themselves to be lobbied by the

While
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plaintiffs or the defendants in the lawsuits, nor do jurists who
2

are hearing a trial by jury allow themselves to be lobbied

3

privately by the parties.

4

decision making is conducted in a public setting on the record.

All the business that leads to their

5

The problem at the Public Utilities Commission is

6

that while on one track you have these public processes, you

7

have the hearings, you have the rule makings, you have the

8

investigations, you have the development of record and evidence

9

and opportunities for people to participate, ultimately the

10

decision making seems to be based more and more frequently on

11

what the individual Commissioners hear in private from

12

utilities, which, in many cases, we have been able to document,

13

is completely irrelevant or in contradiction to what is on the

14

factual record of a case.

15

And we submit that it is just simply poor public

16

policy making to base decisions on what somebody whispers in

17

your ear and ignore the factual record.

18

be the direction that things have been moving in recent years,

19

and our reforms are aimed at moving away from that.

20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27

28

SENATOR PEACE:

In fact, that seems to

Doesn't that argue to eliminate the

ex parte communication?
MS. KRAUSE:

It certainly would argue to limit or to

prevent all ex parte -SENATOR PEACE:

What if you've eliminated all ex

parte communication, but allowed private deliberations?
MS. KRAUSE:

That would be a very different situation

you'd be looking at.
I think our -- generally we would react somewhat
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favorably to that, but we would have some serious reservations
2

about it, because we wouldn't know how it could be properly

3

policed.

4

5

We've already see numerous examples of utilities
violating the disclosure rules that exist now.

6

SENATOR PEACE:

You can't -- one of the hard things

7

about being in a position to make law is the realization that no

8

matter how good you make it, somebody's going to violate it.

9
10

And I guess if they weren't going to violate it, you
wouldn't have to make it in the first place, would you?

II

You can't be so

one way to look at it is, when you

12

look at things, you've got to try and craft the best possible

13

environment you can and hope it works.

14

of a slippery slope that you never to the top of the mountain to

15

ski down.

16

You can't be so .afraid

And if you think that the boogie man is in the ex

17

parte communication --

18

MS. KRAUSE:

You should understand, though, that

19

nobody has been discussing a complete and absolute ban on ex

20

parte communications.

21
22

What was floated at one point as an idea, I guess is
the best way to describe it

23

24

SENATOR PEACE:

MS. KRAUSE:
sense.

27
28

I just asked

you if that makes sense?

25
26

I didn't say you did.

Well, in a perfect world, it would make

And if you're interested in
s·ENATOR PEACE:

perfect?

Would it make an imperfect world more
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MS. KRAUSE:

Maybe,'maybe not.

It's hard to say.

2

mean, if you're interested in proposing a ban on ex parte

3

communications that would be an absolute ban, I'd certainly be

4

interested in talking with you about any proposed

5

SENATOR PEACE:

I

legislatio~.

It just occurs to me there is a

6

logical nexus between the two separate discussion about whether

7

there ought to be ex parte communication or whether there ought

8

not to be ex parte communication, _ and whether Commissioners

9

should be allowed to discuss elements privately or not be.

10

Those are two issues that, to me, are logically related to each

II

other.

12

And I think you made the point quite well when you

13

make reference to a jury deliberation.

14

discuss and required to discuss, but they also are not allowed

15

to have information, and there are violations of that, as we

16

well know.

17

official record at times.

18

courtroom that they're not supposed to get, and they have to be

19

admonished by the judge to ignore what they heard.

20

The jury is allowed to

Juries do get information through other than the
They even get information in the

So, we always recognize a certain imperfection

21

associated with any rules that we establish, and we attempt to

22

encourage people to do their best effort to do that.

23
24

But it would seem to me there's a logical trade-off
there.

25
26
27

28

MS. KRAUSE:

There may be.

That's all I can tell

you.
The last point I want to make is to just say that
you've presented some interesting ideas about the Division of
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Ratepayer Advocates, and I know that the Advisory Committee has
2

also discussed that,

3

ap~arently

without resolution.

I tend to think that the issue of the ORA status, and

4

their -- just the way they interact with the Commission, is a

5

very important issue.

6

deferring that until procedural reform issues are resolved,

7

because there's just so much on the plate right now, it might

8

not get its due.

9

And I would encourage consideration of

Thank you.

10

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

11

There are three persons who have asked to make a

12

comment.

13
14

We'll break for five minutes, and in fifteen minutes,
we'll be out of here at 5:00 o'clock.

15

[Thereupon a brief recess was taken.]

I~

17

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

20

Ladies and gentlemen, we're into

a conclusion.

18
19

Thank you very much.

There are three persons who signed up.
Baker.

There's Steve

Identify yourself for the record.
MR. BAKER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is

21

Steve Baker with Aaron Read and Associates.

22

Association of California State Attorneys and Administrative Law

23

Judges, which includes the attorneys and ALJs of the Commission.

24

We represent the

They have taken a real interest in this issue over

25

the years, and I would like to thank you for your ongoing

26

efforts to try to clear up some of the issues.

27

28

They've been

generally supportive of each of your proposals that you've been
working for a long time now.
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First of all, I'd like to say that I haven't had the
2

opportunity of seeing the 25-page report of the Advisory

3

Committee.

·4

Once we get a chance to take a look at that, then

we'll provide some more detailed recommendations.

5

I would like to just point out, there's been some

6

discussion about the analogy between the difference and

7

similarities between Legislators and Commissioners.

8

is one important difference that hasn't been pointed out, and

9

I'd like to do that.

10

And there

You are elected by your constituents, the voters.

II

And you've got a responsibility to them.

12

disagree with you, then they won't vote for you again, and you

13

may be turned out of office.

14

That isn't the same case with appointed members of

15

the PUC.

16

extent to you.

17

In the event that they

They're responsible to the Governor, and to a lesser

So, I think that it is appropriate that they have

18

some different checks and balances in place on the way they

19

conduct their business.

20

I'd also like to just touch on the issue of the

21

Commissioners' dependence on the staff, because that's been

22

something that •s been discussed here quite a bit also.

23

Our folks tell us that they'd like to actually see

24

the Commissioners have a greater role in decisions.

25

and met with some of the employees there a couple of weeks ago,

26

and I was frankly shocked to hear of long-time Commission

27

employees, attorneys and administrative law judges, who had

28

never met some of the Commissioners.

I went down
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That tells me that there's a problem with the way the
2

Commissioners manage their cases, and that they need to take a

3

greater role in providing some leadership on the way they want

4

to see cases proceed.

5

I don't know where that changed.

It used to be -- I

6

understand there used to be a close working relationship, or a

7

closer working relationship, with Commissioners, and it does not

8

appear that that's the case now.

9

Maybe if we can encourage Commissioners to take a

10

greater interest in the cases, that we won't see some of the

II

concerns that we've heard raised here today.

12

As far as the ex parte issue, I recall working with

13

Senator Roberti about two years ago on his legislation after you

14

had worked on this issue for several years, Senator.

15

Senator Roberti, when he agreed to go ahead and drop his

16

legislation after the Commission agreed to implement their own

17

rule on the issue, Senator Roberti said, "Well, we'll just give

18

them enough rope to go ahead and hang themselves."

19

And

And particularly in light of some of the recent

20

issues that have come up with the decision in the IRD case, it

21

seems like that situation is here now, that we need to have a

22

stricter ex parte rule whereby when decisions are made on the

23

record, there should be a stricter ban on ex parte.

24

Now, in the event that there's some kind of a broader

25

type of package put together, we'd be happy to take a look at

26

hooking that with a judicial type of situation where there's

27

some sort of internal debate with the Commission.

28

to go ahead and review that, and talk to our clients and see how

We'd be happy
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they feel about that and let you know as appropriate.
2

In reference to the Bagley-Keene Act, there's been,

3

again, a lot of discussion about that.

4

point to the analogy that some Members have made with the

5

Legislature.

6

And again, I'd like to

It would appear to me that, particularly for an

7

issues forum -- that's what you've got here in the Legislature

8

with your Rules Committee, who farms out legislation to various

9

committees, and that's how cases are managed here in the

10

Legislature -- that's an open forum.

11

any open -- that we should also have an open forum for case

12

management at the PUC.

13
14

SENATOR PEACE:

The Rules Committee is an open forum?

You said that with a straight face?

15

MR. BAKER:

16

SENATOR PEACE:

17

And it would appear that

Sure it is.
Okay, I'm impressed.

You broke it.

I knew you couldn't do it.

18

MR. BAKER:

19

So, those are our comments.

20

Again, we'd be happy to take a look at the Advisory

It is an open forum, Senator.

21

Group, I guess is the proper word, and make some more

22

recommendations.

23

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

24

Jotham Stein.

25

MR. STEIN:

26

I am an instructor at Boalt Hall School of Law,

27

28

Thank you very much.

Good afternoon.

My name is Jotham Stein.

University of California at Berkeley.
I think I'm probably the only one here who has spent
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four years litigating on behalf of ordinary, politically
2

powerless University students at the California Public Utilities

3

Commission.

4

only party to be denied the right to be heard at the IRD

5

proceedings at the Commission's full panel hearing in August.

6

I am also the only representative representing the

I sent a letter to Mr. Vial setting out eleven real

7

structural proposals that would make real change, because the

R

real problem -- something you haven't been hearing here -- is

9

that the California Public Utilities Commission is really a

10

captured regulatory agency.

II

ordinary individual California citizen.

12

It is not responsive to the

In fact, if you are not a repeat player, or an

13

attorney known to the Commission, then you don't have a right to

14

be heard for the simple reason that they ignore you.

15

And I have set forth eleven real effective proposals

16

that can change that.

The first is to change the office of the

17

Public Advisor into an ombudsman who would have plenary

18

procedural power to investigate all procedural violations going

19

on.

20

or an aggrieved party, could go to the Public Advisor, or a new

21

office of the Public Ombudsman, and say, "This smells.

22

Commission is burying a complaint case.

23

to give me a hearing.

24

communications; I haven't had any."

25

would have the procedural power to affect change.

26

that Public Advisor, or the Ombudsman, the power to tell a

27

Commissioner or the staff, "This isn't American or Californian

28

notions of due process.

No substantive power, but one ordinary California citizen,

The

The Commission refused

The utilities have had 25 ex parte

Change it."

And the Public Advisor
It would give
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If they refuse to respond, and they often do these
2

days, then you should give that Ombudsman power to go to State

3

Superior Court solely for the purposes of affecting procedural

4

change, to take away no substantive power from the Commissioners

5

and the litigating parties.

6

that would go 85 percent of the way to removing this captured

7

regulatory problem we really have at the Public Utilities

8

Commission.

9

But this is a procedural change

Proposal number two, I would offer, is to create a

10

private right of action into State Superior Court on behalf of

II

parties after 60 days for the purposes of requiring the

12

California Public Utilities Commission to follow the statutory

13

law.

14

As it is now, the California Public Utilities

15

Commission, the Commissioners, do not -- they selectively

16

enforce the law.

17

of legitimacy in terms of the public entity, that is, the

18

electorate.

19

which is, I think, in Section 2101, it costs the state coffers

20

millions of dollars in uncollected fines and violations, because

21

the California Public Utilities Commission routinely refuses to

22

enforce those provisions.

23

And that has a real problem.

It costs a lot

It also, in the case of the criminal statutes,

I would also urge a complete ban on ex parte

24

communications.

25

meeting.

26

appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent, I

27

presume, of only the Senate.

28

I would have no problem with Commissioners

They have to make the decisions, and they are

And as long as you have checks

the key is to have checks and balances.
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The check against

the problem now with

2

Commissioners meeting is that they are essentially captured,

3

either directly or through their staff.

4

staff is that the ordinary citizen, the nonrepeat player,

5

doesn't matter.

6

create the check of a private right of action for procedural

7

purposes, create the check of a private right of action to

R

require the Commission to enforce the law, then you will have

9

balanced the problems that you see with capture.

10

The ethos pervading the

But if you create the check of the ombudsman,

You'll have

corrected those procedural problems.

II

I would also urge that, because the ethos runs deep

12

in the Commission, to the staff, that you create a bipartisan,

13

completely independent interim agency to examine the various

14

staff members to see whether they still -- they still believe in

15

California notions of due process, American notions of due

16

process.

17

break up the problem.

18

And if they don't, assign them to other agencies to

You have a rotten state agency that is captured.

The

19

only -- what is the state agency only but the people that work

20

there, and the way you break that up is, you break up the

21

people.

22

rights of the ordinary California citizen.

23

You assign them out if they no longer believe in the

This is not to make people lose their jobs, to lose

24

their pay scale, to lose their pension rights.

25

create a viable, effective agency.

26

completely bipartisan interim overseeing committee, with, like,

27

a year of power, to break up this agency to the extent that it

28

needs to be done.

It's only to

So, you would have a
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I would also urge that ORA mandate.

As you know now,

2

they basically have carte blanche to do whatever they want, and

3

I would urge that you define or redefine part of that mandate to

4

require the ORA to advocate on behalf of the ordinary California

5

citizen.

6

Now, in the eighth largest economy in the world, the

7

ratepayer

8

makes agency determinations.

9

the rights of the ordinary ratepayer because they are making

there are many ratepayers.

But very often, the ORA

Individuals in the ORA jettison

10

agency considerations:

II

power, how they will have better bargaining rights, how they

12

will be able to transfer from the ORA to other areas of the

13

California Public Utilities Commission.

14

you better define that mandate.

15

determination of how they have more

So, I would urge that

I would also urge that you establish -- this will be

16

more difficult -- but a fund for attorneys' fees and for witness

17

fees during investigations in rule makings while the litigation

18

is in process, not a post hoc fund as you have now, so that you

19

will have substantive representation on behalf of the people of

20

California, for those people will have the funds to go into the

21

CPUC during the rule making process, which is now, as you know,

22

very heavily weighted against the average individual, and can

23

have really substantive representation.

24

I ask only that you look at the IRO proceedings, in

25

which you had 24 active parties representing corporations and

26

utilities -- representing at least 39 corporations and

~ 27
28

oAA

utilities, and you had 5 parties, one of whom was the RA,
representing various ordinary citizen, California ratepayer
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interests.
2

And you would want to have, to make an effective

3

decision in a free marketplace, you want to have no barriers to

4

entry, and you want to have full information.

'i

propose both the substantive as well as the procedural changes.

6

And that's why I

I have asked that Mr. Gamson submit into the record a

7

letter I sent to Mr. Vial that outlined these eleven proposals,

8

as well as, I'd like to note that in the earlier meeting, joint

9

meeting of the State Assembly and State Senate Committee, there

10

was entered in the record a letter in which I set out -- a

II

letter directed to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the Honorable Gwen

12

Moore, that sets out the procedural, real

13

violations that I see occurring at the California Public

14

Utilities Commission.

15
16

be happy to answer any questions.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

18

SENATOR PEACE:

20

due process

I thank you very much for your time, and I will

17

19

p~ocedural

Thank you very much.

I'd just like to say, it's refreshing

to have a real person testify, as opposed to, you know.
One person, as you quite eloquently point out,

21

they're all captured by the culture, no matter what side of the

22

issue they're on.

23

had articulating that it's not a matter of picking sides here to

24

fix this thing; it's a matter of breaking down the culture.

25

And I think that's part of the hard time I've

Now, I'm not sure I would take the venture of going

26

through and doing a litmus test, "Do you believe in the American

27

way," or not quite that way, but going inside, having people

28

understand that sometimes movement and change is necessary
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simply because, I don't think anybody's made a conscious
2

decision to be captured by it.

It just happens.

3

so long, and it's so embedded.

And you've done it, and done it.

4

You're there

And the people on both sides of the equation in these

5

debates, they know each other so well.

6

heard it a million times over.

7

same analyses and the same work product, year in and year out.

8

Everything starts sounding the same to them.

9
10

They go through; they've

They start regurgitating the

I'm anxious to look in greater depth at your
recommendations, and appreciate you taking the time to come.

II

MR. STEIN:

12

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

13

Edward Wolf.

14

With that, the meeting is adjourned.

15

Thank you, Senator.
Thank you.

He left?

All right.

coming.

16

[Thereupon this hearing of the

17

Senate Subcommittee on PUC

18

Reforms was terminated at

19

approximately 5:00P.M.]

20
21

22
23
24

25
26
27

28

--ooOoo--

Thank you for
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high-level telephone company managers to secretly write major
portions of the decision, resulting in a potential windfall and
competitive advantage for the local telephone companies. Further,
there were allegations of due process abuses, denial of public
access to the decision-making process, and other improprieties.
In October 1993, the Committee held a Joint Hearing with the
Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee on "Improprieties in the
PUC's Toll Rate Decision." In this hearing, the Committee heard
testimony detailing the concerns about the specific case, as well as
a number of proposals for reforms of the PUC process. The
Subcommittee may want to address specific Legislative remedies to
ensure the improprieties in the IRD case do not recur.
The second rationale for the formation of the Subcommittee involves
a longer-term concern over the fairness and appropriateness of the
current PUC process, and associated organizational structure issues.
Many of the reforms proposed at the october hearing address such
broad issues and suggest long-term changes, dS do current
Legislative proposals.

ADVISORY GROUP
The Subcommittee for~ed an Advisory Group to provide input on PUC
process and structural reforms. The Group is made up of ten
knowledgeable and experienced Californians with a wide variety of
relevant perspectives on the issues (see attached roster). The
Group is chaired by Don Vial, formerly a commissioner and President
of the PUC.
The Advisory Group has held four meetings in order to develop
recommendations to the Subcommittee.
(Discussions at the fourth
meeting, on March 7, occurred too late to include in this memo.)
While the recommendations were not finalized before the hearing,
discussions have focused on the following topics:
o
Ex parte contacts -- Advisory Group members have discussed a
tiered approach to ex parte rules, in which ex parte contacts would
be banned at some polnt in some proceedings, and disclosed but not
banned in other proceedings.
o
Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act -~ The Advisory Group does not
generally favor allowing non-public meetings among Commissioners,
but has considered an .exeption for purely procedural discussions.
o
Rulemaking -- Advisory Group members generally support
legislation to create a presumption that the PUC should use
quasi-legislative Rulemakings whenever possible, instead of
trial-like hearings.
o
commissioner alternate decisions -- There is general agreement
that when a Commissioner substantially alters an Administrative Law
Judge•s proposed decision, this alternate decision should be
available for public scrutiny and comment.
Lower-court Judicial Review -- It is unclear whether Advisory
o
Group members can reach consensus on whether a court below the
supreme court should be able to review PUC decisions.
o
Division of Ratepayer Advocates -- The Advisory Group had not
reached a consensus on the appropriate organizational structure for
the ORA before their March 7 meeting.
The Advisory Group also discussed at length the necessity for
improving communications and procedural management within the PUC.
Advisory Group members agreed that Commissioners should be more
directly involved in the procedural and substantive developments .in
major cases. The Group recommended formation of a 11 Manaaement
Forum 11 to coordinate caseloads and internal case communications.
Although no legislation is necessary to address these issues, the
Advisory Group discussed a number of mechanisms that the PUC may
wish to implement.

?UC P.EFORM LEGISLATION INTRODUCED IN 1994
Several bills have been introduced
PUC's process.

recen~ly

proposing changes to the

SB 1956 !Rosenthal): To amend the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act
to prevent serial, rotating or seriatim meetings involving more than
t~o commissioners, to require a presump~ion that all PUC meetings
should be public, and to require the PUC to allow public comment at
Comm i ssion meetings on all agenda items.
SB 1957 (Rosenthal): To ban ex parte contacts after the release
of an ALJ proposed decision, to require that Commissioner
alternate decisions be made public for 30 days before a vote, and to
strengthen the independence of the ORA.
SB 1325 (Kopp): To allow Appeals Court review of PUC decisions,
~han sole review by the state Supreme Court.

~ather

AB 2840 <Solis): To require the PUC Commissioners to hold
public participation hearings before and after major cases, and to
expand the Bagley-Keene Act to prohibit serial, rotating or seriatim
meetings.
AB 2850 (Escutial: To require commissioner alternate decisions
be made public for 30 days before a vote.
AB 3640 <Bernstein/Moore): To allow Appeals court review of PUC
decisions, rather than sole review by · the state Supreme Court.
Of these bills, three (SB 1325, AB 2840 and AB 2850) were sponsored
by Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN).
TURN, an independent
ratepayer protection organization, testified at the October Joint
committee hearing on these and other reform ideas.
The PUC may also sponsor legislation (currently in spot bill form)
to allow itself to be exempted from the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting
Act for various purposes.
For example, commissioners would be
allowed to meet in private to discuss administrative matters, and to
deliberate certain cases.
The Subcommittee and the Advisory Group have received input from a
number of other organizations regarding PUC reforms. These include
Attorneys for Constructive organizational Reform (representing
attorneys at the PUC), the Association of California state Attorneys
and Administrative Law Judges (ACSA), nineteen PUC ALJs, the
California Water Association, the California Cable Television
Association, and the Law Office of Jotham Stein.
Representative of
these organizations have been invited to address the Subcommittee
during the Public comment segment of the Agenda.

TASK OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
The Subcommittee may want to recommend legislation to the full
Committee. such recommendations could include comments on the
concepts in bills already introduced, recommend amendments to such
~egislation, or recommend new legislative ideas.
If consensus can be reached on any non-controversial PUC reform
issues, an Energy and Public Utilities Committee Bill (SB 1938) has
been introduced for this purpose.
The Subcommittee will need to consider whether proposed reforms
should best be accomplished through legislation. or internal PUC
administrative action. Some concerns, such as allowing lower-court
review of PUC decisions, can only be implemented through legislation
Other issues may be dealt Nith either by legislation or through
internal PUC action. For example, legislation mandating an exparte
rule for the PUC was held after the PUC adopted ari internal rule in
1991.

The PUC is likely to argue that the Legislature should not mandate
procedural rules or reforms for the PUC, but should let the PUC take
care of its own internal management and process. A consideration is
that the Legislature does not have direct control over
administrative actions, which may not be implemented in the same
manner or time period. as legislation would require. At this time.
the Subcommittee may want to consider whether the PUC will. on its
own. effectively adopt and implement rules to ensure a fair and open
process.
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March a, 1994
To:

Members, Subcommittee on PUC Reforms

From:

Chairman Rosenthal

Subject: PUC Violation of Bagley-Keene open Meeting Act
It has just come to my attention that the PUC may have recently
violated the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act by holding secret
meetings. The application of this open meeting act to the PUC is
an issue under review by the Subcommittee and our Advisory Group,
and is the subject of pending PUC reform legislation. A summary of
this controversy is set-forth below. I intend to raise this issue
at today's Subcommittee hearing.
SUMMARY OF FACTS RELATING TO PUC COMMISSIONERS "SECRET" MEETINGS

1. Four PUC Commissioners (all but Comm. Eckert) held meetings on
February 10 and February 16. Neither meeting was noticed to the
public, nor open to the public, nor were any agenda, transcript or
notes released.
2. The meetings were ostensibly held to discuss "optimal
organization" and "use of limited internal resources'' related to
proposals by the Governor and Legislature to reorganize the PUC.
3. The Commissioners agreed amongst themselves that the meetings
were legal, based on President Fessler's assertation that the topics
of the meetings were "not conducting the people's business," but
rather purely "administrative matters" and thus not subject to the
Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act.
4. The meetings were tape recorded. The subcommittee has requested
transcripts of the meetings consistent with the opinion of the
Attorney General's Office (discussed below).
5. In regard to these meetings, the PUC's legal counsel informed
the Commissioners "that the position of the attorneys" in the
Attorney General's office "is that ... a state body risks being found
in violation of the (Bagley-Keene) Act should someone challenge that
action," (emphasis added) according to the PUC's l~tter to the
Attorney General (discussed below) .

..........

6. At least one of the - Commissioner meetings was held after
the internal PUC legal counsel opinion was provided; however,
Commissioner Eckert sent a memo to her colleagues stating that
she did not believe it was appropriate to attend the meetings.
7. The Commission on February 16, at the second closed meeting,
approved a letter that was sent to the Attorney General asking
whether these meetings would constitute a violation of the
Bagley-Keene Act.

a.

The Attorney General responded on March 4. The opinion stated
"We conclude that the discussions amongst members of the Public
Utilities Commission ... concerning the internal reorganization of the
Commission and its staff should be conducted in open public
session." (emphasis added). The Attorney General's office informed
the Subcommittee today that this opinion is not priviliged.
9. The Attorney General recommended that the recordings of the
secret meetings be transcribed and made available to the public.
10. On March 4, I sent a letter to PUC President Fessler requesting
documentation relevant to these events. Documents requested were
provided on March 7, except for the PUC's internal counsel opinion,
for which attorney-client privilige was claimed.
11. The enclosed Attorney General's opinion, and the PUC's letter
requesting that opinion, are made available to you to assist you in
your deliberations at this afternoon'~ Subcommittee hearing.

Attachments
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DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attomey General

State of California
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICI!
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(916) 324-5390
March 4, 1994

Daniel Wm. Fessler
Public Utilities Commission
SOS Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102-3298

RE:

Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act - ( A-85)

Dear Mr. Fessler:
This letter is in response to your correspondence of February 16, 1994,
conceming the requirements of the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (Gov. Code, §
11120 et seq.).!l We conclude that the dist:ussions amongst members of the PubHc
Utilities Commission (hereinafter 11 Commission") concerning the internal reorganization
of the Commission and its staff should he conducted in open public session.
The fact'; as set forth in your letter, are as follows:

"As you may know, over the past several years a major issue which
has faced the Governor and the Legislature, as we)) as the CPUC and the
California Energy Conservation and Development Commission (CEC), is
the reorganization of energy policy in this State. The 1993 Budget Act
contained a requirement that Governor Wilson submit a reorganization
proposal to the Legislature by December 1, 1993. On that date, .the
Governor wrote a letter to legislative leaders in the California Assembly
and Senate in which he presented his outline for reorganization of the
energy functions, as well lts the energy agencies, of California. Included
in that letter were various proposals for internal reorganization of the
CPUC.
I

"In addition to, and to no small degree in response to, the
Governor's letter, several other efforts have been launched to review the

1. All statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.
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internal workings of the CPUC. On December 3, a letter was sent to the
same legislative leaders as had received the Wilson letter, by the
chairpersons of key committees in both houses, which announced that the
Senate Energy and Public Utilities Committee and the Assembly Utilities
and Commerce and Natural Resource Committees would be holding
hearings beginning in January which would examine energy policy and the
governmental structure which regulates it. One hearing, addressing
CPUC/CEC reorganization, has nlready been held. A second hearing, to
address CPUC internal reorganization, is due to be scheduled soon. AJso,
a blue ribbon panel, headed by former CPUC President Don Vial, is
currently holding a series of meetings to discuss, evaluate, and make
recommendations on various reorganization proposals here at the CPUC."
In light of these external efforts to reorganize the Commission, you asked
whether the members of the Commission could meet in private without notice to the
public to discuss the Commission's internal reorganization.
This Office has long taken the position that a meeting is any gathering of a
quorum of the body, either together or serially, to discuss, deliberate upon, or receive
information on matters under the jurisdiction of the body. (63 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 820
(1980); 61 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 220 (1978); 42 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 61 (1963); Open Meeting
Laws (Cal.Atty.Gen., pamp. 1989) p. 15.) TI1e term "meeting11 has been construed to
cover lunch meetings (Sacramento Newspaper GuUd v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supn.
(1968) 263 CaJ.App.2d 41, 47-51), pre-council meetings (Jd.), telephone polling
(Stockton Newspapers, Jnc. v. Redevelopment Agency (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 95),
information seminars (I.L. 75-255), and team building leadership training (Open Meeting
Laws (Cai.Atty.Gen., pamp. 1989) P·. 18).
The fact that a matter does not directly involve a regulated entity does not
mean that it is a matter beyond the jurisdiction of the open meeting law; rather, all
matters must be considered in open session unless a specific exemption expressly
provides for a closed session (§ 11132). The issue of internal reorganization is much
like that of budgetary and personnel issues. As you know, there is a specific exemption
for certain types of personnel decisions (§ 11126(a)). However, issues such as the
employment of an executive director are nol subject to an exception and must be
accomplished in open session (68 Ops.CaJ.Atty.Gen. 34 (1985)). Issues related to the
classification of employees or layoffs for a class of employees are matters which must
be considered in open session (Santa Clara Federation of Teachers v. Governing Board
(1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 831). When an excmpl personnel matter also involves an fssue
related to the expenditure of funds, the monetary issue must be considered Jn open
session (San Diego Union v. City Cowzcil (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 947). Thus, personnel
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decisions arc subject to the Bagley-Keene Act, even though such matters are essentially
internal to the functioning of the agency.
In this particular case, the internal reorganization of the Commission is the
subject of great public interest. ~ your letter indicates, both the Governor and the
Legislature are heavily involved in the process of internal reorganization for energy
related agencies.
In your letter, you referred to a brief passage on page 19 of this Office's Open
Meeting Laws pamphlet concerning procedurnl issues which could be discussed outside
of an open meeting. This reference was to matters such as agreeing upon meeting
dates, coordinating calendars, and reque.c;ts from a member that an item be placed on
the agenda for discussion at a subsequent meeting. This passage in the pamphlet
cannot be relied upon to support the notion that a series of substantive discussions
about the internal reorgEmization of an agency's staff' and workload can be
accomplished in private meetings.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that aU discussions concerning the
reorganization and administration of the commission and its staff involving a quorum of
the commission members, either together or serially, must be undertaken in pubHc
session.
Lastly, in your letter you indicated that the Commission previously held private
meetings concerning the Commission's internal reorganization. We recommend that the
recordings be transcribed and that the availability of the transcripts be made known to
the public through the Commission's mailing list or other vehicle which the Commission
uses to inform interested persons of its meetings.
Sincerely,

DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attorney General

3a~:v.s~~
FLOYD D. SHIMOMURA
Assistant Attorney General
TP:ljh
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February 16, 1994
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren
Attorney General of the State of California
California Department of Justice
1515 K Street
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Attorney General Lungren:
I am writing to inform you of a matter which is of considerable
concern to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC),
involving an interpretation of the Bagley-Keene Open Meetings
Act, Government Code Sections 11120 et seq. As you may know,
over the past several years a major issue which has faced the
Governor and the Legislature, as well as the CPUC and the
California Energy conservation and Development commission (CEC),
is the reorganization of energy policy in this State. The 1993
Budget Act contained a requirement that Governor Wilson submit a
reorganization proposal to the Legislature by December 1, 1993.
On that date, the Governor wrote a letter to legislative leaders
in the California Assembly and Senate in which he presented his
outline for reorganization of the energy functions, as well as
the energy agencies, of California. Included in that letter .were
various proposals fQr internal reorganization of the CPUC.
In addition to, and to no small degree in response to, the
Governor's letter, several other efforts have been launched to
review the internal workings of the CPUC. on December 3, a
letter was sent to the same legislative leaders as had received
the Wilson letter, by the chairpersons of key committees in both
houses, which announced that the Senate Energy and Public
Utilities committee and the Assembly Utilities and Commerce and
Natural Resource Committees would be holding hearings beginning .
in January which would examine energy policy and the governmental
structure which regulates it. one hearing, addressing CPUC/CEC
reorganization, has already been held. A second hearing, to·
address CPUC internal reorganization, is due to be scheduled
soon. Also, a blue ribbon panel, headed by former CPUC President
Don Vial, is currently holding a series of meetings to discuss,
evaluate, and make recommendations on various reorganization
proposals here at the CPUC.
With ·that prelude, I now get to the heart of my concern. Given
all of these external efforts "to restructure and reorder my
agency, I believe it is absolutely incumbent on me as President
to gather my, Commissioners together to discuss the administrative
implications of such efforts. I also firmly believe that the
commission should have the leeway·to hold such sessions in
private, without notice to the pubiic. But I also understand
that there is a lack of clarity in the Bagley-Keene Open Meetings
Act concerning whether we may gather in this way.
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However, my understanding of the Act is that its primary, if not
sole, focus is to ensure that the "public's business" is carried
out by state bodies in noticed meetings which are open to the
public, unless one of the closed session exceptions is
applicable. That is, purely administrative matters internal to
those state bodies are not the statute's focus, and gatherings of
a quorum or more of a state body to d~scuss such purely
administrative items are, in my view, exempt from the open
· meeting requirement.
our counsel has informed us that the position of the attorneys in
your office who have responsibility for interpreting the Act is
that based on the language of the statute and on current case
law, even with gatherings of the nature I have described above, a
state body risks being found in violation of the Act should
someone challenge that action in a court of law. However, your
staff has also indicated that there exists a minority view among
some outside practitioners that gatherings to discuss solely
administrative, internal matters are not of the sort the Act was
intended to regulate, and that convening such a gathering would
not violate the Act if care is taken that no matters which
involve deliberation or decisionmaking on a matter of the
public's business is discussed.
Indeed, in the handbook prepared by attorneys in the office of
then-Attorney General John Van de Kamp interpreting the BagleyKeene and the Brown Acts (Govt. Code Sections 54950 et seq.),
there are indications that a narrowly prescribed exception has
been recognized, covering basically the subject I am outlining in
this letter. For example, in the section discussing seriatim
meetings, the handbook states:
"We do not think the serial meeting prohibition would prevent
an executive officer from planning upcoming meetings by
discussing times, dates, and the placement of matters on the
agenda. It also appears that an executive officer may
receive spontaneous input from any of the board members with
respect to these or other matters." Open Meeting Laws, 1989
publication of the California Attorney General's Office, at
p. 19.
This indicates to me that if a series of one-on-one discussions
between an agency's executive officer and the members of the
board or commission on such administrative items would not
violate the Act by being impermissible seriatim meetings, a
gathering with a quorum or more of the members of the agency
would similarly not violate the Act if such item~ were the sole
topics of discussion.
•

I fully realize that once the agency members begin to engage in
information gathering, or in debate, discussion, lobbying or any
other aspect of the deliberation process either among themselves
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or with staff, involving an item of official business which is
pending before the agency for decision (whether already
officially noticed on an upcoming meeting agenda or not), the
activity must occur in the setting of a publicly noticed meeting.
It is in no way the intention of any of the CPUC commissioners to
go beyond the restrictions of the Act: thus the meetings
contemplated will not encroach upon any of the activities
detailed immediately above nor relate to items of official CPUC
business.
We have already held two unnoticed meetings to begin discussions
on the administrative aspects of various internal reorganization
proposals, and are most anxious to hold additional ones. We have
recorded both of these sessions and intend to continue this
practice. As I have indicated above, the reorganization issue is
time-sensitive: both the Legislature and other groups are
currently convening on various aspects of this issue. By this
letter I am informing you of the Commissioners' activities to
date and future intentions in this regard, and am assured that if
you find any of this to be in contravention of the letter or the
spiri
f the Bagleyne Open Meetings Act, you will inform me
forth \ : :

,Jrl

~#..

Fessler

•.

LAW OFFICE OF

JOTHAM S. STEIN
8025 Skyline Boulevard
Oakland, California 94611
(510) 642 -0626

1 March 1994

Mr. Donald Vial,
Chairman, Advisory Group For the Senate Subcommittee On Public
Utilities Commission Reforms
California Foundation on the Environment and the Economy
50 Osgood Place, Suite 230
San Francisco, CA 94133
Dr. Mr. Vial,
I am an attorney and Boalt Hall Instructor who has spent the
last four years representing ordinary, politically-powerless
California citizens before the California Public Utilities
commission, and I am writing now to offer your Advisory Group
eleven effective proposals that will transform the Commission
into a state agency responsive to the needs of California's
ordinary citizens. I attach to this letter, a letter I sent to
Senator Rosenthal and Assemblywoman Moore that set out seven
severe due process problems currently plaguing the Commission. I
will be happy to discuss with your Advisory Group the proposals I
offer below.
I ask that you call my letter and proposals to the attention
of other members of your Adyisory Group.
Before I begin, I must write that I am very concerned that
two CPUC employees are part of your Advisory Group. The ignorethe-ordinary-California-citizen malaise that has plagued the
Commission throughout the 1990's is not limited to Commissioners,
but affects many employees throughout the Commission.
Consequently, I am very concerned about the impartiality and
scope of the proposed reforms that an Advisory Group with two
CPUC employees may offer. I respectfully request that your
Advisory Group consider proposals 5 and 7 below (relating to
Commission employees} in the absence of the two Commission
employees on your Advisory Group.
STEIN LETTER TO ADV GROUP
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Due Process Problems Plaguing the commission:
For your convenience, I list below the seven due process
problems currently plaguing the Commission. The attached letter
more fully describes these problems.
1.

Meritorious citizen complainants need a Commission
patron to obtain fast and just results.

2.

Powerful corporations and regulated utilities have
unfair access to the Commission and the Commissioners.

3.

Commission ethos teaches that the Commissioners can do
whatever they want to do because the PUC Code provides
only one right of appeal from Commission decisions.

4.

The Commission does not care about enforcing the
statutory law unless its failure to enforce the law
will result in public embarrassment.

5.

The Commission selectively enforces its own orders.

6.

The Commission no longer sees itself as the protector
of the ordinary powerless California citizen.

7.

The Office of the Public Advisor is a powerless entity
that fools the public into believing someone at the
CPUC can actually intercede on the public's behalf.

Introduction To Proposals
If the California Legislature truly wants to make the
Commission a fair place for all Californians, then the
Leg~slature must pass a set of reforms to guarantee procedural
fairness to every Californian, and to guarantee substantive
representation to every Californian. Below, I offer 11 proposals
that, if adopted, will return the Commission to the people of
California.
I group these proposals into three categories:
(1)
Ombudsman, (2) Extra-Commission Procedural Reforms, (3) Internal
Commission Reforms.

.
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Ombudsman
Proposal #1:

Make the Public Advisor a true Ombudsman, or
create a separate Office of the Public Ombudsman.
Make the Ombudsman directly responsible to the
ordinary citizen for all concerns regarding
procedural fairness at the Commission. Give the
Ombudsman power to investigate procedural issues
and the power to request that the Commission take
appropriate procedural steps. Give the Ombudsman
the power to sue the Commission and parties
appearing before the Commission in State Superior
Court to correct procedural inequities occurring
at the Commission. Prohibit the Ombudsman for ten
years before and after service from taking a job
with, or being employed by, regulated public
utilities and corporations. Provide heavy
criminal and civil penalties for violation of the
Ombudsman's
, public trust.

The most effective way to ensure procedural fairness for
every Californian is to make the Public Advisor a true procedural
Ombudsman (or to create a separate Office of the Ombudsman). The
Ombudsman will guarantee to every Californian a level Commission
playing field on due process and procedural issues. The
Ombudsman will have plenary power to oversee and enforce
procedural fairness at the Commission. This proposal guarantees
that every Californian can obtain effective relief when the
Commission or litigating parties try to abridge due process
rights.
By creating an Ombudsman, the Legislature guarantees that
the commission can no longer conduct itself as a captured
regulatory agency on procedural issues . . The Ombudsman will
res~ore the people's faith in the Commission because every
Californian will know a truly effective power guarantees them a
right to be heard.
The Ombudsman will address procedural, not substantive
issues. Substantive issues will remain the purview of the
Commission, the ORA, and litigating parties. For example, under
this proposal, the ombudsman will have the power to tell a
Commissioner to issue a decision in a buried complaint case, but
not have the power to address the substantive issues involved in
the case.

STEIN LETTER TO ADV GROUP
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Extra-Commission Procedural Reforms
Proposal #2:

Provide a right of appeal and a right to mandamus
review to the California Court of Appeals.

By providing a right of appeal and mandamus from the
Commission to a state appellate court, the Legislature will give
a real right of review to parties aggrieved by internecine
commission politics and Developing World notions of due process
of law. I will not further discuss this critical issue because I
realize that the Subcommittee on Public Utility Reforms may not
have jurisdiction over this proposal.

Proposal #3:

Provide a private right of action in State
Superior Court for aggrieved parties to require
the Commission to enforce the law.

To ensure that the Commission does not continue to
selectively enforce the law, the Legislature should provide
ordinary California citizens with a private right of action in
State Superior Court. Doing so will permit parties to request
the court to force the Commission to follow its constitutional
duties. Currently the Commission selectively enforces its own
orders (which are the law), as well as the Public Utilities Code
provisions. This private right of action for enforcement actions
will fix the selective enforcement problem in California's
largest captured regulatory agency.

Proposal #4:

Provide to every California citizen the right to
swear out criminal complaints in local District
Attorneys office to ensure that the Public Utility
Code's criminal provisions are enforced.

The commission costs the state of California millions of
dollars a year because it routinely fails to enforce the criminal
statues as required by PUC §2101. Furthermore, the Commission's
failure to enforce the criminal statutes creates a large societal
process cost because California citizens no longer trust the
agency to apply the law equally to all.
This proposal will generate millions of dollars in revenue
to California by ensuring that the State collects from those that
violate its laws. In addition, this proposal will increase the
legitimacy of the Commission by demonstrating to all Californians
that not even the most powerful utility is above the law.

STEIN LETTER TO ADV GROUP
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Internal Commission Reforms
Proposal #5:

Replace all Commission personnel that an outside
independent committee determines are no longer
disinterested employees intent on fairly applying
the law for all Californians. Establish an
interim committee to make independent
determinations and to reassign Commission
employees to other State agencies.

The Commission's cultural ethos teaches that the ordinary
Californian simply doesn't matter. The prejudice against the
ordinary Californian is a cancer that pervades many Commission
employees' thought processes. Lawyers litigating before the
Commission know that a party needs a Commission patron before it
can get anything done at the Commission. Many Commission
employees put agency considerations before the interests of
substantive and procedural due process.
The only way to fix the cultural ethos of a rotten state
agency is to remove the agency's affected employees. To correct
the Commission's problems, the Legislature should establish a
special outside interim committee to assess every CPUC employee
to determine which employees are able to treat all Californians
equally. The interim committee should be empowered to reassign
all negatively affected Commission employees to other state
agencies.
No employee should lose their job, pension, or pay rate.
The interim committee should simply transfer employees at their
wage scale to other state agencies. At the same time, the
interim committee should transfer to the Commission employees
from other state agencies. Alternatively, the interim committee
should have the authority to hire fresh new employees.

Proposal #6:

Strict ban on all ex parte communications at the
Commission. Establish civil and criminal
penalties for violating Commission ex parte
regulations. Provide that violation of ex parte
regulations is an impeachable offense as to
Commissioners and grounds for dismissal as to
Commission employees. Create a "unrebuttable
presumption" that the ex parte violator committed
fraud in a civil action for fraud.

This proposal will remove every appearance of impropriety at
the Commission. By establishing strict ex parte rules as a
matter of law, the Legislature will guarantee to every
Californian his or her right to an equal day at the Commission.
STEIN LETTER TO ADV GROUP
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This proposal will provide real change. By contrast, the
commission's current ex parte rules are a sham that merely create
an ethical veneer.
Judge Green broke up AT&T while living up to the highest
ethical standard. No party in the AT&T divestiture proceeding
ever questioned Judge Green's integrity as the learned Judge
forever revamped America's communication map. If Judge Green
could break up AT&T while maintaining the highest standard of
ethics, then the people of California are entitled to a
commission that lives up to the same lofty ethical standards.

Proposal #7:

Redefine the mandate of the Division of Ratepayer
Advocates to require ORA advocates to protect the
interest of the individual California citizen.
Provide that a violation of this mandate is a
severe ethical violation punishable by permanent
revocation of bar licenses.

currently, the law provides the ORA with an overly broad
mandate that permits the ORA to do as it wishes. The ORA uses
its carte blanch to define its own interests. Sometimes the ORA
uses its carte blanch to sacrifice the individual consumer's
interest for political and intra-agency gain. Some ORA lawyers
put agency administrative concerns first.
This proposal redefines the ORA mandate to ensure that ORA
lawyers knows that its client is the ordinary, politicallypowerless California citizen. Once the ORA lawyer understands
who his or her clients are, the ORA lawyer must, as a matter of
legal ethics, zealously advocate for his or her client. This
proposal's ethical violation provisions guarantees that ORA
lawyers know the consequences of violating the public's trust.

Proposal #8:

Require the Commission to decide all complaint
cases and cases granted rehearing within 60 days
of the close of hearings.

Proposal #9:

Require Commission ALJ's to issue decisions in the
order in which they hear their cases. Provide a
private cause of action against the ALJ and
Commission for violation of this provision. Make
a violation of this provision grounds for
dismissal.

Proposals 8 and 9 will guarantee that the Commission and the
Chief ALJ can no longer assign into oblivion cases they don't
STEIN LETTER TO ADV GROUP
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want to decide. Taken together, proposals 8 and 9 will do away
with the current destructive real politic requirement that
parties have a Commission patron to shepherd their case through
the Commission.

Proposal #10:

Provide a fund to pay for attorneys fees and costs
to public interest attorneys and attorney's
representing ordinary citizens while the
litigation is in progress in Commission
Investigations, and Complaint Cases Granted
Rehearing.

This proposal will ensure that all of California's citizens
are represented at critical Commission Investigations and
complaint cases granted rehearings. Currently, Commission
Investigations are a monstrous joke as rich public utilities line
up in droves to lobby and win concessions in multibillion dollar
games. The ORA cannot and does not purport to represent all
sectors of California's voting populace. One or two public
interest groups have become the official public interest dissent,
but those groups do not purport to represent all sectors of
California's citizenry.
one only need to look as far as the Commission's IRO
proceeding to understand how substantively unfair the
Commission's Investigations have become. In IRO, four or five
underfunded parties representing California's consumers try to
balance thirty or so behemoths intent on taking a piece of
California's multibillion communication prize. By providing
funding while Commission Investigations are in progress, the
Legislature will guarantee substantive representation to all
Californians. The savings to California's citizens might reach
into the billions.
The Legislature should fund this proposal 50% from
regulated utilities, 25% from cuts in the ORA budget, and 25%
from an additional charge on the consumers bill. The regulated
utilities have a duty to contribute because a utility is
obligated to serve its consumers. The only way to guarantee just
service in the consumers interest is to insure that independent
private consumers test the utilities' fund raising plans. The
ORA budget should be reduced because a redefined ORA's obligation
to represent all Californians can be met, in part, more
effectively by private outside counsel. The California consumer
should pay some share because the consumer will benefit from the
representation arising from the fund.

.
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Proposal #11:
~.

Ten year ban on PUC Commissioners & employees
accepting employment with regulated utilities or
corporations after leaving the Commission.
Require that PUC Commissioners & employees not
have worked for a PUC regulated utility or
corporation for 10 years immediately preceding
beginning work at the Commission.

This proposal guarantees that the Commission will be free
from every appearance of impropriety. This proposal is similar
to ethical requirements recently promulgated for federal
employees.
Please let me know if I can be of further service to you or
your Advisory Group during its deliberations.

cc:

Hon. Herschel Rosenthal
Hon. Newton Russell
Hon. Alfred Alquist
All Advisory Group members.
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TURN

Toward UtfiHy Rate Normalization
625 Polk Street, Suite 403
San Francisco, CA 94102
Tel. (415) 929-8876 • FAX (415) 929-1132
AUDRIE KRAUSE
UECUTIVE DIRFCT'JR

March 14, 1994
Senator Herschel Rosenthal
Chair, Energy & Public Utilities Committee
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
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Dear Senator Rosenthal,
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I want to again thank you for convening the
subcommittee hearing to consider various proposals for
-· . _. procedural reform of the California Public Utilities
Commission (PUC). Your efforts to ensure greater public
accountability at the PUC are deeply appreciated.

:::o~er

In light of Senator Peace's criticism of your March 8
memo regarding the PUC's violations of the Bagley-Keene
Act, I would also like to note for the record that TURN
believes the points you made were in order. Here again,
TURN appreciates the way you have followed up on issues
that we raised in our testimony before the joint hearing
last October.
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With regard to the March B hearinq, there are two
additional points that I would like to make reqarding the
PUC's lack of compliance with the Bagley-Keene Open
Meetings Law.
'
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First, it is worth noting that the Commissioners
regularly discuss legislative positions in public.
Frequently, these discussions get rather heated.
Eventually, the Commissioners reach a consensus and vote.
If the commission can deliberate about leqislative
positions in public, why not do the same with reqard to
regulatory matters? TURN submits that there is no basis
for making a distinction between leqislative and
regulatory positions. Both should be discussed in public
-- if necessary, more than once -- prior to Commission
action.
And that leads to my second point. Many regular
Commission observers share TURN's perception -- although
they undoubtedly won't say so publicly -- that the real
reason the Commission is so wedded to closed meetinqs is
that these particular Commissioners are all-to-often

either poorly-informed or misinformed about important matters on
which they are about to vote. The perception of many observers
is that the Commissioners would rather bend the law than risk
being caught off-guard and embarrassed.
TURN can only speculate as to why the five individuals who
are serving as Commissioners today have, to a much greater extent
than their recent predecessors, isolated themselves as decisionmakers.
Having observed the Commission operate for twenty-one years,
it appears to TURN that the problem stems in part from the
commissioners' failure to take an active interest in regulatory
processes, which effectively isolates them from the wealth of
human resources embodied in the Commission's staff. The problem
is compounded by the Commissioners' apparent aversion to
attending public participation hearings, which before the 1990s
provided reqular consumers with a forum for addressing decisionmakers face-to-face, and on the record.
Instead of listening to the public and discussing regulatory
policy matters in publ~c, the Commissioners spend much of their
time with utility lobbyists, hearing only one side of any given
issue, only those "facts" that support the utility's interest.
Of course, that is exactly why the Commission should be
conducting its business in public. Doing so would ensure that
all interests are heard -- including the public's interest, which
TURN serves.
Again, thank you for inviting TURN to participate in the
recent hearing. I hope you will include this letter in the
record of the March 8 subcommittee hearing.
Sincerely,
./
i

·- . . L.
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_...Audrie Krause
Executive Director

CC:

Members, Senate Enerqy and Public Utilities Committee
Members, Assembly Energy and Public Utilities Committe
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I.

Under the Constitution of 1867:
EDSON et al.

v.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO.
Supreme Court of California
May 23, 1901
133 Cal. 25, 65 P. 15
In bank. Appeal from superior court, city and
county of San Francisco; George H. Bahrs, Judge,
Proceedings by E. B. Edson and others, as
constituting the board of railroad commissioners,
against the Southern Pacific Company, to compel the
defendant to restore a lower rate. From a judgment in
favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed.
BEAITY, C. J.
Section 20 of article 12 of the constitution
provides that 'whenever a railroad corporation shall for
the purpose of competing with any other common
carrier lower its rates for transportation of passengers
or freight frcxn one point to another such reduced rates
shall not be again raised or increased from such
standard without the consent of the governmental
authority in which shall be vested the power to regulate
fares and freights.' This is a proceeding under said
section to compel the defendant to restore a lower rate
which it is charged was adopted by it for the purpose
of competition, and which it has raised without the
consent of the railroad commission established by
section 22 of the same article of the constitution. The
complaint consists of two counts, in the first of which
it is alleged that the defendant lowered its passenger
rate between San Francisco and Fresno for the purpose
of competing with the San Joaquin Valley road, and
afterwards raised the rate without the consent of the
railroad commission.
Several of the material
allegations of this oount are put in issue by the answer.
In the second count it is alleged that, in a proceeding
before the railroad commission instituted by John C.
Moore, the facts alleged in the fust count were
established and found, and an order duly made
requiring defendant to restore the lowered rate. The
answer admits these allegations of the second count as
to the proa:edings actually had before the commission,
but does not admit their force or efficacy. There was
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also a cross complaint by the defendant, to which a
demurrer was interposed and sustained; but, on the
view we entertain of the case, the order of the court
respecting the cross complaint requires no special
consideration. Conceding that it was properly
overruled, we think the court erred in granting the
prayer of the complaint upon the admissions of the
answer. The court held that the fmdings and order of
the railroad commission in the proceeding instituted
before it as above stated were conclusive as an
adjudication against the defendant, and accordingly,
without hearing evidence or making any findings
except by recital of what the commission had found,
made its decree enjoining the observance of the
commission's order.
If the commission had no jurisdiction to hear
and detennine the oomplaint of Moore, this was clearly
an error; and we are of the opinion that the
commission, in assuming to adjudicate the matters
presented by that complaint, exceeded its jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the railroad commission to hear and
detennine oomplaints against transportation companies
is such only as is conferred by section 22 of article 12
of the constitution, which provides that 'said
commissioners shall have the power and it shall be
their duty • • • to hear and detennine complaints
against railroad and other transportation companies,'
etc. But what complaints? It is clear from other
provisions contained in the same section that they are
not given jurisdiction of all complaints against
transportation companies, for it is provided that
nothing in the section shall prevent individuals from
maintaining actions against any such companies, and
further that in any action for damages 'sustained by
charging excessive rates' the plaintiff may, in the
discretion of the judge or jwy, recover exemplary
damages.
Plainly, therefore, it is a question of
oonstruction what complaints the railroad commission
is empowered to hear and detennine, or, in other
words, what cmtrovcrsies are within its jurisdiction as
a court of last resort? To this question we can fmd no
answer in the constitution, except in another clause of
this same section, which subjects transportation
companies to a fine for any transgression of the rules
established by the commission regarding the keeping
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of accounts and the rates of transportation. We think should at this time undertake to decide the
it is the clearly-manifested intention of the framers of constitutional questions which have been so
the constitution to make the conunission a court for the elaborately argued in the briefs. The judgment is
trial of charges preferred against transportation reversed, and cause remanded.
companies under this clause; and such, we think, and
We concur: HENSHAW, J.; McFARLAND,
such only, are the complaints which they are J.; TEMPLE, J.; VAN DYKE, J.; GAROUTIE, J.
empowered to hear and determine. Other complaints
as to abuses by transportation companies they may ll.
Under the Constitution of 1911:
hear and investigate with a view to action in their
legislative capacity in the making or modifying of rules
PACIFIC TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH
for keeping accounts and regulating fares and freights,
v.
and. also, we think, for the purpose of taking
ESHLEMAN et al.
proceedings in the courts on behalf of the public for
Supreme Court of California.
the correction or restraint of abuses, but their
Dec. 20, 1913.
jurisdiction as a court of justice does not extend to
166 Cal. 640, 137 P. 1119
causes arising under section 20 of article 12. That
In Bank. Application by the Pacific Telephone
section has no reference to rates fixed by the & Telegraph Company for a writ of review against
oommission, and their power to impose fines is strictly John E. Eshleman and others, as members and
limited by section 22 to violations of the rules and constituting the Railroad Commission of the State of
rates made and presaibed by themselves. It is a matter California. Order of the Commission annulled.
of history that section 20 was adopted by the
convention before it was agreed to create the
H. D. Pillsbury, of San Francisco, and Hunt
rommission subsequently established by section 22,--a Olipley, of Atlanta. Ga. (Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro,
fact strongly emphasized by the language of the latter of San Francisco, of counsel), for petitioner.
part of section 20, where, instead of naming the
Max Thelen, of San Francisco, for respondent.
railroad commission, resort is had to the awkward
Ralph C. Harrison, of San Francisco, and H.
periphrase above quoted: The governmental authority P. Andrews, of Red Bluff, Amici Curiae.
in which shall be vested the power to regulate freights
and fares.' When the section was adopted it was
HENSHAW,J.
understood that the power to regulate freights and fares
The Tehama County Telephone Company and
might be left, along with the mass of legislative the Glenn County Telephone Company lodged with the
powers, to the senate and assembly; and, of course, it Railroad Commissioo separate petitions or complaints,
was not then supposed that any infraction of its seelcing mlcrs of the Railroad Commission compelling
provisions would be redressed otherwise than through the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company to permit
the medium of appropriate proceedings in the courts. a physical connection or physical connections to be
The subsequent adoption of section 22 required no made between its telephone lines and the lines of the
change in this respect, and none seems to have been complaining companies. The proceedings were
intended.
consolidated, and, after hearing, the Railroad
The superior court therefore erred in tn:ating Commission made certain findings, upon which was
the findings and order of the railroad commission as a based its order in accordance with the prayers of the
fmal and conclusive adjudication against the pctitimcrs. The Tehama County Telephone Company
defendant, and in basing its decree upon the pleadings may be desaibed as a telephone company doing a local
alone, without proof of the facts alleged in the fust . business in the county of Tehama. In like manner the
count of the complaint. As this error of the superior Glenn County Telephone Company is engaged in the
court necessitates a reversal of the judgment. it is same business in the county of Glenn. The Pacific
unnecessary, and, as we think, undesirable, that we Telephone & Telegraph Company does a similar local
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business in each of those counties, and in addition
thereto conducts a long-distance business, reaching
into many, if not all, of the counties of the state. The
order of the Railroad Commission gives to the Tehama
County Telephone Company and the Glenn County
Telephone Company and their subscribers the use of
all the extended long distance service maintained by
the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company within
the state of California, excepting therefrom an
interchange for use of the Pacific Company's lines
between the two counties of Tehama and Glenn; the
petitioning companies between themselves having
established such communication.
In confonnity with the provisions of section
67 of the Public Utilities Act (St. [Ex. Sess.] 1911, p.
55) the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company
made application to this court for a writ of review.
Hon. Ralph C. Harrison, as amicus curiae, filed a brief
presenting to the attention of this court constitutional
questions touching, not only its own jurisdiction in the
matter, but as well the jurisdiction of the superior
court. Those questions demand fli'Sl consideration, not
alone from their gravity, but because their
determination, the one way or the other, will greatly
limit or enlarge the scope of the inquiry now before us.
The argument of the learned friend of the court may be
thus epitomized: Article 6 of the Constitution of the
state vests judicial power in certain designated
tribunals, and apportions the exercise of the judicial
power between and amongst them. Section 4 of this
article gives to the Supreme Court certain appellate
jurisdiction and original jurisdiction to issue named
writs, including the writ of certiorari or review. Section
5 of the same article confers upon the superior court
original jurisdiction of great extent. in fact, and
generally speaking, over all matters of consequence in
law and at equity involving the enforcement of public
or private rights or the redress of public or private
wrongs. Next, so proceeds the argument, it is to be
remembered that the jurisdiction thus conferred upon
these judicial tribunals is not subject to legislative
control; that is to say, that jurisdiction cannot be either
enlargCd or curtailed. 'It is a well-recognized principle
that where the judicial power of courts, either original
or appellate, is fixed by constitutional provisions, the
Legislature cannot either limit or extend that
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jurisdiction.' Olinn v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. 478,
105 Pac. 580; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137,2
L. Ed. 60. It is then pointed out that at the time of the
adoption of the present Constitution the writ of
certiorari had a limited and well-understood scope,
defined by sections 1068 and 1074 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and illustrated and expounded in
confonnity with these sections by many decisions of
this court. The availability of its employment and the
limitations of its scope may be thus summarized: (1) It
is a writ issued by a superior judicial tribunal to an
inferior officer or tribunal exercising judicial functions,
and the proceeding sought to be brought up for review
must in its nature be a judicial proceeding; (2) to
justify its issuance by a superior tribunal it must
appear that the applicant for it has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy; (3) when issued, the
superior tribunal reviews the action of the inferior
officer or tribunal only to the extent of determining
whether the inferior board or tribunal has exceeded its
jmisdiction. People v. Bush, 40 Cal. 346; Quinchard v.
Board of Trustees, 113 Cal. 664, 45 Pac. 856; Cook v.
Civil Service, 160 Cal. 589, 117 Pac. 663. Thus in C.
P.R. R. Co. v. Placer County, 46 Cal. 671, it is said:
'A writ of certiorari is not the appropriate proceeding
for the correction, of mere errors of judgment. in
respect either to the facts or the law of the case, in
detennining questions within the jurisdiction of the
board.' In Sherer v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. 654, 31
Pac. 565, it is said that: 'It must be deemed to be the
settled law of this state that the writ of certiorari brings
up for review but one question, and that is, whether the
inferi<r tribunal or court exceeded its jurisdiction.' And
in Spring Valley Wmr Co. v. Bryant. 52 Cal. 138, this
court declared: 1be resolution and ordinance sought to
be annulled • • • may be obnoxious to the criticism
that they were attempts to deprive the corporation of
its rights and property without due process of law, and
violative of constibltional principles; but neither this,
nor the circwnstance that they were not authorized by
the city charu:r to pass them. can justify a review of the
action of the board and mayor by certiorari.' And,
finally, the indisputable proposition is advanced that
the Legislature cannot enlarge the scope of any writ
named in the Constitution beyond that which it had at
the time the Constitution was adopted. Camron v.
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Kenfield, 57 Cal. 550.
Such being the law, it is argued that the
conclusion is irresistible that the Legislature's attempt
to enlarge the purview of the writ of certiorari when, in
section 67 of the Public Utilities Act, it declares that
'the review shall not be extended further than to
detennine whether the Commission has regularly
pursued its authority. including a determination of
whether the order or decision under review violates any
right of the petitioner under the Constitution of the
United States or of the state of California.' is null and
void, and that the attempt of the Legislature to confer
upon the Supreme Court the power to include in its
detennination under the writ of review the question of
the violatioo of constitutional rights is nugatory and in
direct violation of the principle of the decision of
Spring Valley, Water Co. v. Bryant, supra. Next it is
insisted that the attempt to confer exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court to review the
proceedings of the Railroad Commission, to the
impainnent of the general jurisdiction of the superior
court is itself violative of the Constitution, in that it is
a plain legislative attempt to curtail the jurisdiction
vested in the superior court by the Constitution. The
language of the legislative act in this regard is that, 'No
court of this state (except the Supreme Court to the
extent herein specified) shall have jurisdicbon to
review, reverse, correct or annul any order or decision
of the Commission or to suspend or delay the
execution or operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or
interfere with the Commission in the performance of
its official duties.' Public Utilities Act, § 67; Stats. Ex.
Sess. 1911, p. 55. Therefore, concludes the argument
of the learned friend of the court, it is conceded that
this court has the constitutional power to issue a writ
of review. In the case at bar, admitting that the
Railroad Commission in the matter in question was
exelcising judicial functions, this court's consideration
is limited to the single proposition whether or not the
Commission has exceeded its jurisdiction, or, what is
the same thing in other words, 'has regularly pursued
its authority'; that this court will not, under the writ,
undertake to determine whether constitutional rights
have been violated or other errors have been
committed, but must leave those questions to the
superior court which, under the Constitution, has
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authority to determine them under proper application
to enjoin the enforcement of the order complained of,
and that it is the manifest duty of this court so to hold
and to declare.
A minor branch or corollary of the main
argument upon these jurisdictional questions rests
upon the proposition that in the matter here under
review the Railroad Commission was not exercising
judicial functions, but that its acts were purely
legislative or legislative administrative. As the Public
Utilities Act is here for the first time before this court,
as the questioo is thus fairly within this case, and as to
ignore it is but to necessitate its consideration in
subsequent litigation, it is proper to say that we hold
the powers and functions of the Railroad Commission
in many instances, and in the present one, to be of a
highly judicial nature. That judicial powers were with
deliberatioo vested in the Commission the language of
the Constitution and of the legislative enacbnents
following the Constitution leave no doubt Thus the
Constitution itself declares: 'The Commission shall
have the further power • • • to hear and determine
complaints against railroad and other transportation
companies; to issue subpoenas and all necessary
process and send for persons and papers; and the
Commission and each of the commissioners shall have
the power to administer oaths, take testimony and
punish for contempt in the same manner and to the
same extent as courts of record.' Section 22, art. 12.
While, without quoting, a reading of sections 22 and
23 of article 12 of the Constitution and of sections 53
to 81 of the Public Utilities Act will establish beyond
doubt that the Railroad Commission is empowered to
sit, and in the performarx:e of its most important duties
must sit, as a tribunal exercising judicial functions of
great moment. It may be said that the fmal order of the
Commission in many instances is legislative
administrative in character, but nooe the less the
ordained procedure by which ~ result is to be
reached, the determination of controverted facts
between private litigants and disputants. and the
decision upon these conttoverted matters, are strictly
judicial. Robinson v. Sacramento, 16 Cal. 208;
Imperial Water Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Cal.
14, 120 Pac. 780.
The answer of the Commission insists that
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certiorari is not only a proper remedy, but is the sole
remedy provided by law. It points out that in other
jurisdictions, as in New York (Steward v. R. R.
Commissioners, 160 N.Y. 202,54 N. E. 697), the writ
of certiorari has been employed 'to correct errors of
law affecting property rights.' But these decisions.
showing a broader use of the writ in other jurisdictions,
can have no pertinency to the consideration of the laws
of this state where the writ has never been used with
such latitude, and where its use, defined by our very
statutes, is restricted to questions of jurisdiction alone.
To the argument that section 67 of the Public Utilities
Act in providing for a writ of certiorari before this
court has unconstitutionally enlarged the scope of the
writ by including within it'a determination of whether
the order or decision under review violates any right of
the petitioner under the Constitution of the United
States or of the state of California.' respondent makes
answer that this was not the legislative intent, for if the
Legislature had intended to add to the function of the
writ of review, it would have said, 'and also a
detennination.' or 'in addition thereto a determination,'
etc. But in consideration of the fact that the
proceeding, and the only proceeding, as defined by the
legislative enactment under which the action of the
Railroad Conunission can be considered at all, is under
this writ of review, and as under the constitutional writ
of review only the question of excess of jurisdiction
can be considered, and as under the writ of review
provided for by section 67 much more than this is to be
considered, it is not a satisfying answer to say that the
Legislature did not mean to broaden its scope when by
apt and precise language it actually has broadened its
scope. As was said by this court in Camron v.
Kenfield, 57 Cal. 554: The new Constitution was
framed in view of the construction of the language
used in the fanner Constitution, unanimously
c:oocurred in by the members of the highest tribunals of
the state. Yet the framers of the present Constitution
repeated the words employed in the fanner. We are
foo;ed to the conclusion that they used these words in
the sense which had been attributed to them by the
Supreme Court.' It matters not, therefore, that the
Legislature used the word 'including,' and might have
used the words, 'and also' or 'in addition thereto.' The
legal effect is necessarily the same in each instance,
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and that effect is to broaden beyond all fanner
defmitions, rulings, and decisions in this state the
scope of the writ of review.
To the argumemt of the unconstitutionality of
the act in curtailing the jurisdiction and powers of the
superior court, which jurisdiction and powers
themselves have their origin in the Constitution, the
sole answer made is that because this court has the
power to issue a writ of review and in this case has
done so, the question here is a moot question and will
be met when it properly arises. This response, too, fails
of completeness in view of the fact. as above pointed
out, that the proposition presented is one strictly within
the case, and that proposition is that. in the
performance of its duties, it is compulsory on this
coun to declare what scope pertains to the writ of
review which it has issued, and if it shall hold that its
inquiry is limited to the question of jurisdiction alone,
it must further declare whether or no the superior
couns of the state are open to the redress of asserted
wrongs which this court is incapable of correcting. In
short it must declare whether the doors of the superior
court are closed to petitioners of this class, and
whether the Constitution and laws of this state leave an
applicant for justice under such circumstances to the
limited relief which this court may grant.
The questions thus presented are of great
public moment and of equal private consequence. The
answer to them should not be postponed or evaded.
The demand is immediate and insistent for their careful
consideration and complete solution. In this
consideration the farst established fact is that section
67 of the Public Utilities Act does, in violation of all
precedent and decision, seek to enlarge the purview of
the writ of review. If the Legislature has done this
without sanction of the Constitution, it would result
merely in oompelling a declaration from this court that
the legislative attempt was unwarranted, and that the
writ of review must remain as defined at the time the
Constitution was adopted. The second fact. which
cannot be blinked and must be faced, is that the
Legislature has with deliberation restricted and
curtailed the jurisdiction vested in the superior courts
of this state by the Coostitution. And upon this but one
thing can be said. If there be not in the Constitution
itself warrant and power to the Legislature to do this
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thing. its effort must be declared illegal. Our inquiry is
thus immediately brought to the constitutional
amendments upon the authority of which the Public
Utilities Act was adopted.
Article 12 of the Constitution relating to
corporation was. upon October 10, 1911, amended by
the people of the state in important particulars. A
constitutional body known as the Railroad
Commission was created. The appointment of the
members by the Governor and their terms of office
were provided for.
Upon this Commission was conferred
specified powers in the establishment of rates and
charges for transportation companies. This was done
by section 22 of article 12, which further declared as
follows: 'No provision of this Constitution shall be
·construed as a limitation upon the authority of the
Legislature to confer upon the Railroad Commission
additional powers of the same kind or different from
those conferred herein which are not inconsistent with
the powers conferred upon the Railroad Commission
in this Constitution, and the authority of the
Legislature to confer such additional powers is
expressly declared provision of this Constitution.'
Section 23 of the same article defmed 'public utilities,'
and brought all such utilities under the control of the
Railroad Commission. Section 23 then declared: The
Railroad Commission shall have and exercise such
power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate public
utilities, in the state of California. and to fix the rates
to be charged for commodities furnished, or services
rendered by public utilities as shall he conferred upon
it by the Legislature, and the right of the Legislature to
confer powers upon the Railroad Commission
respecting public utilities is hereby declared to be
plenary and to be unlimited by any provision of this
Constitution. • • • Nothing in this section shall be
construed as a limitation upon any power conferred
upon the Railroad Commission by any provision of
this Constitution now existing or adopted concurrently
herewith.'
Pursuant to this grant of power by the
Coostitutioo to the Legislature, the Public Utilities Act
was passed and~ The act is altogether too long
to be set fCI'th in extenso, but, summarized, it provides
f<r the organization of the Commission, confers upon
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it large powers of control over all public utilities,
prescribes heavy penalties in the way of fines upon
public utilities violating the orders of the Commission,
and declares guilty of a misdemeanor the person who
so violates or aids in violating an order, with
punishment fixed by a fine not exceeding $1 ,000, by
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both.
Power to punish for contempt is likewise conferred,
and the act contains a legislative declaration as
follows: 'If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or
phrase of this act is for any reason held to be
unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the
validity of the remaining portipns of this act The
Legislature hereby declares that it would have passed
this act, and each section, subsection, sentence, clause
and phrase thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one
or more other sections, subsections, sentences, clauses
or phrases be declared unconstitutional.'
Two constructions of the constitutional
provisions above quoted have been presented to the
consideration of the court. First, that the Constitution
itself has designedly confered upon the Legislature the
fullest possible powers to legislate concerning public
utilities through the board of railroad commissioners:
that it was designed that upon the board of railroad
conunissioners should be confem:d whatsoever powers
the Legislature saw fit. and that nothing in any other
provisions of the Constitution should hamper the
Legislature in so doing; that the board of railroad
conunissioners itself was especially exempted from the
operatioo of the recall, to the end that it might exercise
such powers as the Legislature might confer upon it
without possible embarrassment; that the Railroad
Conunission differs from all other officers of the state
in that the Legislature alone, and not the people, is
authorized to unseat any of its members (Coost art.
12, § 22); that this constitutional meaning is precisely
and aptly evidenced by section 22, when it declares
that 'no provision of this Constitution shall be
construed as a limitation upon the authority of the
Legislature to confer upon the Railroad Commission
additional powers of the same kind or different from
those amferred herein which are not inconsistent with
the~ conferred'; that there is the fullest possible
grant of authority, to confer all kinds of additional
powers, with the sole limitation that whatever
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additional powers may be vested by the Legislature in
the Commission shall not be inconsistent with the
constitutional powers conferred; that this means. and
can only mean, that the Legislature may not curtail any
of the powers vested by the Constitution in the
Railroad Commission, but that the legislative
authority. to confer any kind of additional power is,
and is expressly declared to be, 'plenary and unlimited
by any provision of this Constitution'; further, that the
people in enacting these constitutional amendments
designedly and deliberately did this thing, to the end
that the Railroad Commission thus constituted should
have its labors unvexed and their results untrammeled
by the courts of the state; that the Legislature itself
adopted this view in the Public Utilities Act, which
was framed with much care, and passed with due
deliberation; that this is shown in many passages of the
act itself, not alone in that which deprives the superior
courts of their coostitutional jurisdiction, but as well in
that which deprives this court of a jurisdiction which
otherwise it would have. For it has universally been
held by all courts, and specifically by the Supreme
Court of the United States in reviewing the orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission--a kindred board
to our Railroad Conunission--that the question of
disaim.ination and reasonableness is always subject to
judicial review. I. C. C. v. N. P.R. R. Co., 222 U.S.
541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308. Our Public
Utilities Act in tenns declares that the detennination of
the Commission shall not be open to review upon the
subject of 'reasonableness and discrimination.' When
the Legislature vested in this court alone this limited
power of review, and included therein the duty by this
court to detennine whether a petitioner's constitutional
rights were violated, it meant. so far as the
Constitution of the state is concerned, only those
constitutional rights of which the petitioner had not
been deprived by legislative enactment While, so far
as the Constitution of the United States is concerned,
it being a law paramount in dignity and force even to
the state Constitution, the state, not having the power
to deny a petitioner the protection of the Constitution
of the United States, simply made recognition of that
fact.
This view is certainly borne out by the
language of the Coostitution itself, by the action of the
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Legislature under it, and by the position taken by Mr.
Thelen, a member of and representing the Railroad
Conunission. at the oral argument. The grant of power
to the Legislature being that it may confer upon the
Railroad Conunission any additional power that it sees
fit, the limitation upon this grant being merely that the
powers shall not be inconsistent with those conferred
by the Constitution itself. the declaration of the
Constitution being that the Legislature's power is
plenary and unlimited, it necessarily and conclusively
follows that the Legislature may confer upon the
Railroad Conunissioo in the matter of the management
and control of public utilities, in the making of its
orders and decrees, in the punishment for the violation
of its orders and decrees (all of which subject-matters
are cognate and germane to and not inconsistent with
the constitutional powers conferred) whatsoever
authority it may see fit. and that that authority may be
exercised without the slightest restraint; every
constitutional protection and guaranty, civil and
criminal, which the Constitution has accorded to all
other kinds. of property and the owners thereof, are or
may be denied to this class of propeny and its owners.
That this was the view of the law to which the
respondent inclined at the oral argument is manifest
from the inquiries put by the Justices of this court and
by the answers thereto. Thus, the CHIEF JUSTICE
said:
'I don't think there is any more important
question in this case than the question whether there is
anything in any provision of the ConStitution of this
state which limits the power of the Legislature to
coofer powers upon the Railroad Commission, and, if
there is any limitation, I would like Mr. Thelen
himself, as a member and representative of the board
of commissioners, to state where he thinks that
limitation is-if there is any provision of the state
Constitution of California to which the powers
conferred by this act are in opposition.'
'Mr. Thelen: No. It seems to me-my own
personal view is they arc absolutely clear.'
Again:
'Mr. Thelen: I think the Coostitution has given
to the Legislature every possible authority on this
question.
'Mr. Justice HENSHAW: It would seem the
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sole recourse is the federal Constitution.
'Mr. Thelen: That is my point. • • • My view
is that the Legislature has the right, irrespective of
other provisions of the Constitution of this state, to
confer power upon the Commission, • • • subject to
the federal Constitution.' ·

In view of these considerations we regard the
conclusion as irresistible that the Constitution of this
state has in unmistakable language created a
Commission having control of the public utilities of
the state, and has authorized the Legislature to confer
upon that Commission such powers as it may see fit,
even to the destruction of the safeguards, privileges,
and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution to all
other kinds of property and its owners. And while,
under our republican fonn of government (a fonn of
government
under
which
the
three
departments-adminstrative,
executive,
and
judicial-have in the past one and all been controlled by
the limitations of a written Constitution, In re Duncan,
139 U.S. 449, 11 Sup. Ct. 573, 35 L. Ed. 219), it is
perhaps the first instance where a Constitution itself
has declared that a legislative enactment shall be
supreme over all constitutional proviSions,
nevertheless this is but a reversion to the English fonn
of government which makes an act of Parliament the
supreme law of the land. It was at one time argued as
to such acts of Parliament that, while not otherwise
invalid, they would be decreed invalid if 'contrary to
natural justice or to natural right.' But as this
dctennina1ioo itself involved a resort to J}le courts, and
thus made the decision of the courts to that extent
superior to the law of Parliament, the present day
jmiscoosults are agreed that an act of Parliament is not
controlled by natural right or natural justice, but is
controlled solely by what is deemed to be expedient
and wise to the lawmaking power itself. Bryce Am.
Com., c. 23. So here, the state of California has
decR:ed that in all matters touching public utilities the
voice of the Legislature shall be the supreme law of the
land.
Thcrefm: the following conclusions appear to
be irresistible: That when the Constitution itself, as
here, declares that a legislative enactment touching a
given subject shall not be controlled by any provisions
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of the written Constitution, such a legislative
macunent addressed to that subject ex proprio vigore
carries with it all the force of an act of Parliament.
Therefore the same power vested in the Legislature
which admittedly authorizes it to limit or destroy the
jurisdictioo of the courts of this state must necessarily
authorize it to confer upon such courts such
jurisdiction as it sees fit. To say that the Legislature
may deprive the courts of all jurisdiction, but may not
in any respect enlarge their jurisdiction, where the acts
of the Railroad Commission are involved, is but a
stickling over wmls. There can be no question but that
the Legislature meant to enlarge the jurisdiction of this
court by enlarging the scope of the writ of review,
since, if it intended merely that the writ of review
should remain with the scope which this court and the
statutes had previously given it, the act need have said
no more than that a writ of review should issue. But
the declaration in the act itself that the judgment under
the writ of review, besides detennining 'whether the
Conunission has regularly pursued its authority,' shall
'include' a ddennination 'whether the order or decision
under teview violates any rights of the petitioner under
the Constitution of the United States or the state of
California' is either deliberately designed to enlarge the
purview of the writ of review, or else the language is
utter and meaningless surplusage. It is true that the
question whether or not an inferior tribunal has
exceeded its authority may depend upon whether or not
a <XlDSlitutional right has been violated. If that was all
that the Legislature meant by its ·language, it was
unnecessary to have added the including clause, since
the original scope of the writ of review always has
embraced the consideration of such a problem. But it
is equally true that many cases arise where
<XlDSlitutional rights are violated, or where it is asserted
that they are violated, and where the inferior board and
tribunal in so doing has in fact 'regularly pursued its
authority.' This is in precise words declared in Spring
Valley Water Co. v. Bryant, 52 Cal. 138, where it is
said: The resolution and ordinance sought to be
annulled • • • may be obnoxious to the criticism that
they were attempts to deprive the corporation of its
rights and property without due process of law, and
violative of constitutional principles; but neither this
In' the circumstance that they were not authorized by
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the city charter to pass them, can justify a review of the

action of the board and mayor by certiorari.' So, to
repeat, if the Legislature had meant that only those
con~1itutional questions which may legitimately arise
under the writ of review should be considered, there
was no occasion for its saying so. Such questions have
always been considered. But if it did mean this, why
did it with deliberation add the including clause, and
declare that under the writ of review which it
authorized and prescribed there should be an inquiry as
to whether any oonst.itutional right of the petitioner had
been violated?
Therefore, there is the clearest evidence that
the Legislature did mean to enlarge the scope of the
writ of review, and so to enlarge the jurisdiction of this
oourt in reviewing proceedings under this writ. And it
may not be said that the Legislature cannot do this. if
it has, as is unquestioned, the power to take away all
jurisdiction, which power, equally with the power to
enlarge jurisdiction, is safeguarded by the general
provision of our Constitution and our decisions under
them. Could not the Legislature have declared that in
any case the Railroad Commission may demand and
obtain from the Supreme Court a writ to review the
legality of its orders and decrees, under which writ the
oourt shall determine whether the constitutional rights
of any of the parties interested have in any respect
been violated? It is not to be perceived how such a
provision, if it were contained in the act, could be
denied efficacy upon the ground that it was enlarging
the jurisdiction of this court, and equally difficult is to
see how it can be said how the Legislature has not
done this precise thing by other but equally apt words.
This constitutional decree is, of course,
binding upon this court, and under it it becomes the
duty of this court to lend its aid in giving effect to
every power and prerogative with which the
Legislature may vest or clothe the Railroad
Commission. This, however, is subject to one
all-important limitation. There is still the Constitution
of the United States--the supreme law of this state,
supreme over its Constitution and over its
Legislature--and of no protection accorded by that
instrument to a litigant before this court can that
litigant be deprived. Therefore, if it shall be that
among the powers conferred by the Legislature upon
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the Railroad Commission arc those whose exercise by
that Commission do violence to a petitioner's rights
under the Cmstitution of the United States, protection
under that Constitution will be awarded him. The
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States prohibits a state from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, and from denying to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The
petitioner here insists that by the order of the
Commission it is deprived of the equal protection of
the laws of this stale in violation of its rights under the
Constitution of the United States.
To that inquiry we are next brought. The
subject-matter of that inquiry may be thus stated: The
Cmstitution of the state of California (article I,§ 14)
guarantees that private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation
having been fii'St made to or paid into court, and that
this compensation shall be ascertained by a jury in a
oourt of record. unless a jury be waived. The petitioner
insists that the execution of the order of the Railroad
Commission in the case at bar involves a plain taking
of its property; that compensation for this taking has
not been made or paid in advance as the Constitution
provides, has not been made by a jury as the
Constitution contemplates, and has not been made at
all, saving as the Railroad Commission may see fit in
the future to apportion rates or tolls for the use of the
property which is taken away from the petitioning
company and given to its rivals in business. The
petitioner thus asserts that the railroad commissioner's
order is an exercise of the right of eminent domain, in
violation of the state Constitution, in that as to every
other class of property and the owners thereof these
constitutional guaranties are in full force; that this
exceptional exercise of the power of eminent domain
by the Railroad Commission denies to the petitioner
the equal protection of the law. The Railroad
Commission makes answer that its order and tbe
fulfillment of its order are referable solely to the police
power of the state, and not at all to the power of
eminent domain. and that its order amounts to oo more
than a reasonable regulation touching the use of
property held in private ownership but devoted to a
public use. Is the order of the Railroad Commission
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properly referable to the police power, or does it regulation of public utilities, while each case which is
involve, under the guise of a regulatory measure, the rested upon the exercise of that power must be subject
taking of petitioner's property?
to its own individual consideration, there are certain
The oourts, even the highest court of the land, fundamental principles which are not disputed, and
have despaired of giving a satisfactory defmition to the which govern all. The farst of these is that this power
police power of a state--a defmition which will delimit goes merely to the regulation of the public utility, and
the boundaries of that power. Thus, by Mr. Justice that when an order passes beyond proper regulation, it
Brewer of the Supreme Court of the United States, it amounts to a taking of the property, and the order is
has been said that 'by reason of its undetermined then referable, not to the police power, but to the
extent, it is the bete noir of the courts.' By this court, power of eminent domain. The second of these is that
many years ago, it was declared: 'So, while the police this regulatory power falls into three natural
power is one whose proper use makes most potently subdivisions: (1) The right to regulate tolls and
for good, in its undefined scope and inordinate exercise charges, to the end that fair compensation may be
lurks no small danger to the republic. For the difficulty returned and excessive charges be forbidden; (2) the
which is experienced in defming its just limits and right to prevent discrimination upon the part of the
bounds affords a temptation to the Legislature to public utility directed against those who employ it, or
encroach upon the rights of citizens with experimental make use of its agencies, or the commodity which it
laws, none the less dangerous because well meant.' Ex furnishes; (3) the right to make orders and to formulate
parte Jentzsch, 112 Cal. 468, 44 Pac. 803, 32 L. R. A. rules governing the conduct of the public utility, to the
664. But within the legitimate exercise of this great end that its efficiency may be built up and maintained
power comes the unquestioned right to place and the public be accorded desirable safeguards and
restrictioos upon personal liberty and limitations upon conveniences. Beyond these matters regulation, as
the use of private property. One conspicuous example regulation, does not and from the very meaning of the
of the legitimate exercise of the police power is word cannot go. Nor is it of consequence that the law
evidenced by the right of regulatory control exercised or order be in terms and in form regulatory, if, in
by courts, boards, and conunissions over property held effect, it is a taking of property or a deprivation of the
in private ownership, but devoted by the owners to a use of property within the meaning of the Constitution.
public use. Over against the undue or illegitimate No public convenience, no public necessity, however
exercise of the police power is set the limiting and urgent, will justify such a taking. Thus, it might be to
protecting shield of the Constitution both of the United the great convenience of the public that a hundred foot
States and of this state, that property shall not be taken strip of a railroad's private right of way should be
for public use without compensation to the owner. It made into a public aossing and highway. The order of
must be apparent that in the exercise of the sovereign a commission regulating the use upon the part of the
police power many important questions will arise as to railroad of its right of way by exacting of it that it
the reasonableness of the law or order. For, if . grant pennission to the public to cross and recross
reasonable, then the law or order is but a fair exercise would not be a regulation, but a confiscation, and this,
of the sovereign power. If unreasonable it transgresses notwithstanding the fact that the right of way itself was
the constitutional provisions against the taking of devoted to one public use, and the only effort made
private property for public use and unlawfully was to subject it to another public use. Olicago,
restricting personal liberty. It is for these reasons that, Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Olicago, 166 U.S.
as hml been previously said, the courts have declared it 226, 17 Sup. Ct. S81, 41 L. Ed. 979. In the case cited
to be a part of their manifest duty to inquire into the the order was not even the order of a commission, but
was the judgment of a court, yet it was bcld that the
question of reasonableness, which right of inquiry, a
has also been said, has, by the Public Utilities Act, proceedings were in eminent domain, and that the
railroad company for this new use of its rigbt of way,
been denied to the cowts of this state.
But in the exercise of the police power in the which amounted to a taldog of its property, was denied
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the compensa1ion to which the Constitution entitled it.

Another principle. quite as important and
quite as fundamental. is that 'taking' of propeny within
the meaning of the Constitution is not restricted to a
mere change of physical possession, but includes a
pennanent or temp<nry deprivation of the owner of its
use ....

Wyman thus states the principle: The
principles discussed do not go so far as to give one
common carrier the right to demand the use of the
facilities of rival common carriers in order to compete
against them. Thus it seems plain that one railroad
cannot be required to make physical coMection with
its rival so that it may take its business away from it.'
Wyman on Public Service Corporations, § 698.
And Dillon: 'But whatever may be the extent
of legislative power in this respect, it is clear that the
Legislature caMot, without compensation to the fust
company, authorize the second company to take or use
the track of the fU'Sl, although with compensation this
might be done under the power of eminent domain if in
its judgment the public good required iL' Dillon on
Mun. Corp. (4th Ed)§ 727; Id. (5th Ed.) § 1280. This
principle, it is to be noted, is not that the Legislature,
acting directly or through its authorized mandatories,
may not subject property devoted by its owners to a
public use to another public use, or to the same public
use by its rivals, but that the doing of this is an act
referable to the power of eminent domain, and not to
the police power, and that compensation must be made
accordingly. Herein lies the vital distinction between
the legitimate exercise of the police power and the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. In the
fanner, uncompensated obedience to the order is
imperative. In the latter, the order may not be enforced
without compensation fU'St made. And, finally, it may
not be amiss to point out that the devotion to a public
use by a person or corporation of property held by
them in ownership does not destroy their ownership,
and does not vest title to the property in the public use
as to justify, under the exercise of the police power, the
taking away of the management and control of the
property from its owners without compensation, upon
the ground that public convenience would better be
served thereby, or that the owners themselves have
proven false or derelict in the perfonnance of their
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public duty. Any law or order seeking to do this passes
beyond the ultimate limits of the police power,
however, vague and undefmed those limits may be . .
With these indisputable principles before us,
we may oome directly to the consideration of the order
in question. But, at the outset, that consideration is
somewhat embarrassed by a very radical change of
view upon the pan of the attorney of the Railroad
Conunission. In oral argument that position seemed to
be in c.onsonance with the interpretation which we have
put upon the constitutional amendment, namely, that
the Legislature had the power, and had exercised the
power, to confer upon the Railroad Commission the
right of eminent domain, and in bestowing upon the
commission that power had likewise authorized it to
fix the oompcnsation when its orders involved a taking
of property. Thus, upon oral argument, the record
shows the following:
'Mr. Justice SHAW: Your position is that the
Commission, if empowered by the Legislature, could
direct one railroad to tum over its whole plant to
another railroad without any compensation at all so far
as the state Constitution is concerned?
'Mr. Thelen: Yes, sir. But the Legislature has
provided in that case that compensation shall be
recovered. I hardly assume any Legislature would ever
make such a provision, but it might.'
Again, the discussion being addressed to the
effect of the order here under consideration:
'Mr. Thelen: I may have to concede that it is a
taking ofpropcny, but if it is a taking of property, it is
a taking of property under an order of an
administrative tribunal, and I will refer your bono~ to
a large number of cases where they hold the state has
the right to provide that compensation shall be fixed
by an administrative tribunal and not by a jury. As
long as the party gets his compensation, be gets as
much as he is entitled to.
'Mr. Justice SHAW: Their claim under the
Constitution is that if they are entitled to compensation
at all--this old company--they ~ entitled to it in
advance.
'Mr. Thelen: If that is their claim we would
have to axnbal that claim under the statute. There was
no provision made for compensation. They are going
to get a share of the tolls. For all they know they are

REGULATED INDUSTRIES

going to get all, or nearly all, of them. Their own local
exchange is not affected at all. That is certainly
sufficient compensation. Tiley are going to get
compensation in the shape of a portion of the tolls they
are going to get.'
In the printed brief of respondent, however,
the sole argument is based upon the following
declaration: The Railroad Commission's order is a
regulation under the state's police power of the use of
property by a public utility for the purpose to which it
has been dedicated and is not a taking of property in
the constitutional sense.' ft would seem, therefore, that
the Commission's frrst interpretation of the law was
that which the court has here given, and that
subsequent reflection had prompted a modification of
this view. We repeat, however, that we are still
satisfied that it is the only view which can be justly
taken of the constitutional provisions, and certainly it
is the only view which would give to the legislative
enacbnents the efficacy and power which were meant
to be theirs. But. of course, it does not follow, because
the Legislature has authorized the Railroad
Conunission to exercise the power of eminent domain
and take property for public use, that in this particular
instance the Commission has actually done so. That
still is to be determined by the language of the order,
under the restrictions imposed upon this court denying
it the power to consider the reasonableness of the
order. For this discussion must be had, so far as this
court is ooncemed, under the limitations imposed upon
it by the Public Utilities Act. We cannot consider the
reasonableness of the order, but can and must
detennine whether any of petitioner's rights guaranteed
it by the Constitution of the United States have been
violated. But while the reasonableness of the order
may thus not be questioned, resort is permitted to the
findings of the Commission to aid in determining the
meaning and effect of the order.
These findings disclose that for many years
the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company had
maintained a long-distance service in the state of
California which passed through the counties of Glenn
and Tdlama, and in oonnection with this long-distance
service maintained an exchange service in certain of
the towns; but that the local service in each county and
the exchange service between these counties, as
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maintained by the company, was incomplete and
inefficient. The company for a long time failed to
develop the local territory of these counties. This poor
quality of service and failure to develop the local
business of the counties resUlted in the fonnation of
two companies, the one in Glenn, the other in Tehama
county, one oommencing operations in 1908, the other
in 1911. They developed the territory and gave a local
service superior to that of the Pacific Company. After
January, 1912, but before this Railroad Commission
came into existence, the Pacific Company took steps
itself to develop the territory, and prior to March 23,
1912-the effective date of the Public Utilities Act--it
proceeded to parallel 'with feverish baste,' and to a
considerable extent, the lines of the other companies 'in
an apparent effort to aush them.' It not only paralleled
existing lines of the other companies, but gave free
exchange service between towns which theretofore had
not received such service. Upon April 29th the Tehama
county company bad 698 subscribers, of whom 457
did not have a Pacific Company telephone. The Glenn
county company had 889 subscribers, of whom 570
did not have a Pacific Company telephone. The Pacific
Company operated 870 telephones in Glenn county,
and 1,003 telephones in Tehama county. This
company's investment in each of these counties is
greater than that of its competitors. It asserted that it
served the same tenitory that the rival companies do,
and was ready and able to furnish telephone services to
every one of their subscribers at the rates charged
them. The finding upon this is that the Pacific
Company, while it bad duplicated the major portion of
the lines of the independant companies, had not
duplicated all, and that to serve all the subsaibers of
the independent companies would require further
extensions of its lines. The Glenn and Tehama
companies made demand upon the Pacific Company
for telephonic connections which would enable their
subscribers to use the long-distance service of the
company, and, upon refusal, lodged their complaints.
The fuxlings further declare that the Pacific Company
had failed to dp its duty in the matter of extending its
service and affmling a~~venientlocal communication.
This, of course, is not a finding of its present
unwillingness or refusal to perform this duty, for it
expressed its willingness, and urged that it be allowed
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to perfonn whatever duties the Commission thought
incumbent upon it to perfonn, and it will not be
contended, and could not successfully be contended,
tha1 a failure to perform a duty is a justification for the
taking of property without compensation. The fmding
is that the local service of the Glenn county and
Tehama county companies is superior to that of the
Pacific Company. An order requiring the Pacific
Company to improve its service to the standard fixed
by the Commission would unquestionably be
regulatory in its nature. But the inferiority of service
actually rendered is not, of course, a justification for
the taking of property. It would undoubtedly, as the
Conunission finds, be a great public convenience, and
there was great public need for long-distance service
on bcllalf of the subscribers of the Glenn and Tehama
county companies who did not have the advantage of
the long-ilistance service of the other company. But no
necessity, however urgent, justifies a taking of
property without compensation, and, as is said in
Evansville, etc., Co. v. Henderson, etc., Co. (C. C.)
134 Fed. 973, quoted with approval in 1 Wyman
Public Service Corporations, par. 699: 'One water
company, or one telephone company, or one telegraph
company, or one street railway company, or one
railroad company, while bound appropriately to serve
the general public, cannot, Wlless under express
statutory enactment and by due process of law
thereunder, be compelled to give its property to the
uses and benefits of a rival, except by some fonn of
condemnation. The rival is not, ordinarily, to be
included in the tenn 'general publi."
These findings of fact have thus been
reviewed not at all as touching the reasonableness of
the order which the Commissioo made which we repeat
is not within our purview, but to make plain the
proposition that no ooe nor all of these fmdings of fact
are sufficient to sustain the legality of the order, if in
truth it amounts to a taking of property within the
constitutional inhibition.
In precise tenns then, what is the order and
what is its legal effect? It is not an order that the
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company should
improve its own service in these counties up to the
standard fixed by the Railroad Commission-an order
which would be unquestionably regulatory. It is not an
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order that the Pacific Company should develop and
extend its service to meet the existing demands of the
public within the territory it has undertaken to
supply-an order which would certainly in its nature be
regulatory, and a compliance with which would meet
every possible demand which the public could rightly
urge. But it is an order compelling the Pacific
Company to pennit a connection between its
long-distance lines and the local lines of the petitioning
companies, under which, by the use of the
switchboards, operators, and lines of the Pacific
Company, its propcny and its agencies, the petitioning
companies and their subscribers should have the same
rights to all the long-distance instrumentalities of the
Pacific Company as its subscribers·and patrons. That
the order is not primarily designed to benefit the public
is made plain fr!)m the fact that it is not an order
directing the Pacific Company to make bettennents
and extensions for the service of the public though
admittedly such betterments and extensions could and
would by it be made. That it is primarily designed to
benefit the rivals of the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Company in the local business of the two counties is
plain from a consideration of the circumstances, and
was admitted by the learned attorney for the Railroad
Conunission upon argument, when he declared: 1f they
[the petitioning companies] cannot get long distance in
this way, I assume, Wlless long-distance connection is
made, that eventually the local companies will have to
give up business.' It would appear, therefore, that it is
not the n~ssities of the public, but the necessities of
and benefits to the rival companies, which have
prompted an~ devoting the property of the Pacific
Company to the uses of the rival companies.
But it is argued that this use imposed upon the
Pacific Company for the benefit of the petitioning
companies is not a new use, but is a use for which the
telephone company had already dedicated its property
to the public. But to this the telephone company makes
answer, which is unquestioned, that it has never
dedicated its property to the use of rival and competing
companies; that it has dedicated its property to
telephone service conducted by itself for the benefit of
its own patrons; and of local companies in
noncompeting territory; that it is prepared within
reason to furnish telephone service to all who are or
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may desire to become such patrons, and that it has
never permitted a connection and use such as here
ordered upon the part of a rival company doing a
competitive business in a local field and seeking to
maintain and improve that business at the cost of the
Pacific Company by the advantage which would fall to
it from the use of the Pacific Company's long-distance
lines and service.
Again it is said that the order does not involve
a taking of property or the use of property, but is to be
likened in principle to those cases where a regulatory
order requiring direct · connections between two
intersecting or oontiguous railway companies has been
upheld as a not improper exercise of the police power.
Fmally, the proposition is advanced that. conceding the
effect of the order to be a taking of the property, it is a
taking by administrative order, referable to the police
power-a taking where the injury or damage follows as
but an incident to the legitimale exercise of that power,
and where, accordingly, under the august authority of
the Supreme Court of the United States, the taking is
not such as is inhibited by the Constitution unless
compensation be made therefor.
In these contentions respondents greatly rely
upon the exact analogy and precise parallelism which
they assert exist between this case and those upholding
orders for railroad connections. A consideration of the
more important of these cases is thus demanded.
The ftrst. and that upon which supreme
reliance is placed, is that of Wisconsin, Minnesota &
Pacific R. R. v. Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287, 21 Sup. Ct.
115,45 L. Ed. 194. By statute the state of Minnesota
bad ordered common carriers to provide, and bad
ordered its railroad commission to see that they made
provisioo for, connecting tracks for the interchange of
traffic. Such an order was made for a connection
between the Wisconsin, etc., Railroad Company and
the Sioux Falls Railroad Company. From the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Minnesota sustaining the
mlcr the case went to the Supn:me Coun of the United
States upon writ of error. The Supreme Court pointed
out that the power exercised by the Railroad
Commission could not have been exercised by the
courts at oommon law, and thus primarily depended for
its validity upon constitutional or legislative
c:oactDlCDl Next it was pointed out that a fundamental
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prerequisite to the legality of such an order was its
reasonableness, into which the courts would always
inquire. Next, again, that to be sustained it must have
its foundation in public convenience, welfare, or
necessity in the exercise of the police power. The
plaintiff in error ~isted that the execution of the order
would involve a taking of its property without
compensation by virtue of the fact that it did business
in the transportation of cattle and wood, and that this
business would be opened to competition and
subjected to serious loss at the hands of the competing
railroad. The Supreme Court of the United States did
not say that such a competition resulting in loss would
not amount to a taking within the constitutional
inhibition, but it did declare that such competition did
not exist ...And, further, the court says: We think
this case is a reasonable exercise of the power of
regulation in favor of the interests and for the
accommodation of the public, and that it does not,
regard being had to the facts, unduly, unfairly, or
improperly affect the pecuniary rights or interests of
the plaintiff in error.' And, finally, the opinion
concludes: 'Although to carry out the judgment may
require the exercise by the plaintiff in error of the
power of eminent domain, and will also result in some,
axnparatively speaking, small expense, yet neither fact
furnishes an answer to the application of defendant in
error.'
We have been at pains to make these
quotations because the decision itself and the language
of the opinion is made the foundation for many
declarations to the effect that Joss by competition is
not an element in considering the reasonableness of an
order, and that property may be taken under such an
administrative order without compensation. Thus the
Supreme Coun ,of the United States itself appears to
have ova'Sta1Cd the decision in the Jacobson Case in at
least one instance (Oregon R. R. Co. v. Fairchild, 224
U.S. 510,32 Sup. Ct. 535,56 L. Ed. 863), where it is
said, discussing that case, that 'the advantage to the
public was so great that the order requiring the track
connection was sustained in spite of the fact that ooe
of the roads was thereby deprived of the revenue which
it would otherwise have received for the longer haul.'
Such is not the Jacobson decision, whicb is, as above
quoted, that there was no competition between the two
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roads in the matter of hauling cattle or wood. No court
will question the justice of the Jacobson decision under

the facts declared by the Supreme Court. But just
criticism may be directed against an attempt to extend
the decision beyond the court's own statement of the
facts and the law, and beyond what could, by any
possibility, have been in the minds of the jurists who
pronounced il The decision itself amounts to a
declaration that under the authority of the state
Constitution or statute, a commission or court
authorized to exercise the police power in the matter of
the regulation of public utilities may, in a proper case,
order a physical connection to be made between the
tracks of two nearby or intersecting railways, and that,
though the execution of this order may involve the
expenditure of money, and may result in the
modification of the use of a ponion of the railroad
right of way over which the connecting track or tracks
be carried, such an expenditure of money, when
reasonable, and such a limited change of use of the
right of way, on the demand of public interest or
convenience, are but the outcome of a legitimate
exercise of the police power, and do not constitute a
taking of property without due process of law. Such is
the decision and the whole of the decision of the
Jacobson Case. See Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Michigan
Railroad Conunission (D. C.) 198 Fed. 1009. There is
in this no declaration that the question of undue
competition and injury to business will not be
considered, any more than there is a declaration that
one railroad may use the tracks of another. There is the
distinct declaration that oompetition was not within the
facts of the case.
The foregoing quotations must make it
apparent that here is no intimation that property may
be taken for a public use without compensation, but, to
the contrary, a distinct affmnation that it cannot be so
taken. ooupled with a declaration, manifestly just, that
there was no taking, but a mere regulation addressed to
the public use to which the property bad been
dedicated-a regulation to prevent discrimination.
In Pittsburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Railroad
Commission of Indiana, 171 Ind. 189, 86 N. E. 328,
the Railroad Commission of Indiana had made its
order requiring track connections between two roads.
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The Supreme Court of Indiana declared that the
reasonableness of the order would be considered, that
the railroad's propeny was devoted to a public use, and
that it was therefore subject to due regulation, and that,
if the order was not an unreasonable regulation, it did
not amouru to the taking of property in violation of the
Constitution. The oourt held that the order, referable to
the police power, was a reasonable regulation touching
the use of property.
Fmally, in the case of State of Washington v.
Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 32 Sup. Ct. 535, 56 L. Ed.
863, respondent contends that it finds the fullest
suppon for the proposition that it may actually take
property without compensation, or without
compensation first made and paid as our Constitution
requires. In the last-cited case the order of the
Washington Railroad Commission required the Oregon
Railway & Navigation Company and the Northern
Pacific Railway Company and the Spokane & Inland
Railroad Canpany to connect their tracks at a number
of named towns and stations. The decision of the
Supreme Court reversed this order for its
unreasonableness. The opinion employs language
which gives rise to uncertainty, and which, if not
properly understood, must result in great confusion.
Thus, in the opening sentence of the opinion, it is said:
The Commission's order requiring the Oregon
Company to make track connection was not a mere
administrative regulation, but it was a taking of
property, since it compelled the defendant to expend
money and prevented it from using for other purposes
the land on which the tracks were to be laid.' And
further declares the opinion: 'So that where the taking
is under an administrative regulation, the defendant
must not be denied the right to show that, as matter of
law, the order was so arbitrary, unjust, or unreasonable
as to amount to a deprivation of property in violation
of the fowteenth amendment' Elsewhere the court
states the proposition to be 'the contention that as a
matter of law the order, on the facts proved, was so
unreasonable as to amount to a taking of property
without due process of law.'
If these expressions should be construed as
respondent seeks to have them construed, as meaning
that the Supreme Court of the United States has
decided that, in the exercise of the police power,
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private property may be lawfully taken for public use
without compensation made to the owner, it must be
said that it is the frrst and only declaration of the
Supreme Court of the United States to that effect, and
that the statement itself means the elimination from the
Constitution of the United States of the last clause of
the fifth amendment of that Constitution, declaring that
private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. In a sense, every exercise
of the police power which calls for the expenditure of
money by the owner of property, or limits, or otherwise
regulates the use which an owner may make of his
property, whether or not that property be dedicated to
a public use, is a taking of property. Thus the
requirmlent that fue escapes be placed upon buildings
which have them not necessitates the expenditure of
money by the owners of such buildings, and in that
limited sense is a taking of their property. The
requirement that one maintaining a nuisance shall
abate it may necessitate upon his part the expenditure
of money in so doing, and in that narrow sense is a
taking of his property. The well-recognized legal
restrictions upon the use of property, prohibiting the
use for slaughler houses, powder mills, and the like are
all in a limited sense a taking of property. So, too, the
requirement of track connections obviously involves
the expenditure of money and a limitation upon the
original use, for the original use of the right of way
was for the tracks alone of the railroad which owned it.
By the track connection, a portion of that right of way
is subjected to the use of the connecting track, which is
owned perllaps-operated in common certainly-by the
two railroads. But, Wlless we have read the law to no
purpose, the vitally essential principle limiting the
exercise of the police power and distinguishing it from
the exercise of the power of eminent domain is that
private rights in the former case must, for the benefit
of society, yield to reasonable regulations controlling
the use of property, in the case of public utilities,
within the use to which the property has been
dedicated.
The law has the power to regulate the use to
increase eftkiency and prevent abuses, and such
regulations, though they involve an expenditure of
money or a modification of the use, are regulations
which the lawmaking power may impose by virtue of
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the very fact that the property has been dedicated to
that public use. Therefore it is that the decisions
declare either that such a regulation is not a taking
within the oonstitutional inhibition, or declare that, the
regulation being legal, the mere fact that the
expenditure of money is involved in no sense amounts
to a taking. But when, however, the regulation exceeds
the just limits of the police power, that regulation is
void, whether or not it amounts to a taking of the
property within the Constitution. Many such orders do,
under the guise of regulations, invade the province of
eminent domain and work an uncompensated taking of
property which is confiscation. Such orders are, of
course, void. Others, without necessitating the
expenditure of money, so unreasonably restrict or so
unreasonably enlarge the use of property for the
supposed benefit of the public as to accomplish the
same results. We think it certain that it is in the light of
these fundamental principles that the language of the
Supreme Court in the Oregon Railway Case must be
read; for if construed in any other way, there is an
obliteration of all distinction between the power of
eminent domain and the police power and the
equivalent of a declaration that a railroad commission
may take property for public use without compensation
to the owner. Therefore, as we construe the decision
under consideration. the meaning of what the Supreme
Coun said was either that, under the guise of an
administrative police regulation, the Commission had
taken property in violation of the Constitution, or that
the effect of upholding the regulation in question
would be sanctioning such a taking in violation of the
Constitution. It was as though the Supreme Court had
declared that this administrative order for track
connections is so unreasonable as to pass beyond the
limits of the police power in the matter of regulation,
and to enter the field of the power of eminent domain.
~ the latter field it is a taking of property without
compensation. If by any possibility this court can be
wrong in the construction which it thus puts upon this
language, this informing knowledge must cane from
the Supreme Coun of the United States itself.
Therefore, it must be said that the conclusion
may not be evaded that the authorities are unanimous
in declaring that, in dealing with public utilities,
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regulation of use within the dedicated use is as far as
the police power may be extended, and that when the
regulation exceeds this, it is always void for
tmreasonableness, and may, depending upon the fonn
and character of the order, be also void as an attempt
to take property without compensation in violation of
the constitutional protection. This does not mean that
a board or commission authorized thereto may not
itself exercise the power of eminent domain and so
take propeny for public use. But when such board or
commission attempts to do this, it must do it after
compensation paid to the owner.
From this consideration of the railroad cases
we pass to a review of the telephone cases which it is
asserted support the commissioner's order. They are
but two in number. The fll'St of these is Billings
Mutual Telephone Co. v. Rocky Mountain Bell
Telephone Co. (C. C.) 155 Fed. 208. The circuit court
had before it the application of the Mutual Telephone
Company, doing a local business in Billings, Mont,
for an order compelling the defendant telephone
company to permit it to make connections and use the
latter's long-distance lines and service. The action was
in eminent domain, plaintiff seeking a decree of the
court 'upon such tenns and for such compensation as
the court may deem just,' and praying that 'the court
may proceed by law to determine the right to connect
and the value of the services and use of defendant's
lines.' The defendant itself was operating a competing
local line in Billings, and pleaded this and other facts
declaring that public convenience did not require the
connection; that the result of the order would be a
taking of defmdant's property for no higher public use,
and therefore, a taking unauthorized by law. Many
other matters of special defense were urged, but the
foregoing statement is sufficient for the purposes of
the present oonsideration. At the outset. then, it is to be
noted that the action was not addressed to the
consideration of any regulatory measure under the
police power, but that it was a judicial action where the
power of eminent domain was sought to be exercised.
Thus the case is founded upon the fundamentals that
defendant's propeny was to be taken, and that
compensation should and would be made for such
taking. 1be defenses, one and all, were grounded upon
the proposition that, even in eminent domain
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proceedings, defendant's propeny could not be taken
excepting for a higher use, and that the use
contemplated was not a higher use. The decision of the
court quotes section 14, an. 15 of the Constitution of
Montana, as follows: 'Any association or corporation,
or the lessees or managers thereof, organized for the
purpose, or any individual, shall have the right to
construct or maintain lines of telegraph or telephone
within this state, and connect the same with other lines;
and the legislative assembly shall by a general law of
unifonn operation provide reasonable regulations to
give full effect to this section.' Following this
constitutional authorization, the Civil Code of
Montana reaffumed the constitutional declaration as to
the right of telephone companies to connect with each
other's lines, and further declared that in case they
could not do this by agreement, proceedings might be
taken 'and the damages assessed and the right of
connection granted, as provided in the Code of Civil
Procedure.'
It is argued by respondent that the Legislature
so declared because there was in existence no
administrative board vested with power to fix or
withhold compensation. We cannot of course judicially
know this to be ttue, but certain it is that the
Legislature of Montana regarded such a use as a taking
of property referable to the power of eminent domain,
and made provision accordingly. This, moreover, was
the view of the learned circuit judge, as will abundantly
appear from the language of his opinion. His holding
was that the defendant had 'erected its system subject
to the reasonable impositions that might be put upon
it by the Constitution and laws of the state,' and that it
was therefore under a duty 'to allow such a connection
and use.' And, says the court, 'the spirit of the
Constitution and the letter of the laws of the state in
which defendant operates its lines compel it. under its
primal duty to the public, to yield to the right of
plaintiff company to connect its · lines with the
defendant's, and to enjoy the use thereof in a
reasonable and effective way, provided of course
damages are paid as requin:d by law.' We are unable to
perceive bow this case can successfully be called to the
support of an administrative order which respondent
earnestly insists is referable to the police power alone,
and which refuses to recognize any right of
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compensation for the taking of the use.
The only other case cited by respondents is
Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Grant Rural
Telephone Co. (Okl.) 119 Pac. 968. The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma granted a rehearing in the case, and
for this reason undoubtedly the decision does not
appear in the authorized volwnes of the Oklahoma
reports, but it may be treated as an existing decision
meriting consideration for the principles which it may
announce. and the reasoning upon which they may be
based. The application was by the Grant County Rural
Telephone Company to compel the Pioneer Telephone
& Telegraph Company to permit it to make
connections. The petitioning company was a mutual
company operating locally. Both companies were
organized under the Constitution and laws of
Oklahoma. Section 5 of article 9 of that Constitution
provides that: 'All telephone and telegraph lines,
operated for hire, shall each respectively, receive and
transmit each other's messages without delay or
discrimination, and make physical connections with
each other's lines, under such rules and regulations as
shall be prescribed by law, or by any commission
created by this Constitution, or by any act of the
Legislature for that purpose.' Section 18 of article 9 of
the Constitution authorized the creation of a
commission having 'the power and authority and be
charged with the duty of supervising, regulating, and
controlling all transportation and transmission
companies doing business in this state.' This
corporation commission had ordered the appealing
company to permit connection to be made. The court
of Oklahoma found and declared: The appellant is
engaged in a general public telephone business
throughout the state, furnishing exchange telephone
service from various exchange plants located in many
cities and towns within the siate, including the city of
Pond Creek, and also furnishing toll or long-distance
service over its toll or long-distance lines constructed
generally throughout the state, including toll or longdistance service to and from the city of Pond Creek.'
The decision of the court declares: When appellant
procured its charter and its franchise to engage in this
public service business, it did it wilh the full
knowledge that it thereby became an agency of the
state, subject to its control and regulation, under the
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exercise of its police power, for the comfort and
convenience of the citizens of the state (31 Cyc. 902),
subject to the condition that appellant's property
should not be taken, except by due process of law.
When a fair and just oompensation is afforded for such
convenience, facility, and service, that constitutional
requirement is satisfied. The order of the Commission
as modified, must be affmned.' What, then, is this
decision? It is that the appellant company had taken its
franchise from the state of Oklahoma. and had engaged
in business subject to its Constitution and its laws; that
the Constitution required such telephone companies to
permit connections with others and the use by such
others of their instrwnentalities; moreover, that this
precise thing was the business in which the appellant
oompany was engaged It had dedicated its property to
the public use of furnishing such long- distance service
to local oompanies. Therefore the order compelling the
oompany to pennit a connection wilh the Grant County
Rural Company was not the taking of appellant's
property for a new use, but was a mere regulation of
the use, which it was obliged by its charter, accepted
under the Constitution of Oklahoma, to acknowledge,
and the use to which in fact it had publicly dedicated
its property ....And, finally, it is to be noted that the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the last two sentences
quoted from its opinion, itself makes distinct
recognition and affumance of the fact lhat fair and just
compensation must be granted to comply with the
constitutional requirement against unlawful taking.
Again we fail to perceive any force to lhi~ decision as
applied to the present case, where the charter of the
petitioning company was not subjected to any such
right of connections, and where the company had never
dedicated its property to such use by competing lines.
The principles to be deduced from the
authorities may be thus swnmed up: Such a use by
physical a:mnection between two telephone companies
could not be decreed by any court or commission, in
the absence of an authorizing statute. Where the
Constitution or laws of a state declare that such use
shall be pcnnitted, it will be held that a corporation or
an individual which thereafter enters upon the business
does so, having in law dedicated its property to this
public use; that is to say, to the use of allowing even
oompeting lines to make camection with and use of its
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telephone service. Where, regardless of such
constitutional or statutory provision, a company has
actually dedicated its property to such use, it will not
be allowed to indulge in unjust discrimination by
ar-bitrarily refusing to one the connection aild use
which it has pennitted to others. In these two classes of
cases there is no change of use, and consequently no
taking of property, but there is a regulation of use, and
the compensation to be allowed need not necessarily be
a compensation paid in advance other than such as will
equitably compensate for the cost of connection, but
will be a compensation· for the future service which
may be fairly adjusted by rates and tolls. In all other
cases such an order for a physical connection does
involve a taking of property within the Constitution,
for which compensation must be made. It would seem
that the matter would become quite apparent if the
order in this case had decreed that for the transmission
of messages the Pacific Telephone Company should
tum over its agencies and instrumentalities to the
Glenn county and Tehama county companies for 1
hour ·out of each 24. That the order actually made
requires the Pacific Telephone Company to do this
same thing for five minutes or ten minutes at a time
during any and every hour of the day may tend to
obscure the fact that it is a taking, but does not change
it.
In this cormection we cannot do better than to
quote at some length from the well-considered case of
State v. Cadwallader, 1721nd. 619, 87 N. E. 644, 89
N. E. 319; Where the Supreme Court of Indiana had
under consideration some of these very questions: 'By
analogy and by statute, where they are constructed or
maintained for the public for profit, or charges are
made for their use, individuals conducting telephone
exchanges are subject to the same obligations as
oorporations with respect to equal facilities and equal
charges and freedom from disaimination and partiality
as against any person, persons, or corporations in like
situatiop, conducting a lawful business. Bums' Ann.
St. 1908, § 5802. This duty does not amount to an
absolute requirement that one company or individual
shall furnish the paiiOOS of another the use of its or his
exchange and lines, unless it has been voluntarily
undertaken, so that he or it may not afterward
discriminate in classification. Patrons of the

19
rorporation or individual contracted with are bound to
know that, in the absence of an undertaking so to do,
another corporation or individual is not bound to
subject its or his property to their use by direct or
unrestricted use of their lines. Telephone exchanges
conducted for the benefit of the public for
compensation may fairly be said to be impressed with
a public interest, but their public character depends
upon the nature, and not the extent, of their business.
Each agency or exchange conducted by a corporate
entity or individual is separate and distinct from all
others with respect to the conduct of its business and
in its relation to the public, and owes duties of an
impartial character, and free from discrimination to all
who are like circumstanced. The fact that it is a quasi
public agent, by reason of being impressed with a
public interest, is.only so to the extent that it owes an
impartial duty to all with respect to its particular
capacity and undertakings from its or his own initiative
agreement or consent. If this were not true, it will
readily be seen that any one who saw fit could, by
establishing a telephone exchange and procuring few
or many patrons, or if a once extensive field of
operations had existed when the relation began, which
furnished the consideration, but had dwindled to small
proportions, so that there would be practically no
return to the one for the service to the other, could
insist on connection with and service through indefmite
extensions, and produce an inequality which in itself
would be inequitable and lacking in consideration. If
the right to such connection were once admitted to
exist, as an abstract right, it would not depend upon
the number of patrons, but upon the question of
individual right, and it must be based upon that right if
it exists at all, in the absence of contract, express or
implied, for there would be no means of determining
where the particular plant, exchange, or property
becomes or ceases to be impressed with a public
interest It could only be thus impressed by the
character of the use, and not by the nwnber of users.
The effect would be the destruction of the private right
of cootract, and would amount to practical confiSCation
of another's property. When a business becomes that
of a conunon carrier, it becomes impressed with the
common-law duty of receiving from a connecting
carrier and transporting commodities, the same as if
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offered by an individual, and so here relator and his
patrons through him, upon compliance with the
reasonable rules and regulations and payment of the
compensation which is ordinarily charged to others,
would be entitled to have his and their messages
handled and transmitted by appellee's exchange; but
that is a very different thing, in the absence of contract,
from the demand that a physical connection shall be
maintained involuntarily, and as of right, when from
the character of the business itself the control of
appellee's plant would be, in a measure, wrested from
him and subjected to the administration of another, or
many others. The private right of property and of
contract may not thus be interfered with, and we are
treating now only of the relations of these quasi public
utilities, where there is no statutory regulation and no
contractual relation, express or implied.'
There can be no escape then from the
conclusion that the order here before us involves a
taking of the property within the meaning of the
Constitution, and that the taking, without regard to the
authority of the commissioners to exercise the power
of eminent domain, is a taking without compensation,
respondent itself insisting upon this view of the case,
saying: The Commission has at no time contended or
admitted that any compensation·is due petitioner for a
taking of its property. The compensation referred to is
compensation to be paid to petitioner for services
rendered in recei~g and transmitting long- distance
telephone messages.' It, therefore, stands admitted, as
indeed it must, that for the taking no compensation
whatsoever is made. And of course it cannot be
contended, and is not contended, that an apportionment
of rates or tolls for a service to be rendered in the
future is a compensation for the present taking of
property, and as little can it be said that the allocation
of such rates and tolls to be earned in the future can
ever measure up to the constitutional requirement that
property shall not be taken without compensation farst
made and paid to the owner. Attorney General v. Old
Colony Railroad, 160 Mass. 62, 35 N. E. 252, 22 L. R.
A. 112.
This consideration has been addressed
principally to the proposition of the taking of property
by the subjectioo of it to a new use. There is, however,
within this case, as has previously been outlined, the
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further contention that there is an additional taking, in

that the property of the company is turned over to the
use of a competing company, to the manifest and
proved injury to petitioner's local business. We need
not dwell upon this further than to say that it is weD
established by the quotations and citations above given
that this is an added element of injury in the taking and
a proper matter for compensation.
There is left for consideration one other
proposition which is not presented in argument, but
which necessarily arises under the interpretation which
we have given to the amended provisions of our
Constitution. That interpretation, as we have said,
makes paramount even to the Constitution itself the
powers which the Legislature may see fit to confer
upon the Railroad Commission. Amongst those
powers is that which authorizes the Commission to sit
as a tribunal in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain and to fix compensation under its awards. This
clearly is a power at variance with that constitutional
provision above quoted, which declares that
compensation for the taking of property shall be
assessed by a jmy and paid into court. It is the
equivalent of saying that in the case of public utilities
the power of eminent domain shall be exercised and
damage assessed by the Railroad Commission, while
the owners of aU other kinds of property shall have this
assessment made in court by a jury. Conceding this
discrimination to be valid so far as the state
Constitution is concerned, either because it is an
amendment superior to aU constitutional provisions, or
because from the nature of public utilities and the
difficulties in assessing damages for the taking, a
distinction may be drawn and a different mode
provided, there is still left the problem whether or no
the rights of public utilities are violated, in that this
would be a denial to them of the equal protection of the
law. This problem is of no practical consequence in the
present case, for, as has been said, there is no
contention upon the part of the respondent that it
allowed any compensation whatever for the taking of
propeny.
In the consideration of this problem our
Constitution (article 1, § 14) is to be read as though
amended by the proviso that in the case of all public
utilities the power of eminent domain may, by
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authority of the Legislature, be vested in the Railroad
Coounission, with power to that body to detcnnine the
public convenience or necessity and make an award for
damages without the intervention of a jury. The
requirement of a jury and of a prepayment of damages
is not a part of the federal Constitution, nor of that of
many of our states. It is in those jurisdictions quite a
common practice to cr~te boards and commissions to
exercise the power on behalf of the state, and to make
awards between litigants. It is certainly true that in the
vast modern development of public utilities in their
multifarious activities, in their complicated
interrelations, where a taking of property is involved,
a great saving of time. and a more just award may be
expected from a learned, skilled, and dispassionate
tribunal such as the Railroad Commission than can
ever be hoped for from the haphazard verdicts of
juries. And very good reasons therefore appear why,
for the benefit of the state as well as for the benefit of
the public service companies, awards as to the latter
should be made by this body, and not by a jury. It is
therefore concluded that no violence is done to the
rights of petitioner under the Constitution of the
United States by this proviso of the state Constitution
authorizing the Railroad Commission to exercise the
power of eminent domain and assess damages for a
taking of property.
But while the compensatory award in such
cases rests with the Railroad Commission, it is still the
duty of that Commission to make compensation for
such a taking. This not only by virute of article 1 of
section 14 of the Constitution, but as well by the
provisions of the Public Utilities Act itself. For
example, in section 41, dealing with the taking of
property through the use thereof, the act declares that
the railroad Commission shall 'prescribe a reasonable
compensation and reasonable terms and conditions for
the joint use.' We do not fmd in the public utilities act
any intmt to deprive a public utility, whose property is
so taken, of the compensation in advance, which is the
due, under our state Constitution, of the owner of any
other kind of property. So that, while in this class of
cases, the jury is eliminated and the award of the
Railroad Coounission substituted for the jury's verdict,
it still remains as a part of our Constitution that the
compensation decreed to the public utility for a taking

of its property shall be paid in advance of such actual
taking.
We may now sum up our conclusions as
follows:
1. The Constitution has, in the Railroad
Commission, created both a court and an
administrative tribunal.
2. The Constitution has authorized the
Legislature to confer additional and different powers
upon this Commission touching public utilities
unrestrained by other constitutional provisions.
3. The legality of such powers as the
Legislature has or may thus confer upon ·the
Coounission, if cognate and gennane to the subject of
public utilities, may not be questioned under the state
Constitution.
4. Th2Jt therefore the deprivation of
jurisdiction of the courts of the state may not be
questioned.
5. That therefore the reasonableness of the
Railroad Conunission's orders and decrees may not be
inquired into by any court of this state, and
consequently is of federal cognizance only.
6. That the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain in matters involving public utilities
has been vested by the Legislature in the Railroad
Commission, and that the exercise of this power and
the making of awards thereunder without the
intervention and verdict of a jury are not in violation of
the Constitution of this state or of the United States.
7. That payment of such awards must be made
in advance of the actual taking.
8. That the order in question involves an
exercise of the power of eminent domain and not of the
police power.
9. That the order in question admittedly gives
no compensation for the taking of petitioner's property,
and is therefore void by force and virtue of the
Constitution of the state and of the United States.
10. That the order in question must therefore
be, and it hereby is, annulled.
We concur: LORIGAN, J.; MELVIN, J.
SLOSS, J. (concurring).
I agree with the conclusion that the order
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under review should be annulled. the concur in the
judgment so declaring, but cannot assent entirely to the
reasoning by which this result is reached. Important as
is the detennination of the right of the Railroad
Conunission to order the physical connection which it
has here directed to be made between the lines of the
petitioner and those of the Glenn and Tehama
companies, more important still is the correct
ascertainment of the extent of the power of this court
to review orders of the Railroad Commission under the
writ provided for in section 67 of the Public Utilities
Act, or otherwise. What orders may be reviewed, what
claims of right may be examined here? The correct
dc:tennination of these questions lies at the base of the
decision-, not only of the particular case before us, but
of the similar proceedings already pending, and
nwnerous others which will undoubtedly be brought to
test the exeiCise by the Railroad Commission of the
authority vested or believed to be vested in il I think it
proper, therefm:, to state, in some detail, my views on
these fundamental questions, and to point out how far
those views are not in complete accord with the
conclusions expressed in Justice HENSHAW'S
opinion.
The courts of this state derive their powers
and jmisdiction from the Constitution of the state. The
constitutional jurisdiction can neither be restricted nor
enlarged by legislative act. An attempt to take away
from the rourts judicial power conferred upon them by
the Constitution, or to impose upon them judicial
powers not granted or authorized to be granted by the
Constitution, is void. This declaration is not only in
accord with the decisions elsewhere (Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 2 L. Ed. 60), but has been
held by this court from the early history of the state
(Thompson v. Williams, 6 Cal. 88; Hicks v. Bell, 3
Cal. 219; [citations]. It is still the rule except in so far
as it may have been modified by changes in the
Constitution itself.
By the amendment in 1911 of section 22 of
article 12, creating a Railroad Commission, it is
provided that: 'No provision of this Constitution shall
be construed as a limitation upon the authority of the
Legislature to confer upon the Railroad Commission
additional powers of the same kind or different from
those c:mferred herein which are not inconsistent with
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the powers conferred upon the Railroad Commission
in this Constitution, and the authority of the
Legislature to confer such additional powers is
expressly declared to be plenary and unlimited by any
provision of this Constitution.' And section 23 of the
same article, defining public utilities and declaring that
they are subject to the control and regulation of the
Railroad Commission, provides that 'the right of the
Legislature to confer powers upon the Railroad
Commission respecting public utilities is hereby
declared to be plenary and to be unlimited by any
provision of this Cmstitution.' To the extent, then, that
the Legislature has acted in conferring powers
(germane to the subject of the regulation and control of
public utilities) upon the Railroad Commission, it
necessarily follows that the validity of such grant of
powers is not to be questioned by reason of any other
provision of the state Constitution. This position is
fully developed in Justice HENSHAW'S opinion. It
would seem to follow, too, that if a legislative grant of
power to the Railroad Commission is so extensive in
tenns as to exclude or limit the power of any court to
question or review the order of the Commission, such
exclusion or limitation must be recognized as valid,
although it amounts to a restriction of a part of the
jurisdiction conferred upon the courts by other parts of
the Constitution. If the Legislature has plenary power
to confer powers upon the Railroad Commission, it
may declare that the orders of the Railroad
Commission shall be final and conclusive, and not
subject to review by any court of this state. Such
declaration would be an exeiCise of the unlimited
power of the Legislature to confer additional powers
upon the Railroad Conunission. H the Legislature may,
as a part of its grant of powers to the Railroad
Conunission, take away all right of the' courts to review
the orders of the Commission, manifestly it may take
away a part of such right by providing that the acts of
the Commission shall be subject to only a limited and
specified review. There can, then, be no objection,
under the Coostitution of this state, to the provision of
the Public Utilities Act (section 67) that 'no court of
this state (except the Supreme Court to the extent
herein specified) shall have jurisdiction to review,
reverse, correct or annul any order or decision of the
Conunission or to suspend or delay the execution or
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operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere
with the Conunission in the perfonnance of its official
duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus shall lie
from the Supreme Coun to the Commission in all
proper cases.' I fully agree therefore, with Justice
HENSHAW'S view that section 67 of the Public
Utilities Act is valid and effective in so far as it takes
from every court, except the Supreme Court, the power
to review or suspend any order of the Commission, and
in so far as it takes from the Supreme Court the power
to review such orders in any mode other than those
specially pennitted by the act, to wit, by writ of review
or mandamus.
But the conclusion that the amendments to
sections 22 and 23 of article 12 of the Constitution
authorize the Legislature to take away or to limit the
jurisdiction of the courts with respect to orders and
decisions of the Railroad Commission does not carry
with it the conclusion that the Legislature is authorized
to enlarge the constitutional jurisdiction of any court of
this state. These amendments do not give to the
Legislature any right to alter the jurisdiction of the
courts except to the extent that such alteration is
. involved in a grant of power to the Railroad
Commission. To say that the orders of the Railroad
Canmission shall not be subject to review is to confer
upon the Railroad Commission a greater or more
absolute power than it would have if its orders were
subject to review in the regular course of judicial
procedure. To say, however, that any court shall have
a jurisdiction beyond that conferred upon it by the
Constitution to review, annul, or modify an order of
the Railroad Commission is not to grant additional or
other powers to the Railroad Commission. It is, on the
contrary, to limit the power of the Railroad
Commission and to grant additional powers to the
courts. There is nothing in the amendments of 1911
which authorizes such extension by the Legislature of
the jurisdiction of the courts. The rule must therefore
be now, as it has always been, that any legislative
attempt to confer upon the courts powers beyond those
conferred by the Constitution is void.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
carefully defmed by the Constitution. The court has
jurisdiction on appeal .from the superior court in cenain
cases. It also has appellate jurisdiction in matters
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pending before a district court of appeal which shall be
ordered by the Supreme Court to be transferred to itelf,
and it has original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus,
and all other writs necessary or proper to the complete
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The Public
Utilities Act does not attempt to confer upon this court
any appellate jurisdiction. Under the views already
expressed it is not competent for the Legislature to
confer upon the Supreme Court any original
jurisdiction which is not embraced within one or the
other of the writs above mentioned, i. e., mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus and all other
writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.
Section 67 of the act provides that the party
against whom a decision is rendered by the Railroad
Commission may apply to the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari or review for the purpose of having
the lawfulness of the order inquired into and
detennined. The writ of review (certiorari) is one of the
writs which, under section 4 of article 6 of the
Constitution, is within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. To the extent, then, that certiorari is
an appropriate remedy to review the orders of the
Commission. this court would have had power to issue
such a writ if the Public Utilities Act had been silent on
the subject of the right of the courts to examine the
acts of the Commission. And, considering the settled
rule with respect to the power of the Legislature to
enlarge the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts, the
power to issue a writ of review and to dispose of the
questions arising under it is to be regarded as derived
primarily from the Constitution, rather than from
section 67 of the Public Utilities Act.
The writs embraced in the grant of original
jurisdiction contained in section 4 of article 6 of the
Constitution are the designated writs as they were
understood and defined at the time the Constitution
was adq>ted, and the Legislature has no power to
extend the scope of the writs as thus limited...
.Maurerv. Mitchell, 53 Cal. 291; Camron v. Kenfield,
57 Cal. 550. The writ of review, as is well settled in
this state. is issued only to an officer or tribunal
exercising judicial functions. It lies for the pwpose of
reviewing only judicial or quasi judicial proceedings.
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People v. Bush, 40 Cal. 346; Quinchard v. Board of
Trustees, 113 Cal. 664, 45 Pac. 856; Cook v. Civil
Service Comm., 160 Cal. 589, 117 Pac. 663. It does
not lie to review errors of fact or law, but only to
determine whether an officer, board or tribunal has
exceeded his or its jurisdiction. This is the purpose of
the writ as declared by section 1068 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The provision of section 1074 of the
same Code (enacted prior to the adoption of the
Constitution of 1879) that the review cannot be
extended further than to determine whether the inferior
tribunal, board, or officer 'bas regularly pursued the
authority of such tribunal, board, or officer' did not
asswne to enlarge the range of inquiry. 1bis court has
expressly held that the clause 'whether the tribunal has
regularly pursued its authority' is the equivalent <?f
'whether it has exceeded its jurisdiction.' C. P. R. R. v.
Placer County, 43 Cal. 365; Quinchard v. Board,
supra.
It follows that the inquiry which we may make
under the writ issued in this case is limited to
detennining whether or not the Railroad Commission
has exceeded its jurisdiction in making the order
complained of. If section 67 of the act undertakes to
give to this court any broader power than that, the
attempt so to do must be disregarded as in violation of
the Constitution. I think, however, that, properly
~onstrued, section 67 does not assume to authorize
anything more than a search into the jurisdiction. It
provides that the review shall not be extended further
than to detennine 'whether the Commission has
regularly pursued its authority.' This is the Vel)'
language of section 1074, and is synonymous with
detennining whether the Commission has acted within
its jurisdiction. The words 'including a detennination
of whether the order or decision under review violates
any right of the petitioner under the Constitution of the
United States or of the state of California' do not
extend the inquiry as thus defmed. The examination of
constitutional rights is, under the tenns of the Public
Utilities Act, included in the inquiry whether the
Commission has regularly pursued its authority. It is
not made a separate and distinct subject of judicial
scrutiny. Whether or not the Commission is acting
within its jurisdiction may or may not depend upon
constitutional questions.
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What, then, are the grounds of objection to the
order here made? It is said that the order is. in effect,
one for the taking of private property for public use
without compensation, and that such order. therefore,
violates the provisions of both the state and federal
Constitutions.
I do not see how it can be said that there is any
violation of the state Constitution. The procedure of
the Railroad Commission and the order made by it
were in strict conformity with section 40 of the act.
That section gives the Commission power to do just
what it has done. If this amounts to a taking of private
property for public use without compensation, it is a
taking authorized by the terms of the act. Under the
provisions of sections 22 and 23 of article 12 of the
Constitution above quoted. the powers granted to the
Commission by the act are not controlled by any
provisioos of the state Constitution. Hence it cannot be
said that an order made under a power expressly
oonfcrred by statute upon the Commission violates that
Constitution. Section 40 names the conditions oo
which the order can be made. viz.. that it can
reasonably be made. that the lines can be made to fonn
a continuous line of communication. that public
convenience and necessity will be subserved thereby,
and that the purpose is not primarily to secure local
transmission. Fmding these conditions, . the
Commission is authorized to order the connection
under rules imd regulations established by it and, if the
axnpanies do not agree. to fix the division of the cost
of connection and of the rates. Evidently no
axnpensation except such·as may inhere in a division
of tolls is comtemplated. It is, then, the law. and not
any order made outside of the law, that takes property
without compensation, if property is thus taken. I do
not find in the act any provision authorizing the
Railroad Commission to exercise generally the power
of eminent domain, or to assess damages oo
anlcmnalioo. The only section authorizing it to allow
a oompensatioo f<r property taken is section 41, which
refers solely to the case of one public utility using the
conduits, subways, tracks, wires, etc., of another on,
over or Wlder a street or highway. This section bas no
pertinency to the case at bar. There is no provision
which rcqtms <r autloizes the Railroad Commission,
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in a case like the one before us, to award to one of the

two telephone companies directed to make a physical
connection between their lines any compensation as
such for the taking of its property. The Commission,
therefore, has strictly pursued the powers which the
Legislature, acting under the plenary power conferred
upon it by the state Constitution, has granted, and the
provisions of other parts of that Constitution seem to
me to be out of the case.
The other ground of attack is that the order is
a violation of the rights of the petitioner under the
federal Constitution. The fifth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, providing that
private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation, has no bearing upon the
case, as it is well settled that this amendment is a
limitation upon the power of the federal government,
and not upon that of the states. Barron v. Baltimore, 7
Pet. 243, 8 L. Ed. 672. If, however, the order in
question does amount to a taking of private property
fer public use without just compensation, such taking
is a violation of the rights of the petitioner under the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, providing that no state shall deprive any
persoo of life. liberty, or property without due process
of law. 'A law which authorizes the taking of private
property without compensation or for other than a
public purpose cannot be considered as due process of
law in a free government.' 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain
(3d Ed.)§ 11 ....

Upon the remaining question--whether the
order of the Commission amounts to a taking of the
property of the petitioner without compensation--!
agree with the conclusion reached in Justice
HENSHAW'S opinion, and, in substance, with the
reasoning upon which that conclusion is based. It is
plain that the answer to this question depends upon an
ascertainment of the precise nature of the
governmental power which has been called into use in
making the order before us. If the Commission has
merely exercised the power of .regulation conferred
upon it--if, in other words, it has, as an instrument of
the state, used the police power of the state-- no right
under the federal Constitution is invaded, unless the
order is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to
a coofisc:.Woo of property. The order, viewed as a pure
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regulation, can hardly be so characterized. Even if it
could. it is doubtful whether, in view of the provision
of the public Utilities Act that the findings and
conclusions of the Commission on questions of fact,
including reasonableness and discrimination, shall be
final and not subject to review, the order could be
attacked on this ground in any court of this state,
however assailable it might be in the federal courts. If,
on the other hand, the Commission, pursuing the
poWer attempted to be granted to it, has made an order
which amounts to a taking of the petitioner's property
for public use, the Commission, as an agency of the
state, was exercising the power of eminent domain. If
that power was sought to be exercised without at the
same time making provision for compensating the
petitioner for the property taken, the order was one
which the state was, by virtue of the fourteenth
amendment to the federal Constitution, precluded from
making. It may be that, if the statute contained proper
provision for an assessment and payment of
compensation for the taking, the failure of the
Commission to fix and allow adequate compensation
could not be made the basis for assailing the order on
certiorari. In such event, it might be said that the
statute vested jurisdiction in the board, and that an
order which omitted to provide compensation would
merely constitute error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
See Bishop v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. 226, 25 Pac.
435.
But, as already stated. the statute itself fails to
provide for the assessment or payment of damages,
and such statute must therefore be held to be in conflict
with the federal Constitution to the extent that it
assumes to authorize the taking of private property
without cornpemalion. A void statute-- and one which
conflicts with either the federal or the state
Constitution is void-is not effective to confer
jurisdiction on any court or board whose authority to
act in the particular case is not granted except by that
statute. This is well illustrated by the case of Conn.
River R. R. Co. v. County Commissioners, 127 Mass.
50, 34 Am. Rep. 338, where it was held that a writ of
prohibition would lie to prevent proceedings in
eminent domain under a statute which did not make
adequate provision for compensation to the party
whose property was sought to be taken.
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It is true that the fmdings of the Commission
refer to the fact that the petitioner had, under
agreement, connected with other companies. Mention
of this circumstance was made in answer to the claim
that there were practical difficulties in the way of
making a physical connection. It is not claimed,
however, and under the evidence there was no room to
claim, that the petitioner had ever made connections
with competing companies. All it had done was, upon
terms and for a consideration (or compensation)
satisfactory to it, to connect with companies operating
in territories where it offered no local service. The fact
that the service here is directed to be given to
competing companies seems to me to be a most
essential factor in the conclusion that the petitioner is
called upon to subject i~ property to an additional and
different use. Rival companies are not within the class
of the public to which it has offered its facilities for
me. Wyman Pub. Serv. Corp., § 698. If there were two
companies furnishing electric light or power to the
inhabitants of a city, could one of such companies,
having a surplus of current beyond that required for its
existing contracts, be compelled to furnish that surplus
to the rival company, for no other compensation than
a rate fixed by public authorities, to the end that the
rival might be enabled to compete with it more
effectively? It would seem fairly clear that this was not
a service which the frrst company had undertaken or
professed to perform. The case at bar is, I think, the
same in principle. By installing its long-distance plant
for the use of subscribers to its local systems, the
petitioner has developed an element of great value in
the conduct of its local business at various points. It
has thereby built up for itself an advantage, and a
perfectly legitimate one, over competitors who, with a
much smaller investment and at far smaller risk, have
created only a local system. It has never offered to
share this advantage with rival companies. To be
compelled to so share it is to subject its property to a
new use--and thus, in part, to take iL If the public
inlcrest requires the connection, appropriate provision
for estimating and paying the damage occasioned
thereby must be made. A men: division of the tolls,
even though the entire toU may be allotted to the
petitioner, is not the compensation required as a
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condition to the taking of property for public use. In
the frrst place, it is uncertain, both, as to amount and
time. Conn. River R. R. Co. v. County Com'rs, 127
Mass. 50, 34 Am. Rep. 338. In the next place, the
division of tolls will only pay the company for the
service actually rendered by it from time to time. It wiD
not afford any compensation for the damage
occasioned by the taking, i. e., by the subjecting of its
property to the demands of a public service to which
that property was not dedicated. What the measure of
such damage is I do not attempt here to defme, but it is
plain that it includes elements not covered by a men:
apportionment of tolls.
The oonclusions reached may be summarized
as follows:
1. This court has no power to review the
orders of the Railroad Conunission except by means of
a writ of certiorari, or to control its action except in
appropriate cases by mandamus. No other court of the
state has any power to review the orders of the
Commission or to control its official action.
2. Upon a writ of certiorari against the
Railroad Commission this court must inquire whether
the Railroad Commission has acted within its
jurisdiction, and if this inquiry be answered
affrrmatively the proceeding must be dismissed.
3. If the Railroad Commission has acted in
conformity with the powers granted to it by the
Legislature, the validity of its order cannot be
questioned in this court or elsewhere under a claim of
violation of any provision of the state Constitution
other than the provisions relating to the Railroad
Commission. This statement is, however, to be taken
subject to the qualification that the powers conferred
by the Legislature on the Railroad Commission must
be such as are cognate and germane to the purposes for
which the Railroad Commission was created; i. e., the
regulation and control of public utilities.
4. Where the Coounissioo has acted within the
powers conferred upon it by the Legislature, the ooly
recourse of one affected by its action is to the
guaranties of the federal Constitution. And in cases
where the violation of the right guaranteed by the
federal Constitution does not involve an excess of the
jurisdiction of the Railroad Coounission, the fedaal
courts are the only ones in which he may assert his
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rights under those guaranties.
5. If the Railroad Commission, acting within
the powers granted to it by the Legislature, makes an
order which amounts to a taking of private propeny for
public use without compensation, such order does not
violate any provision of the Constitution of this state.
6. If in making such order private propeny is
taken for public use without compensation, such taking
is a violation of the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United Stales.
7. Any provision of the Public Utilities Act is
void to the extent that it purports to grant to the
Railroad Commission power to take private propeny
without compensation, and the act confers no
jurisdiction on the board to make an order having this
effect.
8. Section 40 of the act, authorizing the
ordering of physical connections between telephone
companies, is void in so far at least as it purports to
require a company having long-distance and local
service, to make a physical connection for
long-distance service with a company competing
locally, where the flrst company has not professed to
render this kind of service. An order for physical
connection is, in such a case, a taking of the propeny
of the complaining company without 'compensation.
9. 1be order under review was in excess of the
jurisdiction of the Conunission and should be annulled.
I concur: SHAW, J.

ANGELLOITI, J. (dissenting).
I am unable to concur in the judgment

annulling the order of the Railroad Commission, and,
in view of the importance of the case, deem it proper to
state very briefly my conclusions upon what I consider
the material questions presented.
I concur in the conclusions reached by Mr.
Justice SLOSS in his concurring opinion, numbered in
the summary at the end thereof as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, and
in the reasoning upon which the same are based. Nor
can there be any doubt that the conclusion in said
summary numbered 6 is correct It is not so clear to
me, however, that, even if we assume that under the
facts of this case, the execution of the order in question
involves a prohibited taking of private propeny

without compensation, any excess of jurisdiction on
the pan of the Railroad Commission is shown, or
anything other than such a violation of a right
guaranteed by the federal Constitution, as, in view of
the provisions of our state Constitution and those of
the Public Utilities Act, can be alleged and determined
only in the federal courts.
However this may be, I am not convinced that
there is shown by the facts of this case any 'taking' of
petitioner's property within the meaning of that term as
used in our law prohibiting the taking of propeny
without compensation to the owner. Not being satisfied
of the correctness of the conclusion that such a taking
is shown, I am unable to concur in the judgment.

CLEMMONS

v.
RAILROAD COMMISSION
OF STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Supreme Court of California.
Aug. 4, 1916.
173 Cal. 254, 159 P. 713
In Bank. Application for writ of review by
Dan aernmons and William aemmons against the
Railroad Conunission of the State of California and the
members thereof. Proceeding dismissed.
SLOSS,J.
This is a proceeding brought to review an
order of the Railroad Commission. Tujunga Water &
Power Company, a corporation engaged in supplying
water in certain territory in the county of Los Angeles,
applied to the Commission for an increase of rates.
Certain consumers, including the petitioners above
named, appeared and resisted the application. After a
hearing the Commission, on July 8, 1915, made and
flied its order establishing a schedule of rates greater
than those theretofore in force. The order contained a
provision that the authorized schedule be put into
effectooandafter July 15,1915. On August 13, 1915,
Dan and William aemmons, petitioners herein, filed
with the Conunission their application for a rehearing.
The rehearing was denied on various grounds. one of
them being thal the application had not been presented
within the time allowed by law. The applicants
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petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari.
In the frrst instance, we issued an order to
show cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue. In
response to this order, the Commission raised the
objection that its order could not be reviewed here
because timely application had not been made to the
Commission itself for rehearing. Public Utilities Act,
§ 66. On the return day of the order to show cause, the
court directed the issuance of a writ of certiorari, and
return to this writ bas been duly made.
Notwithstanding our order that a writ issue,
the respondents are not precluded from continuing to
insist, as they do, upon their preliminary objection
raised in response to the order to show cause. In
ordering the issuance of the writ of certiorari we did
not fmally pass upon the merits of this objection. In
any event, the point goes to the jurisdiction of the
court, and it may, therefore be raised at any stage of
the proceedings.
The Public Utilities Act.(section 67) provides
that: 'Within thirty days after the application for a
rehearing is denied, or, if the application is granted, •
• • within thirty days after the rendition of the decision
on rehearing, the applicant may apply to the Supreme
Court of this state for a writ of certiorari or review • •
• for the purpose of having the lawfulness of the
original order or decision or the order or decision on
rehearing inquired into and determined.'
The same section, after defming the scope of
such writ of review. declares that: 'No court of this
state (except the Supreme Court to the extent herein
specified) shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse,
'correct or annul any order or decision of the
Commission or to suspend or delay the execution or
operation thereof, or to enjoin, restrain or interfere
with the Commission in the performance of its official
duties; provided, that the writ of mandamus shall lie
from the Supreme Court to the Commission in all
proper cases.'
The validity of these limitations upon the
control of the court of this state over the acts of the
Railroad Conunission Was defmitely settled in Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal.
640, 137 Pac. 1119, 50 L. R. A (N. S.) 652, Ann.
Cas. 1915C, 822. All of the justices who took part in
the decision of that case agreed that the conclusion just
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stated was the necessary consequence of the
constitutional grant to the Legislature of authority to
confer powers upon the Railroad Commission, such
authority being 'expressly declared to be plenary and
unlimited by any provision of this Constitution.' Const.
art. 12, § 22. Section 66 of the Public Utilities Act
provides that: 'No cause of action arising out of any
order or decision of the Commission shall accrue in
any court to any corporation or person unless such
corporation or person shall have made, before the
effective date of said order or decision, an application
to the commission for a rehearing.'
Since in the case at bar 'the effective date' of
the order complained of was, by the order itself,
declared to be July 15, 1915, and since application for
rehearing was not made until 29 days after that date, it
follows that the petitioners have lost their right to
apply to this court, or to any court of this state, for a
review of the action of the commission.
In the absence of any provision to the contrary
in the statute, we see no reason to doubt that the
Conunission may provide in its discretion for the time
when its orders shall take effect. It is urged by the
petitioners that the Commission might fix so short a
time that it would be impossible to petition for a
rehearing, and might thereby deprive a party aggrieved
of any right to resort to the courts for redress. But the
answer to this is that the Legislature might have
withheld from the courts of the state any power of
reviewing the acts of the Commission. Pac. T. & T.
Co. v. Eshleman, supra. The power of review which is
given must be exercised within the limits and upon the
conditions which the Legislature has seen fit to fix.
The necessary result of the foregoing
discussion is that the failure of the petitioners to ask
the Commission for a rehearing within the time
allowed by the statute bars them of any right to ask
this court to review the order complained of. There is
therefore no occasion, and it would be improper to
inquire into the merits of the attack made upon the
ocder of the Camnissicn That order has become final,
so far as the power of this court to review it in
certiorari is concerned.
The proceeding is dismissed.
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We concur: SHAW, J.; MELVIN, J.;
HENSHAW, J.; LORIGAN, J.; LAWLOR, J.
TRABER et al.

v.
RAILROAD COMMISSION.
Supreme Court of California.
July 9, 1920.
183 Cal. 304, 191 P. 366
In Bank.
Proceeding in certiorari by John W. Traber
and another to review an order and decision of the
Railroad Commission of the State of California.
Petition for writ denied.
SHAW,J.
This is a proceeding in certiorari, under the
Public Utilities Act, by plaintiffs, for themselves and
in behalf of 22 other persons interested in like manner,
to review an order and decision of the Railroad
Commission made on June 6, 1919, fixing rates to be
charged by the Fresno Canal & Land Corporation for
waler supplied from its canal for the irrigation of land.
· The ground for review is that the Fresno Land & Canal
Corporation is not a public utility, at least so far as
plaintiffs's rights to water are concerned; that the
respective rights of the plaintiffs to the water are
private rights appurtenant to their respective tracts of
land, and consequently that the commission is without
power over them, and may not fix rates different from
those fixed by the respective contracts between
plaintiffs and the predecessor in interest of said
corporation. It is also claimed that the order is void,
because it authorizes the canal corporation to make an
improper discrimination in the rates charged.
The Fresno Canal & Land Corporation was
incorporated on January 5, 1917. It thereupon took
over the properties and functions of the Fresno Canal
& Irrigation Company, and ever since that time it has
been operating the large water system in Fresno county
previously~ by the last-named corporation. In
the year 1917 it made two applications to the Railroad
Commission, under section 32 of the Public Utilities
Act (Stats. 1915, p. 132), asking said commission to
investigate the condition of the business carried on by
said corporation and make an award regulating and
fixing the rates to be charged by said corporation for
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the service of water by it by means of said water
system. On June 6, 1919, the commission made its
award and decision in the matter of said applications,
declaring that the corporation should thereafter charge
for the service of water at the rate of $200 per year for
each 160 acres of land served. The plaintiffs, in
connection with other persons, numbering 24 in all,
had been previously receiving water from the
corporation under contracts made in 1875 with its
prooecessor in interest, providing that they should
receive water at the rate of $25 annually for each
quarter section served. The object of the present
action is to annul said order, so far as these parties are
concerned.
Section 67 of the Public Utilities Act
authorizes this proceeding in review. It provides that
the review shall not be extended further than to
determine whether the commission has regularly
pursued its authority and whether or not it has violated
any constitutional right of the petitioner. It also
provides that the findings and conclusions of the
commissioo oo questions of fact shall be fmal and not
subject to review. The first duty of the commission
with respect to such applications was to inquire into
and determine whether or not the facts existed that
were necessary to confer upon it jurisdiction to act in
the matter. Notwithstanding the declaration of section
67 that the commission's detennination of matters of
fact are not subject to review, it must be held that its
determination upon the question whether or not the
facts existing are sufficient to bring the case within the
scope of its powers must be subject to review, so far as
they present a question of law bearing upon that
subject, and that the provision that the 'conclusions' of
the oommissioo oo the facts are fmal does not apply to
facts necessary to the existence of the jurisdiction of
the oommissioo to act Del Mar, etc., Co. v. Eshleman,
167 Cal. 677, 140 Pac. 591,948. But if the evidence
in proof of such facts is substantial in character, and
justifies the inference or conclusion that the facts
necessary to the jurisdiction of the commission did
exist, then, under the general principles of law
regarding the proceeding in certiorari, its decision as to
the effect of such evidence is binding and conclusive
oo the reviewing court. [citations] Our consideration
of the facts presented must therefore be governed by
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this principle.
The Public Utilities Act and the Constitution
(section 23, art. 12) undoubtedly give the commission
power to make orders prescribing the rates to be
charged by corporations engaged in operating a system
of waterworks or canals for the distribution of water
dedicated to public use. If said canal corporation was
so engaged, and the water it agreed to supply, and was
supplying. to the plaintiffs for their land, was a part of
the water so dedicated to public use, the power of the
commission to make the order is clear. The rights of
these parties arise from contrcns made with the Fresno
Canal & Irrigation Company, and the inquiry relates
exclusively to the character and business of that
company and its water supply, and the nature and
effect of those contracts.
We think the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the conclusion of the commission that the
company last named was a public utility at the time
these contracts were made, and that the water to be
supplied by it in pursuance of said contracts was a part
of the water it had dedicated to public use. The Fresno
Canal & Irrigation Company was incorporated on
February 16, 1871. Paragraph m of its original articles
stated that it was formed for the purpose of
constructing canals out of Kings river with which to
supply water for irrigation to lands along and near the
line of its canals and to collect rents for the use of the
water it supplied. In May, 1871, said paragraph Ill was
amended by eliminating the foregoing provisions and
stating in lieu thereof that the corporation was formed
to erect dams or other works in the channel of Kings
river and its branches at points near and above the
town of Centerville and for the construction and
enlargement of canals out of Kings river, and to
continue said canals along such routes as should be
found most feasible across Fresno county in every
available direction.
Nothing was said in the
amendment about supplying water for irrigation or for
any other use to any person or about charges or rates
for water supplied. The articles also declared that the
company was organized under the act of April 14,
1853, 'and the several acts amendatory thereof and
supplemental thereto.'
The act of April 14, 1853, provided for the
organization of corporations, but not for corporations
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for supplying water. Stats. 1853, p. 87 (G. & S. p.
273). The act of May 14, 1862, which was
supplemental to the act of 1853, provided that
corporations could be formed under the act of 1853 for
'the construction of canals, for the transportation of
passengers and freights, or for the purpose of irrigation
or water power, or for the conveyance of water for
mining or manufacturing purposes, or for all of such
purposes.' Slats. 1862, p. 540. It also provided that
such corporations should have power 'to establish,
collect, and receive rates, water rents, or tolls, which
shall be subject to regulation by the board of
supervisors,' and also the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain by acquiring land or other property
necessary for its canals by condemnation in the mode
presaibed by the railroad act of 1861. Stats. 1861, p.
618, §§ 22 to 39. The declaration in its articles that
said oorporation was formed under the act of 1853 and
the several acts supplemental thereto includes the act
of 1862 aforesaid as one of the acts under which it was
organized. This act, in effect. gives the corporations
organized under it the power to act as a public service
corporation for the supply of water for irrigation. In
Price v. Riverside, etc., Co., 56 Cal. 431, it was
decided that 'every corporation deriving its being from
the act above cited (the act of 1862) has impressed
upon it a public trust-the duty of furnishing water, if
water it has, to all those who come within the class or
community for whose alleged benefit it has been
created. • • • The power--in its nature a public
power-and the public duty are correlative. The duty
exists without any express statutory words imposing it
wherever the public use appears.' It is therefore clear
that the company, in so far as it derives its powers
from the act of 1862, was a corporation of the class
now known and described as a public utility, and one
which, with regard to public service it carries on, is
subject to regulation by the Railroad Commission as
provided in the Public Utilities Act.
Another act supplemental to the act of April
14, 1853, is the act of April2, 1870. Stats. 1869-70,
p. 660. (By an obviously clerical eJTOr it refers to the
previous act as the act of April 14, 1863.) This act
repeals all acts and parts of acts in conflict with its.
provisions. Sectioo 13. The plaintiffs contend that the
Fresno Canal &. Irrigation Company must be deemed
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to have been formed under the later act alone. Section
I of the act of 1870 is in substantially the same words
as section 1 of the act of 1862 above quoted, and the
subsequent provisions of the act are similar to those of
the act of 1862, except that. instead of referring to the
Railroad Act of 1861 for the mode of condemning
private property for corporate purposes, the act itself
(sections 4 to 11 ), prescribes the mode, and with the
further exception that it contains nothing
corresponding to section 3 of the act of 1862, the
section providing that the rates established by a
company formed under it shall be 'subject to regulation
by the board of supervisors,' and authorizing such
corporations to make rules regulating the distribution
of its water and the like. The argument is that these
omissions operate as a repeal of those parts of the act
of 1862 which in Price v. Riverside, supra, were held
to make the corporations formed under that act public
utilities, and hence that the Fresno Canal & Irrigation
Company had authority to act as a corporation for the
private purpose of diverting, distributing, and selling
water for its own profit, free from public regulation of
any kind.
We do not think the act of 1870 operated as a
repeal by implication of the act of May 14, 1862. The
repeal of statutes by implication is not favored. The
rule is 'that where there are two laws upon the same
subject. they must be so construed as to maintain both,
if it can be done without destroying the evident intent
and meaning of the latter act.' Merrill v. Gorham, 6
Cal. 42; Hilton v. Curry, 124 Cal. 87, 56 Pac. 784.
The act of 1870 expressly repeals all parts of other
acts which are 'in conflict' with it. The provisions of
section 3 of the act of 1862 do not in any manner
conflict with the act of 1870, but are entirely consistent
therewith. Hence there is no express repeal thereof.
Nor do the provisions of the latter act show that it was
intended as a complete substitute, and so to operate as
a repeal of the earlier act, under the rule applied in
Mack v. Jastro, 126 Cal. 132, 58 Pac. 372. Both
statutes were in force when said company was
organized, and it must be considered as a company
formed Wldcr both statutes, and as having, potentially,
at least, the powers conferred by both.
The act of 1870 confers authority to exercise
the power of eminent domain. This would be a taking
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of private property for public use. Const. 1849, art. 1,
s 8. Of necessity, the property so taken would be
dedicated to public use, and to that extent at least the
corporation taking it would be a public utility
administering a public service. But it does not appear
that the Fresno Canal & Irrigation Company took any
of its property in that manner, and it may be conceded
that the act of 1870 might very reasonably be
construed to authorize the formation of a corporation
to appropriate, distribute, and sell water without
dedicating it to public use. It is to be noted that these
transactions took place prior to the adoption of the
Constitution of 1879 declaring that the use of all water
appropriated for sale, rental, or distribution is public
use. Article 14, § 1. At that time, therefore, no
presumption of a public use arose from the mere fact
that the corporation diverted water and agreed to sell it
to certain persons. If there were no other evidence of
a dedication of the water to such public use, it might be
conceded that the proof before the commission was
insufficient to show jurisdiction. But there was other
evidence, consisting of acts and declarations, which
were sufficient in that respect, as we will proceed to
show.
After the irrigation company had completed its
dam, it was necessary to construct a canal through the
higher banks of Kings river in order to take the water
to lands susceptible of irrigation. The company was
without funds wherewith to do so. It proposed to the
plaintiffs and those whom they represent, 24 in
nmnber, that if they would excavate the canal through
said banks the company would thereupon execute
water-right contracts to each person so assisting, for
the delivery of one cubic foot of flowing water per
second for each quarter section of land, at an annual
rate of $25. The proposal was accepted, and said
parties excavated the canal under this agreement.
Thereupon the company executed to said 24 persons
the contracts now under consideration....
The oontracts provided that the company was
to furnish the water at its main canal or some branch
thereof, and was to place a gate therein to allow the
water to flow into a side ditch to be built by the
plD"Chascr from his land to said gate, which side ditch,
after construction, should be under control of the
company and become one of its branch ditches, with
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the right to use and enlarge the same, providing such
act did not interfere with the delivery of water to said
land. Subject to these and similar restrictions,
depending upon the situation of the particular tract, the
water was for sale to all who would apply. From all
this evidence the commission concluded that the
conduct of the company in disposing of its water in
this marmer amounted to a dedication thereof to public
use. We think the evidence was sufficient to establish
that fact. Thayer v. Cal. Dev. Co., 164 Cal. 128, 128
Pac. 21. The offer of the company was a general offer
to any and all persons who should apply for the water
upon its terms for their lands. Whether in all cases
such an offer would constitute a dedication to public
use or not, it is clear that evidence of such offer and
acceptance is sufficient to justify a finding of such
dedication. As soon as the contracts were all sold, the
persons making the purchase and the lands to which
the water was to be applied would comprise the
portion of the public entitled to the use, and to whose
use the water was dedicated, so far as it was necessary
thereto.
The fact that contracts were made declaring
that the agreement to supply water should be
appurtenant to the respective tracts of land is not
inconsistent with the theory of a dedication to public
use. Fresno C. & L Co. v. Park, 129 Cal. 437, 62 Pac.
87. Such contracts relating to the service of water
devoted to public use are subject to regulation an(l
control by the public authorities, whether acting under
laws then existing or Wlder laws subsequently enacted.
Southern P. Co. v. Spring Valley W. Co., 173 Cal.
298, 159 Pac. 865, L. R. A. 1917E, 680.
The objection that the order of the Railroad
Commission authorized an unlawful discrimination
between persons similarly situated with regard to the
use of the water is not well taken. It appears that, at
and before the time the company was constructing its
diversion works and preparing for the construction of
its canal, certain other persons owning some 1,700
acres of land had constructed a ditch and had taken
water from Kings river therein to their lands for the
irrigation thereof, and claimed a prior right to do so,
both to the water taken and to the use of the ditch
through which it was carried. As this ditch would
interfere with the construction of the canal laid out by

the company, it became advisable to make some
arrangement with said persons for a common use.
Accordingly it was arranged that the company should
construct its canal as laid·out, and that thereafter it
should take OUl of the river at its headgate the quantity
of water previously diverted by said persons, and
should carry the same to a designated place on its
canal ." and there deliver it to said other persons into a
canal to be constructed by them leading to their lands,
and that in view of the mutual concessions of the
parties the company should make no charge for such
carriage of the water. This, in substance, was the
arrangement made at that time, and under it the
company has ever since carried the water from the
river to said canal of said other persons free of charge,
as it had agreed to do. The order of the Railroad
Commission did not expressly authorize this to be
continued, but it did not provide that it should be
discontinued, and this constitutes the discrimination
complained of. The arrangement made between the
company and these persons was entirely lawful, and it
did not make the company the owner of the water it
diverted from the river to be carried to and delivered to
these persons for their lands. It was a mere
arrangement whereby the ditch of the company was for
that purpose to be used by the other persons to carry
their water to their lands. The effect was that they had
a common use of the ditch, although it was under the
control of the company.
Upon the filing of the petition herein the court
did not order a writ of review to issue and return to be
made, but merely made an order that the respondent
show cause why such writ should not issue. We are
Wlable to perceive any reason for the issuance thereof.
The petition for a writ of review is denied.
PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.

v.
DEVUN, et al.
Supreme Court of California.
Jan. 30, 1922.
188 Cal. 33, 203 P. 1058
In Bank.
Application by the Pacific Gas & Electric
Company fa- certiorari to review an order of Frank R.
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Devlin and others, as members of and constituting the
Railroad Commission. Order affirmed.
SLOANE,J.

This is a proceeding to review a ruling of the
Railroad Commission of the state of California. fixing
the amount of compensation to be paid to the
petitioner, Pacific Gas & Electric Company. by the city
of Auburn, a municipal corporation, in Placer county,
Cal., for a water plant consisting of reservoir and
distributing system, owned and operated in said city by
the petitioner.
The hearing before the Railroad Commission
was had pursuant to the provisions of section 47 of the
Public Utilities Act (St.1915, p. 139, as amended by
St.l917, p. 261). The only questions raised are as to
whether or not the commission in arriving at its
valuation of the water property regularly pursued its
authority under the act, and granted to the petitioner its
constitutional right to just compensation.
The decision complained of followed a hearing
on the application of the city of Auburn filed on the
lOth of May, 1918. After hearings the commission on
September 27, 1920, announced and filed its opinion,
findings of fact, and decision in which it determined
the "just compensation to be paid by the city of
Auburn to Pacific Gas & Electric Company for its
public utility water system supplying water to
conswners in said city • • • in the sum of $52,000." It
is recited in the opinion that the valuation was reached
upon hearings had at which all interested parties were
given an opportunity to appear and be heard and in
which appraisals were filed by engineers representing
the city of Auburn, the Pacific Gas & Electric
Company, and the Railroad Commission. It is further
stated in the opinion as follows:
'Two appraisals were filed by the engineers
for the commission; one based upon prices of labor
and material prevailing during the five-year period
from 1913 to 1917, inclusive; the second appraisal
being based upon prices prevailing during a six-month
construction period ending May 10, 1918, the date of
the filing of the application. Thus the principles
heretofore established have been adhered to; i.e., the
date of the valuation is as of the date of the filing of
the application, and prices of labor and material
prevailing over a reasonable construction period prior
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to the date of the appraisal have been used in
estimating unit costs. All factors relating to the
oondition of the properties in question were taken into
consideration in arriving at an estimate of reproduction
cost less depreciation.
"Inasmuch as it was stipulated at the hearing
in this matter that the Commission might add to its
findings of value the value of any additions,
betterments and improvements of the system which
were made a part of the system subsequent to May I 0,
1918, the date as of which the valuation was
submitted, in accordance therewith the net
expenditures of the company -for betterments and
improvements during the period May 10, 1918, to
April30, 1920, are included in the fmdings herein."
Upon an application for rehearing demanded
by the petitioner on the alleged ground, among others,
that contrary to the requirements of subdivision 4 of
section 47 of the act, the valuation was fixed as of the
date April30,1920, instead of May 10, 1918, the date
of the filing of the original application of the city of
Auburn, and without the taking of further testimony,
the commission on March 31, 1921, made its amended
findings and order, in which it fixed the valuation of
the plant as of May 10, 1918, at the same figure as in
the original order, namely, $52,000. The amended
decision contains the following recital:
"Inasmuch as technical objection has been
made to this course of procedure, it appears that a
finding of just compensation should be made as of
May 10, 1918, the date of filing of the original
application, and after a careful consideration of all of
the elements pertinent to a fmal conclusion herein, and
all of the items going to make up the value of the
propenies sought to be acquired by the city of Auburn
in this proceeding, including all matters presented in
the application for rehearing, it appears that the just
compensation to be paid by city of Auburn to Pacific
Gas & Electric Canpany for said properties is the sum
of $52,000, and that the application for rehearing
should be denied...
We do not understand that petitioner is relying
upon the objection that the commission exceeded its
jurisdiction in amending its decision, but rests upon the
cmtention that in the matter of allowing compensation
the commission did not "regularly pursue its
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authority," oc protect the petitioner in its constitutional
It may be at once conceded that petitioner in
guaranties, by fixing a "just compensation." It is not this proceeding before the Railroad Commission was
questioned that both panics to the proceeding before entitled to a fmding fa- the just value of its water plant
the commission were allowed full scope in the as of the date of the filing of the application by the city
introduction of evidence, and no objections are made of Auburn, and that a just value was the actual or fair
as to either the introduction or exclusion of evidence. market value of the property in its then condition; that
Petitioner's case is presented under the to arrive at such valuation it was the duty of the
following heads:
Railroad Commission to take into account every
"(1) The oommission found that the estimated
element of the plant which was actually used and
reproduction cost new of the Auburn Gty Reservoir, reasonably required for the storage and distribution of
on May 10, 1918, amounted to the sum of $10,822 water to the city of Auburn and its inhabitants, on May
(Commission Ex. No.2, p. 8), whereas the evidence 10, 1918, and which entered into and remained a part
shows the reproduction cost new to be $11,131.75.
of the cost of its construction; and also to resort to and
"(2) The oommission failed and refused to fmd
apply reasonable and recognized measures of value to
or allow any value a- compensation for 68 fue hydrant
each oonstituent element going to make up such water
connections, in the face of uncontradicted evidence of system. And it follows that, if in such appraisement
a reproduction cost of said property of $367.36.
any constituent element of value was omitted, or any
"(3) The oommission failed and refused to fmd illegitimate measure of value applied, to that extent
or allow any value, or compensation, for the petitioner would be deprived of his property without
preliminary and organization expenses, in the face of compensation, or due process of law, and by a process
uncontradicted evidence of a cost or value of $5,150. in excess of the jurisdiction of the Railroad
"(4) The commission adopted and employed Commission.
the theoretical 'straight line method' of depreciation in
Returning to petitioner's specifications, it may
determining the depreciated value of petitioner's be said generally that there is nothing in the record to
depreciable property in the face of undisputed evidence show that the commission did not regularly pursue its
that a depreciated value arrived at in this manner bore authority, or that its decision was not supported by the
no relationship to the actual depreciated value of the evidence.
physical properties, nor the amount of depreciation
that had actually accrued.
This is subject, of course, to the qualification
"(5) The commission found that the that the commission must have regularly pursued its
depreciated value of petitioner's entire physical authority, and have acted upon competent evidence,
propertiesandlands,asofMay 10,1918, amounted to and as corollary to this, that it has not ignored or failed
$51,063 in the face of undisputed evidence that the to consider any oompetent evidence; but any ground of
depreciated value of said properties and lands attack upon the regularity of its proceedings must be
determined from a consideration of the actual physical clearly established. H the decision is regular on the
ooodition of the properties, as evidenced by inspection. face of the record it will be supported by every
and the use of the tables adopted by the Railroad presumption that follows a judgment of a court of
Commission for the identical properties, was the sum reaxd Oenunonsv. R.R. Conunission, 173 Cal. 254,
of$75,736.
-159 Pac. 713; Marin Water Co. v. R.R. Commission,
"(6) The commission failed and refused to fmd 171 Cal. 706, 154 Pac. 864, Ann.Cas. 1917C, 114;
or allow any value in excess of the sum of $937 for Pac. Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Eshleman, 166
petitioner's business or going concern in the face of Cal. 640, 137 Pac. 1119, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 652,
evidence presented by petitioner of a special value, in Ann.Cas. 1915C, 822. "An appellate court will not
addition to the value of the tangible properties, of interfere with the report of commissioners [in the
$12,500 and in the face of evidence presented by the assessment of damages to correct the amounts
city of Auburn of a going concern value of $3,000."
reported] except in case of gross error showing
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prejudice, corruption, or plain mistake." Shoemaker v.
U.S., 147 U.S. 282, 13 Sup.Ct. 361,37 L.Ed. 170.

It may be properly assumed in support of the
decision of the Railroad Commission, which is entitled
to every presumption in its favor, that without
accepting the appraisements in detail of each item of
cost and depreciation of its own engineer, the
conunission may have concluded in the light of all the
evidence that he had reached in the aggregate a fair
valuation for the entire plant, and, as the report quoted
by petitioner says, by adding a few hundred dollars
rounded it to $52,000 as the just value of the entire
system.
The order and decision of the Railroad
Commission is affmned.

SOUTHERN PAC. CO.

v.
RAILROAD COMMISSION
OF CALIFORNIA et al.
Supreme Court of California.
March 3, 1939.
13 Cal.2d 125, 87 P.2d 1052

In Bank.
Proceeding by the Southern Pacific Company
against the Railroad Commission of the State of
California, and Wallace L. Ware, Leon 0. Whitsell,
Frank R. Devlin, Ray C. Wakefield, and Ray L. Riley,
as members of and constituting the Railroad
Commission, to review an order of the Commission
with respect to freight rates.
Order annulled.
PER CURIAM.
With the exception that with respect to one
order that is involved herein, the subject of rates
propoSed to be charged for transportation of freight
relates particularly to canned goods, and in a second
oo:lc:r, that soap and other allied products represent the
commodities that are affected by the several proposed
rates,-no impmant factual differences are discernible
when compared with the underlying facts that are
narrated in the proceeding entitled Southern Pacific
Company v. Railroad Commission, 87 P.2d 1055,
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wherein a decision by this oourt has this day been filed.
In addition thereto, each of the several contentions of
the respective parties that are therein decided by this
court is likewise applicable in the instant matter. No
useful purpose would be served herein by a repetition
thereof. Suffice it to say that appositely each of the
several rulings that was made in the proceeding to
which reference just has been had is adopted as a
ruling in the proceedirig now under consideration.
Particularly with reference to the point, in
substance that not only was there no evidence to
support the so-called 'fmding' to the effect 'that the
rates under suspension • • • have not been shown to be
justified • • *', the record herein not only sustains the
petitioner in that regard, but goes further, in that it
unmistakably appears that such fmding is contrary to
the evidence. In its brief herein, the respondent
commission initially undertakes to show why, in
rendering its decision in the proceeding then before it
for consideration, the evidence that had been
introduced by the petitioner at the hearing that took
place before the respondent commission was
disregarded. Nowhere in its ruling, which includes a
commingling of argument, findings of fact and
conclusions of law, did the respondent commission
ever refer to either of the several postulates which it
now advances as its reasons for refusing to give either
full or any credence to such evidence. Indeed, other
than the bare conclusion that the proposed rates were
'not justified', the 'fmdings' by the respondent
conunission contain no intimation but that the evidence
that was received at the hearing on behalf of the
petitioner did not deserve the weight to which on its
face it was properly entitled. On the other hand, in its
reply brief, the petitioner has effectively answered the
asserted reasons for discrediting such evidence, which
reasons, for the farst time, are suggested by the
respondent commission in its brief herein. But
assuming, without conceding, that none of the reasons
that are now urged as sufficient for the rejection of
such evidence is sound, the respondent commission
urges the point that 'even though there be no conflict,
the appraisal of the evidence presents a question of
fact for the commission's determination; it does not
raise a question of law for the detennination of the
courts'.
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In that connection, in substance, the statutory
requirements as to 'fmdings' to be made by the
Railroad Commission are practically identical with
those that are contained in the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act(§ 67, Stats. 1917, p.
831) which relate to the industrial accident
commission, and which declare that 'fmdings and
conclusions of the [industrial accident] commission on
questions of fact shall be conclusive and fmal and shall
not be subject to review'; and that 'such questions of
fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings and
conclusions of the oonunission'. Subdivision (c). With
regard to such a situation, it is stated in 27 California
Jurisprudence, page 575 (sec. 218), that When the
jurisdiction of the [Industrial Accident] commission to
make any award depends upon the establishment of an
ultimate fact. the reviewing court may examine the
evidence upon which the fmding of the commission to
that effect is based,' and that, 'In such a case, to justify
the upholding of an award there must be sufficient
cxxnpetent evident% to support every jurisdictional fact
essentially involved in the application for
compensation. And where such findings have been
made without any evidence to support them, the award
will, of course, be annulled.' (Italics added.)
In the instant case there was no evidence to
support the Railroad Commission's fmding that the
proposed rate was not justified,--all the evidence being
to the contrary ,--and as hereinbefore stated, such
finding was contrary to the evidence adduced.
In the case entitled Coombs v. Industrial Ace.
Com., 81 Cal.App. 137, 252 P. 1069, 253 P. 976, it
was held that the portion of section 67 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act to the effect that .'the
findings and conclusions of the commission on
questions of fact shall be conclusive and fmal and shall
not be subject to review', means merely that the
findings of the commission are conclusive where the
commission has not exceeded its jurisdiction by
making a finding without the support of testimony.
See, also, vol. 12, Cal.Jur. [10 yr.] Suppl., pp. 120,
121, and notes. Again, in the case entitled National
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Ace. Comm., 139 Cal.App.
414, 34 P.2d 163, with regard to findings of the
industrial accident commission, it was said that the
mly question of law involved was whether there was
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any evidence in support of the finding that an award
should be made. And in the case entitled Thoreau v.
Industrial Ace. Com., 120 Cal.App. 67,7 P.2d 767, it
was held that even in cases where evidence is said to
be conflicting, the conflict must be substantial.
Although it was held in the case entitled Hufstetler v.
Dept. of Indus. Relations, 107 Cal.App. 741, 290 P.
922, that notwithstanding the fact that evidence was
uncontradicted, an order of the (Industrial Accident)
ronunission which denied compensation would not be
set aside where there were circumstances in the case
which justified the commission in disbelieving the
uncontradicted evidence,--it has been repeatedly held
by the appellate coons of this state that an award of
the industrial accident commission, based on findings
not supponed by the evidence, should not be allowed
to stand. In Hubbert v. Industrial Ace. Com., 14
Cal.App.2d 171, 58 P.2d 171, 172, in annulling an
award of the industrial accident commission, it is said,
•• • • if there is no evidence to support a finding the
proceeding becomes subject to the court's review.
Market Street Ry. Co. v. Industrial Acx. Com., 193
Cal. 178, 224 P. 95. • • ••; and that 'uncontradicted
evidence, not inherently improbable, may not be
arbitrarily rejected by the coons (Cowan v. Hill, 109
Cal.App. 656, 293 P. 871) and the Industrial Accident
Commission is bound by the same rule, this court
having specified that there must be a real and
substantial conflict in the evidence to render the
findings of the commission immune to inquiry by a
reviewing court [citing cases]. In ihe instant case, in
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, and with
all the direct evidence supporting the claim of
petitioner that her deceased husband was an employee
of Miller, we are constrained to hold that there is no
evidence to support the fmding, that the deceased was
Miller's partner'. (11alics added.) (See, also, Winthrop
v. Industrial Ace. Com., 213 Cal. 351. 2 P.2d 142;
Modoc County v. Industrial Aa;. Commission, 32
Cal.App. 548, 163 P. 685.) Again, this court said in
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Industrial Aa;ident
Commission, 197 Cal. 164, 239 P. 1072, 1073, that
'the findings of the • • • Commission are subject to
review ooly in so far as they have been made without
any evidence whatever in support thereof. [Citing
cases.] In short, if the facts show substantially without

37

REGULATED INDUSTRIES

conflict that there is no evidence to support the fmding,
the Commission was without jurisdiction to make the
same. There must be some evidence. upon which the
finding of special employment is predicated • • • .'
(Italics added.) See, also, Nielsen v. Industrial Ace.
Com., 125 Cal.App. 210, 13 P.2d 517. In Children's
Hospital Soc. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 22 Cal.App.2d
365, 71 P.2d 83, 85, where there was a total lack of
evidence to support the fmding, it was said that 'an
award of compensation may not be based upon
sunnise, conjecture, or speculation'.
In the case entitled American Toll Bridge
Company v. Railroad Commission, Cal.Sup., 83 P.2d
1, 4, in reviewing the action of the Railroad
Commission with regard to its powers affecting
rate-making, this court said that an examination of the
inquiry as to whether the rates so fixed are
conflSCalory necessarily entails a judicial determination
of the question of whether the finding of such body in
supported by the evidence; also, that the requirements
of due process are met where there is accorded 'a fair
hearing' and the commission has acted 'upon evidence
and not arbitrarily'; furthermore, that where these
requirements are met, 'the judicial inquiry into the facts
goes no further than to ascertain whether there is
evidence to support the findings, and the question of
the weight of the evidence in determining issues of fact
lies within the legislative agency acting within its
statutory authority'. (Italics added.)
Although in the instant matter, in effect, the
commission contends that regardless of the strength of
evidence presented by the petitioner, and even in the
absence of any evidence introduced to the contrary, the
conunission has the right to disregard the evidence and
decide the issue according to its own concepts,--as a
conclusion from the foregoing authorities it becomes
apparent that the Railroad Commission has no greater
authority than has the industrial accident commission
on questions of fact; and where, as here, all the
evidence supports the petitioner's contention, and none
has been adduced in opposition thereto, the ruling of
the conunission amounts to the making of an order by
the commission without any evidence in support
thereof.

For the reasons herein indicated, it is ordered
that the order here in review be, and it is, annulled.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
EDISON CO., Limited,

v.
RAILROAD COMMISSION
OF CALIFORNIA et al.
Supreme Court of California.
July 6, 1936.
6 Cal.2d 737, 59 P.2d 808

In Bank.
Certiorari proceeding by the Southern
California Edison Company, Limited, against the
Railroad Commission of the State of California and
another, to annul a decision and order of the Railroad
Commission.
Affirmed.
SHENK, Justice.
By this proceeding the petitioner seeks to
annul the decision and order of the Railroad
Commission purporting to fut the just compensation to
be paid by the city · of Tulare for certain lands,
properties, and rights of the petitioner, constituting the
electrical distributing system of the petitioner within
that city.
The jurisdiction of the commission to make a
decision such as the one here complained of is
conferred by article 12, § 23a, of the California
Constitution, which reads as follows: The railroad
commission shall have and exercise such power and
jurisdiction as shall be conferred upon it by the
legislature to fix the just compensation to be paid for
the taking of any property of a public utility in eminent
domain proceedings by the state or any county, city
and CO\Dlty, incorporated city or town, municipal water
district, irrigation district or other public corporation
or district, and the right of the legislature to confer
such powers upon the railroad commission is hereby
declared to be plenary and to be unlimited by any
provision of this Constitution. All acts of the
legislature heretofore adopted which are in accordance
herewith are hereby confirmed and declared valid.'
Pursuant to the power thus conferred, the
Legislature has provided in the Public Utilities Act
(Stats.1915, p. 115, as amended) the procedure to be
followed by the commission in condemnation cases.
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Section 47 (St.1915, p. 139, § 47, as amended by
St.1917. p. 261) provides for . two types of
proceedings. designated as petitions of the first and
second class. In petitions of the first class. the
petitioning governmental subdivision sets forth its
intention of taking the property described in the
petition. Preswnably. under this type of petition. the
city is able to fmance the purchase without a bond
issue. In petitions of the second class. the intention of
the governmental subdivision extends no further than
to the initiation of the proceedings so as ultimately to
submit to the votelS the question whether the city shall
acquire the property at the values fixed by the
commission. In connection with petitions of this class
it is assumed that a bond issue is necessary to fmance
the proposed purchase. The proceeding here involved
falls within the latter class. The commission has, by
its order, fixed the price to be paid by the respondent
city and the question whether the property is actually
to be taken remains to be decided by a vote of the
people. If it be later determined, by a proper vote, that
the property shall be taken, the valuation fixed by the
commission in this proceeding, under section 47(b)(8)
of the act, will be conclusive on the petitioner in a
condemnation suit which may later be filed in the
superior court, unless the order of the commission be
set aside in the present proceeding.
The property sought to be taken by the city,
and which is described in detail in the petition filed
with the commission, consists of the petitioner's
electric lines, franchises, property, and business within
the city of Tulare. This property comprises the
distributing system of the petitioner and does not
include any generation plants, all of which are located
outside of Tulare. The distributing system thus sought
to be condemned is part of the entire system of the
petitioner, the major portion of which is also located
outside of Tulare.
The commission found compensation as
follows: For property rights to be taken, not including
severance damages, $200,000; for certain severance
damages, $28,700. The separate awards were made
under the terms of section 47(b)(4) of the act, which
require the compensation for the property to be fixed
by the commission 'in a single sum' and severance
damages 'shall be found and staled separately.'
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At the outset we are called upon to defme the
powers of this court on thi~ review in the light of the
enactment by the Legislatwe in 1933 of an amendment
to section 67 of the Public Utilities Act (Stats.1933, p.
1157).
Prior to the amendment the section provided
in its pertinent pans that within thirty days after the
application for a rehearing by the commission has been
denied, 'the applicant may apply to the supreme court
of this state for a writ of certiorari or review
(hereinafter referred to as a writ of review), for the
purpose of having the lawfulness of the original order
or decision, or the order or decision on rehearing,
inquired into and determined. • • • The review shall
not be extended further than to determine whether the
commission has regularly pursued its authority,
including a determination of whether the order or
decision under review violates any right of the
petitioner under the constitution of the United States or
of the State of California. The findings and
conclusions of the commission on questions of fact
shall be final and shall not be subject to review; such
questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the
findings and conclusions of the commission on
reasonableness and discrimination. The commission
and each party to the action or proceeding before the
conunission shall have the right to appear in the review
proceeding. Upon the hearing the supreme court shall
enter judgment either affirming or setting aside the
order or decision of the commission.' St.1915, p. 161.
The amendment of 1933 added, immediately
after the above-quoted language, the words, 'except as
hereinafter provided,' and then at the end of the section
appended the following paragraph:
'In any proceeding wherein the validity of any
order or decision is challenged on the ground that it
violates any right of petitioner under the Constitution
of the United States, the Supreme Court shall exercised
an independent judgment on the law and the facts, and
the fmdings or conclusions of the commission material
to the determination of the said constitutional question
shall not be fmal.'
The foregoing amendment no doubt was
enacted in view of the contention often made in this
court and in the federal courts that section 67 was
unconstitutional in that it did not accord a litigant the
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opponunity to obtain in a judicial tribwtal an
independent review of the law and the facts when an
order or decision of the commission was challenged on
federal constitutional grounds. Its enactment appears
to have been in furtherance of a movement instituted at
least as early as 1931 and later fostered by the public
utility regularatory conunissions in the several states to
encourage the enactment by Congress of a measure to
deprive the District Courts of the United States of
jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of orders of any
state administrative board or commission fixing rates
to be charged by public utilities affecting only
intrastate commerce 'where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the
courts of such state.' Such a measure was pending in
Congress when the amendment to section 67 was
enacted in 1933, and was, in 1934, adopted as an
amendment to the Judicial Code, section 24 (48 Stats.
at Large. 775; U.S.C., title 28, § 41, 28 U.S.C. § 41).
The amendment to section 67 in 1933 was enacted
apparently because of certain language found in
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the frrst
of which is stated to be Ohio Valley WIller Co. v. Ben
Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287,40 S.Ct. 527,528, 64
L.Ed. 908. That case involved a review of a rate fixing
order of the Pennsylvania public service commission.
After that commission had taken evidence, valued the
utility's properties, and made its order fixing the rates,
the utility appealed to the superior court, claiming that
the commission's valuation was much too low and that
the order would deprive it of a reasonable return and
thereby confiscate its property. The superior court
reviewed the record, appraised the property at a much
higher figure, reversed the order of the commission,
and remanded the proceedings with directions to fix
rates sufficient to provide an adequate return. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of the state the judgment
of the superior court was reversed, the Supreme Court
concluding as follows: 'A careful examination of the
voluminous record in this case has led us to the
cmclusion that in the items wherein the Superior Court
differed from the commission upon the question of
values, there was merely the substitution of its [the
former's] judgment for that of the commission in
determining that the order of the latter was
UIU"eaSSO18ble.' In reviewing the opinion and judgment
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of the State Supreme Court the United States Supreme
Court stated: 'Looking at the entire opinion we are
compelled to conclude that the Supreme Court
interpreted the statute as withholding from the courts
power to determine the question of confiscation
acrording to their own independent judgment when the
action of the commission comes to be considered on
appeal.' The federal Supreme Court further indicated
defmitely in that case that the state of Pennsylvania
had, by statute, conferred power upon the superior
court judicially to hear and determine all objections to
the ooler on appeal, and that but for the opinion of its
Supreme Court the state appeared to have accorded
due process to the complaining party. But with the
opinion of the State Supreme Court, as construed by
the nation's highest tribwtal, standing in the way, that
state had, nowhere along the line, provided for a
judicial determination on the question of confiscation.
In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court of the
United States further stated, 253 U.S. 287, at page
289, 40 S.Ct. 527, 528, 64 L.Ed. 908: 'The order here
involved prescribed a complete schedule of maximum
futmc rates and was legislative in character. Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53
L.Ed. 150; Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co. v. State
Public Utilities Commission, 249 U.S. 422, 424, 39
S.Ct. 345, 63 L.Ed. 684. In all such cases, if the
owner claims confiscation of his property will result,
the stale must provide a fair opportwtity for submitting
that issue to a judicial tribwtal for determination upon
its own independent judgment as to both law and facts;
otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the
due process clause, Fourteenth Amendment'
The foregoing pronowtcement in the Ben
Avon Case was later cited with approval. Bluefield
Warec Works, etc., Co. v. Public Service Commission,
262 U.S. 679, 689, 43 S.Ct. 675, 67 L.Ed. 1176;
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Board of Public Utility
Com'rs, 278 U.S. 24, 29, 36, 49 S.Ct. 69, 73, 73 L.Ed.
161, 62 A.L.R. 805.
The declaration of the court in the Ben Avon
Case to the effect that a state must provide a 'fair
opportunity' for the submission of the issue of
confiscation in rate cases 'to a judicial tribunal for
detennination upon its own independent judgment as
to both law and facts' in order to satisfy the due
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process clause of the Founeenth Amendment, was
interpreted by the coun in the above cited Lehigh
Valley R. Co. Case as requiring. on behalf of the
utility, a 'proper opportunity for an adequate
independent judicial hearing as to confiscation on the
law and the facts.'
The question then is: Had the state of
California, either by its Constitution or by statute,
effectually precluded this court from exercising its own
independent judgment on the law and the facts on a
review of a Railroad Commission order appropriately
challenged, as depriving ·a party of his rights under the
Federal Constitution? If this coun was not so
precluded prior to the amendment of section 67, due
process was then accorded (see Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 45, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598), and the
amendment of 1933 added nothing which was not
theretofore a part of our state law.
It is apparent from the history of the 1933
amendment to section 67 that its purpose was to meet
any objection that might be raised to any public utility
rate order made by the respondent commission on the
ground of confiscation or lack of due process, in the
event the proposed federal legislation above referred to
be enacted. It is to be noted that the amendment uses
language almost identical with that found in the Ben
Avon Case. It must also be noted that the terms of the
amendment are general in their scope, and if applied
literally would encompass the order or decision of the
commission in any and every proceeding before the
commission where the order or decision is challenged
on the ground that it violates any right of the party
affected thereby wtder the Constitution of the United
States. Of this more will be said later.
On the immediate question as to the effect of
the amendment on the powers of the coun in rate
regulation proceedings, it must be concluded that said
amendment did not, in any substantial degree, change
the rules in force prior thereto. The law of the state,
bolh constitutional and statutory, before 1933, and as
oonstrued by this court, was at pains to preserve to the
complaining party the right to challenge in this court
any order or decision of the commission on federal
amstitutional grounds when, of course, such challenge
oould appropriately be made in the proceeding. As to
the rate regulation orders of the commission affecting
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transportation companies. the Constitution, by
amendment to section 20 of article 12 in 1911,
effectually preserved to the utility the right to review in
coun of the question whether the rates ordered by the
commission would result in confiscation of property.
While the Constitution did not in such express
language preserve the same right to other utilities
whose rates were subject to regulation by the
conunission, the Public Utilities Act, adopted pursuant
to constitutional authority, did by section 67 preserve
to the complaining utility the right to a review and
dctcnninaJ..ion in this court of the question 'whether the
commission has regularly pursued its authority,' and
'whether the order or decision under review violates
any right of the petitioner wtder the Constitution of the
United States or of the State of California.' In passing
upon the questions thus presented and required to be
determined, this court must necessarily pass upon the
merits thereof as to both the law and as to the facts
presented in the review proceeding. It is 'the primary
duty of every cowt to dispose of cases according to the
law and the facts.' Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg.
Co., 177 U.S. 485,488, 20 S.Ct. 708,710,44 L.Ed.
856. Prior to 1933 it was the function of this court to
thus dispose of cases corning here from the
conunission for review in which federal constitutional
questions were appropriately raised. In thus disposing
of than the·cowt acted judit-ially and the determination
thereof was on the merits even though the order of the
cowt be a denial of an application for review. Such an
order of this coun fully complies with federal
constitutional requirements as interpreted by the
Supreme Court of the United States. Napa Valley
Elec. Co. v. Railroad Commission of the State of
California, 251 U.S. 366,40 S.Ct. 174, 64 L.Ed. 310.
Although section 67 assumes to make the
findings and conclusions of the commission on
questions of fact final and not subject to review, this
court has excluded from the operation of such,
provision its apparent finality when federal
constitutional objections are available to the
complaining party. · Del Mar Water, etc., Co. v.
Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666, 140 P. 591, 948; Traber v.
Railroad Commission, 183 Cal. 304, 191 P. 366;
Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. Railroad Commission, 202
Cal. 179,259 P. 937; Id., 279 U.S. 125, 49 S.Ct. 325,
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73 L.Ed. 637; Atchison, etc., Ry. Co. v. Railway
Commission, 209 Cal. 460, 288 P. 775; ld., 283 U.S.
380, 51 S.Ct. 553, 75 L.Ed. 1128; Western Canal Co.
v. Railroad Commission, 216 Cal. 639, 15 P.(2d) 853;
ld., 289 U.S. 742, 53 S.Ct. 688, 77 L.Ed. 1489. In
this connection it should be observed that under the
State Constitution and the Public Utilities Act, the
powers of this court in a proceeding to review an order
or decision of the commission are not limited to the
considerations incident to the writ of certiorari or
review mentioned and provided for in section 4 of
article 6 of the Coostitution and sections 1067-1CY77 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Pacific Telephone, etc.,
Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 P. 1119, 50
L.R.A.(N.S.) 652, Ann.Cas.1915C, 822.
The proceedings on review from the Railroad
Commission, as contemplated to be affected by the
amendment to section 67 in 1933, were without any
doubt such proceedings as grew out of the exercise by
the commission of its legislative functions, such as the
fixing of rates of public utilities within its jurisdiction.
As to those proceedings the law of the state
theretofore enabled this court to consider and pass
upon federal constitutional questions and therefore
afforded due process.
There is another field of extensive scope in
which the respondent commission exercises its powers
and wherein the action of the commission is brought
into question before this coun. In this field are the
executive and administrative orders of the commission
in connection with which the commission exercises a
wide discretionary power, such as in the granting,
withholding, and canceling of permits and countless
other orders of regulation and control. Within this
classification it quite often happens that the
complaining party seeks redress in this court on
alleged federal constitutional grounds, when in fact
there is no such question substantially involved. In
such cases it may not be successfully contended that
this court, on a review proceeding involving the action
of the commission, should be a trier of disputed
questions of fact, already resolved by the commission.
H the mere challenge on federal constitutional grounds
was intended by the amendment of 1933 to be
sufficient to take the case out of the rule that the
findings and conclusions of the commission in such
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cases should be final and beyond review, then we
would have grave doubt of the power of the
legislature thus to transfer to this court the traditional
functions of the commission. But where a substantial
federal constitutional question is involved and
appropriately raised. the rule is and should be as it was
before the amendment to section 67 in 1933.
There is still another field in which the
respondent conunission exercises its powers under the
Constitution. Those powers are conferred by section
23a of article 12 adopted in 1924. It is under this
section, and the legislative enactment in pursuance
thereof (section 47, Public Utilities Act), that the
commission proceeds to fix the just compensation to
be paid for the taking of any property of a public utility
by the state or by a city or by any other governmental
agency mentioned in the constitutional section. In the
exercise of this power the commission acts judicially.
Marin Water, etc., Co. v. Railroad Commission, 171
Cal. 706, 154 P. 864. The proceeding is one in eminent
domain wherein the commission is set up
constitutionally as a special judicial tribunal to hear
and determine the question of values submitted to it.
No question of lack of due process is present, for due
process is inherent in such a proceeding before the
commission, whose determination as to values
becomes as final and binding as in any other court of
first instance unless appropriately and successfully
challenged. Marin M. W. Dist v. Marin, etc., Co., 178
Cal. 308, 173 P. 469. Obviously it was not the action
of the conunission exercising this judicial function that
was intended to be affected by the amendment to
sectim 67 in 1933. If it may be said to have attempted
to do so, it is clear that it was not within the power of
the Legislature to transfer to this court the power nisi
prius specially granted to the Railroad Commission by
section 23a of article 12 of the Constitution. On a
review of the action of the commission in such a
proceeding in eminent domain the complaining party
may challenge such action of the commission on
federal constitutional grounds, but the fmdings of the
axnmission on the issues of fact involved are like the
findings of a court or the general verdict of a jury.
PacificGas&ElcaricCo. v. Devlin, 188 Cal. 33,203
P. 1058.
Our conclusion on this branch of the
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proceeding is, as contended by the respondent
commission, that the enacunent in 1933 of the
amendment to section 67 of the Public Utilities Act has
not materially affected the procr.dure theretofore
followed by this court in the review of orders and
decisions of the Railroad Commission.
We tum now to other points raised by the
parties, having in mind that the proceeding here for
review belongs to the class of controversies in which
the commission has exercises a judicial function.
The petitioner further insists that it was
deprived of its constitutional rights in that the hearing
herein was conducted by one commissioner, who
reported to the conunission as a whole, the commission
rendering the decision and order. Such procedure is
expressly provided for in article 12, § 22, of the
Constitution of this State, and by section 9 of the
Public Utilities Act (St.l915, p. 121).
The
constitutional provision is as follows: The act of a
majority of the commissioners when ip session as a
board shall be deemed to be the act of the commission;
but any investigation, inquiry or hearing which the
conunission has power to undertake or to hold may be
undertaken or held by or before any commissioner
designated for the purpose by the commission, and
every order made by a commissioner so designated,
pursuant to such inquiry, investigation or hearing,
when approved or confmned by the commission
ordered filed in its office, shall be deemed to be the
order of the commission.'
Section 9 of the Public Utilities Act is to the
same effect and further provides: The evidence in any
investigation, inquiry or hearing may be taken by the
commissioner or commissioners to whom such
investigation, inquiry or hearing has been assigned or,
in his or their behalf, by an examiner designated for
that purpose. Every fmding, opinion and order made
by the commissioner or commissioners so designated,
pursuant to such investigation, inquiry or hearing,
when approved or confmned by the commission and
ordered filed in its office, shall be deemed to be the
finding, opinion and order of the commission.'
The proceeding before the commission in this
matter was referred to one of the commissioners for
hearing. The evidence of both parties was fully

42
produced before him and transcribed for the benefit of
the parties and of the commission as a whole. On this
evidence the commissioner so designated rendered his
findings, opinion and order, which in tum were
approved by a majority of the commission. All of the
requirements of the Constitution and of the statute
adopted in pursuance thereof appear to have been
complied with and due process must be deemed to
have been accorded the parties to the proceeding.
The petitioner has called attention to the
consolidated cases of Morgan v. United States, 298
U.S. 468, decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States on May 25, 1936, in support of its contention
that a sufficient hearing was not afforded to it in the
proceeding before the oorrunission by reason of the fact
that the whole or a majority of the commissioners did
not sit and hear the evidence upon which the order
under attack was based. In the case relied on the
appellant Morgan had alleged in his bill of complaint
that he had not been given a proper hearing by the
secretary of agriculture in a proceeding fixing the
maximum rates to be charged by market agencies for
buying and selling livestock at the Kansas City
stockyards under the Packers and Stockyards Act of
1921 (7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq.) Among other things, it
was alleged that the secretary, who under the statute
had power to make the order after 'full hearing', had
made the rate order without having heard or read any
of the evidence, and without having heard the oral
argwnent or having read or considered the briefs of the
appellants, and that the only information which the
secretary had as to the proceeding was what he derived
from consultation with employees in his department.
The district court of three judges, on motion of the
government, had stricken these and other allegations of
like import from the bill of complaint, and had thus
foreclosed proof in support thereof. The judgment was
reversed on the ground that said allegations had been
improperly stricken. By the judgment of reversal the
defendants were required to answer said allegations on
the theory, of course, that if the same were true the
complainants had not had the hearing to which they
were entitled in any substantial sense.
Such is not at all the situation here presented
either in substance or by analogy. Here the petitioner
was accorded a full hearing before a state officer
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authorized by the Constitution and laws of the state to
conduct the same. He acted in full compliance with the
authority vested in him, and when his order was
approved by a majority of the commissioners as
required by law, the order became the order of the
commission. In the absence of a showing, and there is
none, that the commissioners failed to exercise their
power in the authorized manner, it must be asswned
that all of the legal requirements were complied with.
Without exception, so far as we are advised, the
procedure laid down by the law of the state has been
recognized as affording due process.
Other points made by the parties need not be
discussed.
Decision and order affmned.

CAMP MEEKER WATER SYSTEM, INC.,
Petitioner,

v.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION,
Respondent;

CAMP MEEKER RECREATION
AND PARK DISTRICT,
Real Party in Interest.
Supreme Court of California,
Nov. 15, 1990.
51 Cal.3d 845, 799 P.2d 758, 274 Cal.Rptr. 678
Water utility petitioned for review of Public
Utilities Commission's ruling that utility owned
easement that penniued it to obtain water from entire
watershed, and thus that utility was not obligated to
axnpensate landowners for its exercise of easement, or
to pass on cost of future well site use to ratepayers.
The Supreme Coun, Eagleson, J., held that: (1)
Commission acted within its constitutional and
statutory jurisdiction by construing deeds for purposes
of exercising its regulatory and ratemaking authority;
(2) deed created easement under which water system
property became dooiliwlt tenement holding easement
appurtenant to that land over propeny in possession of
another; (3) easc:mcnt which was expressly granted by
deed burdened the retained property of grantor; and
(4) easement penniued water utility to exploit any and
all sources of water on parcel.
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Affmned.
EAGLESON, Justice.
We are asked to determine whether, pursuant
to article XII of the California Constitution or
legislative enactment, the Public Utilities Commission
(commission) has jurisdiction to adjudicate interests in
real propc:ny, and. if so, the effect of such adjudication
on the interests of persons who are not regulated
utilities in that property. Petitioner Camp Meeker
Watt:I System, Inc. (CMWSO. a regulated utility, also
challenges, as 1D15Upported by the evidence, the finding
and conclusion of the commission that CMWSI is the
holder of an extensive easement for water resource
development and exploitation in lands in which it does
not claim an interest and to which it does not hold title.
On examination of the record it appears that,
in the exercise of its ratemaking authority, the
commission has done no more than construe deeds
oonveying real property and easements to petitioner
and its predea:ssor. It has done so in the same manner
that a oourt or agency consttues any written instrument
(see Civ.Code, § 1066 et seq.; Code Civ.Proc., ss
1857, 2077) for the purpose of ascertaining facts
relevant to the merits of the application for increased
rates, not for the purpose of resolving disputes
between parties claiming rights under the deed or to
enforce rights conveyed by those deeds. The
commission acknowledges that it does not have
jurisdiction equivalent to that of a court, to adjudicate
incidents of title, and that it would be bound by a
judicial ruling in a quiet title action brought by any
person claiming an interest in the subject property who
believes the oommission ruling clouds his title. (Code
Civ.Proc., § 760.010 et seq.)
The onJy issues properly before us in this
proceeding, therefore, are whether the evidence
suppms the axnmissioo's construction of the deeds in
issue, and its decision, based on that construction, to
deny in part petitiooer's application for a rate increase.
In undertaking that review this court is limited to
determining if the commission has regularly pursued
its authority. Factual findings of the commission are
not reviewable unless a petitioner asserts that the
petitioner's constitutional rights have been violated.
(Pub.Util.Code. ss 1757,1760.) [FNI] Since CMWSI
makes no such claim, and there is evidence to support
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the commission decision. we shall affirm.
I
Thi'> dispute arises in major part because wells
located on a 16-acre parcel of land owned by CMWSI
no longer supply water to the system which serves
approximately 350 customers in or near the Sonoma
County community of Camp Meeker. Wells on an
adjacent parcel, the "Olenoweth parcel," which is a
watershed for the CMWSI land, currently supply
approximately half of the water needed by the utility.
CMWSI is wholly owned by members of the
Cllenoweth family, who are also the record title owners
of the Olenoweth parcel. The CMWSI and
Olenoweth parcels were conveyed to the Olenoweths
in 1951 by members of the Meeker family who then
owned and operated the Camp Meeker Water System
(CMWS). The Olenoweths incorporated the utility in
1959.
In November 1983, CMWSI sought a rate
increase based on a claim that in order to meet the
needs of its customers for water CMWSI would have
to lease additional wells on the Olenoweth parcel.
After extended hearings, and rehearing, in decision No.
89-10-033, the commission concluded that CMWSI
owns an easement that permits it to obtain water from
the entire 600-acre Olenoweth watershed, and
therefore is not obligated to compensate the
Olenoweths for its exercise of that easement, or to
pass on the cost of future well site use to the
ratepayers.
This proceeding arises on the petition of
CMWSI for review of that decision. As we have noted,
and will explain in greater detail below, the
commission decision construed two 1951 deeds, the
first of which conveyed CMWS, the sixteen-acre
parcel of land on which the water system is located,
and the easements in issue here to the Olenoweths.
The second conveyed the lands making up the 600-acre
parcel to the Olenoweths and again conveyed to them
property owned by CMWS. The commission found
that the frrst of these deeds conveyed an easement for
water rights on the adjacent 600-acre Olenoweth
parcel which the grantors had not yet transferred to the
Otenoweths. Based on that construction it ordered:
1. CMWSI to enforce those water rights
against the record titleholders;

2. CMWSI to record a notice of intent to
preserve its easements pursuant to Civil Code section
887.060;
3. The commission's Advisory and
Compliance Division to intervene in proceedings
before the State Water Resources Control Board to
prevent the record titleholders of the Chenoweth parcel
from obtaining rights inconsistent with those held by
CMWSI under its easement;
4. The Advisory and Compliance Division to
forward copies of the decision to title insurance
companies and take other steps to ensure that any
future purchaser of the burdened 600-acre property
would have actual notice of the easement.
The commission, relying on cases decided
under Code of Civil Procedure section 902, opposed
issuance of the writ of review on the ground that
CMWSI was not a party aggrieved by its decision.
The right to petition this court for review of a decision
of the commission is governed by section 1756,
however. That section expressly authorizes a petition
by an applicant for rehearing before the commission.
Nonetheless, because CMWSI benefits from the
commission ruling that it holds easements in the
Chenoweth parcel, its standing to complain that the
factual findings underlying the decision are enoneous
extends only to the impact of that decision on its
application for a rate increase. . . . 1
Because the commission regularly pursued its
authority in reaching its decision, the only issue to be
addressed is CMWSI's claim that the commission's
fmding that CMWSI owns rights to substantially all, if
not all, wells, stored surface water, and surface runoff
of the Olenoweth parcel, is not supported by the
evidence.

n
PROCEDURAI.JEVIDENTIARY HISTORY
CMWSI filed its application for authority to
increase revenues from $34,200 to $53,800 (a 57.3
percent increase) on November 13, 1983. A 12.74
percent offset increase was authorized by resolution on
November 22, 1983, after which hearings were held
addressed to the balance of the requested increase, an
end to an existing morauriwn on new connections, and
a 6.5 percent attrition increase. On September 19,
1984, the commission granted an increase of 19.46
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percent. continued the ban on new connections, granted

attrition increases, and found:
"11. Members of the Meeker family, original
owners of the water system at Camp Meeker, executed
a deed conveying all but approximately 16 acres of the
land on which the water system was located to
members of the Otenoweth family on November 29,
1951, without Commission authorization.
"12. The question of fact as to whether the
property described in the Meeker deed of November
29, 1951 contained only private nonutility property
and no public utility water resources has not been
presented to the Commission for its determination."
The commission then concluded:
"The deed from the Sonoma County Land
Title Company to Hardin T. Otenoweth, William C.
Olenoweth, and L.C. Chenoweth dated November 29,
19 51 is void for want of authorization by the
Commission." 2
Rehearing was granted on February 6, 1985,
limited to treatment of the Otenoweth parcel. Two
years of Ul'lSlJa:eSSful negotiations between the owners
of that parcel and the commission's Division of
Ratepayers' Advocates (DRA), ensued. Resumption of
evidentiary hearings before the administrative law
judge (AU) were delayed until January 1988, by the
death of William Chenoweth, president of CMWSI.
Based on this evidence, the AU concluded
that CMWSI had no easement rights over the
Chenoweth parcel. He reasoned that the language of
the November 26, 1951, deed was not ambiguous and
could not be interpreted to convey rights in the
surrounding lands, and was consistent with the
intentions of the parties as expressed in the 1951
agreement
Thus, the sunounding lands, including the
well sites developed by the Chenoweths and leased to
CMWSI were not dedicated to public utility water
service.
The conunissioo reached a conttaJy conclusion
in its October 12, 1989, decision. 3 That decision, like
the proposed decision of the AU, concluded that the
1951 conveyances to the Olcnoweths were proper
since they represented a commonly understood
segregation of the Meeker property between public
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utility and private property for tax and ratemaking
purposes. The commission also concluded that the
November 26, 1951, deed conveyed the CMWS real
estate and all water rights, easements and privileges
appurtenant thereto. The November 29, 1951, deed
conveyed the remaining Meeker land.
Unlike the AU, however, the commission
concluded that while the property conveyed by the
November 29, 1951, deed was the private real estate of
the Otenoweths, it was: "subject to the public utility
water rights, easements and privileges granted by the
November 26, 1951 deed."
'1'be rights given to CMWS by the November
26, 1951 deed (and subsequently given to Camp
Meeker Water System, Incorporated (CMWSI) by the
August 7, 1959 deed) [FN9] allow the utility to
explore for and develop public utility water sources on
the Otenoweth land, and to take such actions as may
be necessary to ensure that the Olenoweths do not
jeopardize the ability of the water system to meet its
public utility obligations. The Chenoweths are free,
however, to use their land as they see fit so long as that
use is consistent with the utility's rights and
easements."
...the commission found:
"[T)he Meeker family operators of CMWS
enjoyed quasi-easement rights to use the non-utility
portion of their Camp Meeker property for public
utility purposes by vinue of their common ownership
of the utility and non-utility portions of their property.
These rights included the right 1) to take all water
flowing over or located under the land; 2) to enter
upon the land to explore for, develop, and maintain
water sources thereon; 3) to construct dams and
reservoirs on the land for water storage and supply
purposes; 4) to enter upon the land to maintain such
dams and reservoirs; 5) to construct and maintain
pipelines and rights of way necessary for the taking of
water from the land; 6) to drill wells and develop
springs nea:ssary to supply water from the land; 7) to
expand their use of the land as necessary to replace
deteriorating or obsolete water sources and to develop
new sources of walei" to meet the growing needs of an
increased customer base; 8) to insist that no me
interfere with any of these rights; 9) to rely on the
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maintenance of the land in a manner that would not
adversely affect the utility's water supply operations;
and I 0) to do anything else necessary to utilize the
non-utility portion of their land for public utility water
services purposes."

m
COMMISSION JURISDICfiON
Petitioner assumes that the commission has
undenaken to adjudicate incidents of title, and has
adjudicated the rights of third parties against the public
utility. It argues on that basis that the commission has
exceeded its authority and has taken, on behaJf of the
utility, property owned by the third parties without
compensation.
As noted earlier, however, the commission
makes no claim to have such jurisdiction. Rather, it
purports only to have construed the existing legal
rights of CMWSI, and disclaims any power to create
new rights. 1be oommission expressly recognizes that
its functions do not include determining the validity of
contracts, whether claims may be asserted under a
contract, or interests in or title to property, those being
questions for the courts. (Hanlon v. Eshleman (1915)
169 Cal. 200, 146 P. 656. See also C.B. Lee (1939)
42 C.R.C. 41.) It claims only the power to construe,
for purposes of exercising its regulatory and
ratemaking authority, the existing rights of a regulated
utility.
In construing the 1951 deeds for that purpose,
the commission acted within its constitutional and
statutory jurisdiction.
"Private corporations and persons that own,
operate, control, or manage a ... system for the ...
furnishing of ... water ... are public utilities subject to
control by the Legislature." (Cal.Const., art. XII,§ 3.)
The commission may, pursuant to the grant of
authority found in article XII, section 2 of the
California Constitution "[s)ubject to statute and due
process ... establish its own procedures." And,
pursuant to article XII, section 5, "[t)he Legislature has
plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of
this constitution, but consistent with this article, to
confer additional authority and jurisdiction upon the
commission, ... "
In the exercise of its plenary power the
Legislature has provided that all charges by a public
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utility for commodities or services rendered shall be
just and reasonable (§ 451) and has given the
oommission the power and obligation to determine not
only that any rate or increase in a rate is just and
reasonable (§§ 454, 728), but also authority to
"supcvise and regulate every public utility in the State
and [to] do all things, whether specifically designated
in this pan or in addition thereto, which are necessary
and convenient in the exercise of such power and
jurisdiction."(§ 701.)
In regulating a public utility the commission
may determine the facilities, service, and method of
service in order to ensure that the service provided is
adequate (§ 761 ), and in aid thereof may order that the
utility extend or improve its physical facilities or
properties. (§ 762.)
Further, a public utility may not dispose of
any property necessary and useful in the perfonnance
of its duties without authorization by the commission.
(§ 851.) While this section is most often applied to
outright transfers of property, read together with the
above sections which authorize the commission to
require that a utility ensure its ability to provide
adequate service, it unquestionably permits the
commission to prevent disposal of such property by
indirection, as by failure to exercise or safeguard rights
possessed by the utility. (Civ.Code, § 811, subds. 3 &
4. See also, Crum v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp. (1934)
220 Cal. 295, 309-310, 30 P.2d 30.)
Therefore, construction of the November 26,
1951 , deed in reference to the transfer of the
appurtenant Otenoweth parcel in order to determine
CMWSfs rights to sources ofwater on the Chenoweth
parcel was a necessary incident to the commission's
consideration of CMWSI's application for an increase
in its charges. The commission was obligated to
detennine if the claimed expense for leasing wells on
the OtenoWdh parcel was justified, and to ensure that
CMWSI did not abandon or otherwise dispose of
property in Ute form of easement rights necessary and
useful to meet the present and future needs of its
customers.
Similarly, the action taken by the commission
in an attempt to ensure that a plirchaser of the
Otenoweth parcel would not be entitled to assert the
conclusive presumption of the second paragraph of
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section 851 is a reasonable exercise of its power and
obligation to ensure that the propeny of CMWSI is not
transferred without its authorization. Since the
casement right'\ of CMWSI over the Chenoweth parcel
are not described in the November 29, 1951, deed and
thus may not be subject to the constructive notice
provision of Civil Code section 1213, the commission
could rea.'\Onably conclude that an attempt to give
actual notice that CMWSI may have such rights is
necessary.
IV

SUffiCIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Petitioner claims that there are neither facts
nor law to suppon the commission's conclusion that
CMWSI holds an easement over the Olenoweth parcel.
1bal claim is largely based on evidence other than that
on which the commission relied in reaching its
decision;' however, and fails to acknowledge the
limited scope of review permitted this court in
commission matters.
A. Scope ofReview.
Section 17 57 limits our consideration of
CMWSfs claim that the decision lacks factual suppon.
The question is not whether the evidence is sufficient
under traditional criteria for appellate review because
section 1757 provides: "No new or additional
evidence may be introduced in the Supreme Court, but
the cause shall be heard on the record of the
commission as certified to by it. The review shall not
be extended funher than to determine whether the
commission has regularly pursued its authority,
including a determination of whether the order or
decision under review . violates any right of the
petitioner under the Constitution of the United States
or of this State.
"The findings and conclusions of the
commission on questions of fact shall be final and
shall not be subject to review except as provided in
this article. Such questions of fact shall ioolude
ultimate facts and the fmdings and conclusions of the
commission on reasonableness and discrimination."
This legislative limitation is expressly
authorized by section 5 of article XII of the California
Constitution, which vests the Legislature with "plenary
power, unlimited by the other provisions of this
constitution, but consistent with this article, to ...

establish the manner and scope of review of
CODUJlission action in a coun of record...."
As a result our review of commission
decisions "is generally limited to a determination
whether the commission has regularly pursued its
authority." (Toward Utility Rate Normalization v.
Public Utilities Com. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 870, 880,245
Cal.Rptr. 8, 750 P.2d 787.) A decision that affects the
rights of a pany, but has no factual support, would not
be one made in the regular pursuit of commission
authority and couJd deny due process. If there is
evidence to suppon the commission's fiOOings,
however, the findings are final and unreviewable
unless the evidence is undisputed and subject to only
one reasonable inference.
"[T]he provision of section 1757, that the
findings and conclusions of the commission oo
questions of fact shall be final, refers to findings and
conclusions 'arrived at from the consideration of
conflicting evidence and undisputed evidence from
which conflicting inferences may reasonably be drawn.
Findings and conclusions drawn from undisputed
evidence and from which conflicting inferences may
not reasonably be drawn, present questions of law.'
[Citations].
Therefore, if there is evidence to suppon the
commission's factual findings and conclusions, and
those findings and conclusions are the basis for the
commission's order or decision, further review by this
court is foreclosed. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Public
Utilities Com. (1953) 41 Ca1.2d 354, 362, 260 P.2d
70.) We may not substitute our judgment as to the
weight to be accorded the evidence or the factual
findings of the oommissioo. (Goldin v. Public Utilities
Commissioo (1979) 23 Ca1.3d 638, 153 Cai.Rptr. 802,
592 P.2d 289.)
Wbile section 1760 gives the court the power
to exercise its indcpc:ndcnt judgment on the law and the
facts if an order or decision of the commission is
challenged on grounds that it violates the federal
constitutional rights of the petitioner, no claim to
which section 1760 applies is properly before us.

v
CommissioodecisiooNo.89-10.033isaffirmed.
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1

Those claims, which attempt to assert the rights of other parties, assume that the commission
decision has res judicata effect and may be binding in future ratemaking or judicial proceedings.
Pursuant to section 1709, the commission decision--that CMWSI is not presently entitled to a rate
increase--is binding as, "[i]n all collateral actions or proceedings, the orders and decisions of the
corrmission which have become final shall be conclusive." The Public Utilities Code does not give
the ruling any greater effect. This court has recognized that when the commission exercises its
judicial power, its orders or decisions have "the conclusive effect of res judicata as to the issues
involved where they are again brought into question in subsequent proceedings between the same
parties." (People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. (1954) 42 Cal.2d 621, 630,268 P.2d 723.) However,
the commission exercises its legislative power, not its judicial power, when it fixes rates. (People v.
Western Air Lines, Inc., supra. 42 Cal.2d 621, 630, 268 P.2d 723; Southern Pacific Co. v. Railroad
Com. (1924) 194 Cal. 734, 739, 231 P. 28.) Therefore, its detemlination of the property rights is
subject to relitigation in any court of law which is asked to determine these interests.
2

Section 851 provides, inter alia: "No public utility ... shall sell ... the whole or any part of
its ... plant, system, or other property necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public
... without first having secured from the commission an order authorizing it so to do.... "Nothing in
this section shall prevent the sale ... or other disposition by any public utility of property which is not
necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public, and any disposition of property by
a public utility shall be conclusively presumed to be of property which is not useful or necessary in
the performance of its duties to the public, as to any purchaser ... dealing with such property in good
faith for value; ... "
3.The findings of the commission commence with the 1951 deed transferring the Meeker
properties to CMWSI and the Chenoweths. The evidence regarding events relevant to the
properties dates back only to 1932, although t_he record does reflect that Effie M. Meeker and
Julia E. Meeker, her sister, constructed the water system now known as the Camp Meeker Water
System, Inc., around 1910 to serve a sununer camping and residential community in Sonoma
County. Real party in interest, Camp Meeker Recreation and Park District, is both a user of
water supplied by CMWSI, and, as a county service district elected by the residents of Camp
Meeker, represents their interests in these proceedings.
4.Petitioner's argument is based in part on the reasoning of the AU and evidence he considered.
Evidence in any commission hearing is taken by an AU(§ 311, subd. (c)), but the commission
need not accept any finding made by the AU, and "may, in issuing its decision, adopt, modify, or
set aside the proposed decision or any part of the decision." (§ 311, subd. (d).)

